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Abstract 
Popular support for the British National Party (BNP) in England reached 
unprecedented high levels during the early twentieth century. The BNP won a number 
of local council and European Parliament seats on the back of this popularity. This 
study seeks to provide a case study of one such poll success: Nuneaton 2008. 
Evidence from Nuneaton, a BNP success not previously studied, will be used to test 
the literature already generated addressing other locations of ‘breakthrough’, 
including Burnley and Stoke (Burnett 2011; Rhodes 2009). The thesis seeks to 
explain why the BNP was able to win elections where there had previously been no 
appetite for far right politics. 
The research focuses on the role of demand and supply-side factors 
contributing to the electoral success of the BNP in 2008, showing that any analysis of 
the far right has to be multivariate in nature. The demand-side variables identified and 
analysed are: socioeconomics, immigration and Islamophobia. The supply-side factors 
assessed are political opportunity structures, the BNP campaign strategy and the role 
of the media. A mixed-method approach was undertaken which included interviews 
with voters and politicians, focus groups, a questionnaire capturing the views 308 
constituents, and archival research of socioeconomic data and newspaper reports. 
The findings of this research indicate that the BNP’s electoral breakthrough in 
Nuneaton was multivariable in nature, and it is reasonable to argue that particular 
variables were more significant than others. Immigration stands out as the most 
prominent variable. In addition, the role of the media, the press in particular, was of 
great significance in explaining breakthrough in Nuneaton through the sanitising and 
legitimising of negative stereotypes of immigrants, asylum seekers and Muslims. This 
case study also suggests that Islamophobia should be regarded as a key factor. Indeed, 
Islamophobia was an important part of the jigsaw and conflates with a number of 
variables tested in this thesis.  
In sum, this research broadly corroborates the existing literature. It does 
however suggest that socioeconomics has been overplayed to a degree in previous 
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Introduction  
The 2008 Nuneaton and Bedworth borough elections witnessed an electoral 
breakthrough for the British National Party (BNP). Martyn Findley and Darren John 
Haywood were respectively returned as local councillors for the Barpool ward and 
Camp Hill ward. The BNP had won elections for the first time in a borough 
traditionally dominated by the Labour Party, where the far right historically had no or 
very little presence previously (see Table 1).  
Table 1: Local council elections Nuneaton and Bedworth  
Year No. of Wards BNP Candidates Elected BNP Councillors 
2002 17 0 0 
2004 17 0 0 
2006 17 0 0 
2008 17 12 2 
 Source: Democratic Support Services, Nuneaton and Bedworth Borough Council (2010) 
 
Analysis of the 2008 local elections shows that, as well as success in Camp Hill and 
Barpool wards, the BNP received over 20 per cent in three more wards, (Galley 
Common, Kingswood and Wem Brook), and an overall share of the vote of 25 per 
cent across the town (Table 2). 
Table 2: BNP local Election support in Nuneaton 2008-2012 
  
Ward 
2008 Local election  
Total no. of votes 
2008 Local election  
% of the vote 
2012 Local election 
Total no. of votes 
2012 Local election  
% of the vote 
Abbey 391 17.60% 96 6.10% 
Arbury 347 18.10% Did not stand 0% 
Attleborough 322 16.70% 116 8.30% 
Barpool 653 34.20% 402*  27.70% 
Camp Hill 675 36.10% 100 8.40% 
Galley Common 417 21.40% Did not stand 0% 
Kingswood 462 25.20% Did not stand 0% 
Wem Brook 519 24.90% Did not stand 0% 
  
*Vote split between BNP 121 votes and former BNP councillor Martyn Findley Independent 281 votes  
Source: Nuneaton and Bedworth Borough Council (2008/2012) 
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Moreover, the BNP drew support from across the political spectrum in Nuneaton. 
This 2008 success came on the back of a number of electoral victories for the BNP 
across England between 2001 and 2008. By 2008, the party boasted over fifty local 
councillors nationwide, and two seats won in European Parliament elections.
1
 
Multiple wards were held in Burnley, Stoke and Barking and Dagenham. The early 
twenty-first century had thus brought an electoral breakthrough for the BNP: 
something that had previously eluded the British far right throughout its history. 
Understanding the factors behind the success of the BNP in Nuneaton in 2008 
is what this study seeks to determine. In order to do this a case study was conducted. 
Part of the analysis included a comparison with locations such as Burnley and Stoke. 
The aim was to test the main factors highlighted in the literature which have analysed 
far right success in order to show just how representative Nuneaton is in comparison 
with other geographical areas. Nuneaton was chosen because, as will be demonstrated 
in the following chapters, although it has many similarities with other locations where 
the BNP were successful it also offers many important differences which will add to 
the debate as to what are the necessary factors for far right success. For example, in 
the wards where the BNP were successful in Nuneaton these are amongst the most 
deprived in the country and in comparison they do not contain a large minority ethnic 
population. However, it does compare with other studies in that the BNP achieved 
electoral success in a location which had been a Labour Party heartland, and the far 
right had not been relevant in these locations prior to their successes in the first 
decade of the twenty-first Century. 
Historically far right parties have existed in Britain. The first prominent far 
right political figure in Britain was Sir Oswald Moseley, who led the British Union of 
                                                          
1 The BNP vote increased from 808,200 votes in the 2004 European Election to 943,598 in 2009. The BNP leader Nick Griffin 
won 8% of the vote in the North West and Andrew Brons won 9.8 % in Yorkshire and the Humber. 
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Fascists (BUF) during the 1930s. Moseley was formally a Conservative member of 
parliament who ‘crossed the floor’ and joined the Labour Party. However, he turned 
to fascism because of what he perceived as the British parliamentary system’s failure 
to radically respond to the growth in unemployment, and the continued economic and 
political decline of Britain during the depression of the 1930s (Thurlow 1998: 61-62). 
The BUF was the first widely supported far right organisation in Britain which 
actively sought to influence policy. The early 1930s witnessed the growth of the BUF 
as an organisation, and it is estimated that the BUF membership peaked at around 
50,000 in July 1934, although in the latter years of the 1930s the BUF membership 
would never reach the high point of 1934 (Thurlow 1998: 91). Throughout this period 
the BUF failed to achieve any electoral breakthrough at either a local or national 
level.  
As with other far right parties on the continent in the 1930s, the BUF became 
more radical, more violent and overtly anti-Semitic and this led its support to decline 
further. For example, the BUF employed the tactic of political violence, mainly 
against left-wing opponents, which famously culminated in the ‘Battle of Cable 
Street’ on 4 October 1936, and the Public Order Act being passed at the end of 1936 
(Reading 2006). However, it was the outbreak of World War II, and the subsequent 
introduction of Defence Regulation DR18b which finally spelled the end of the BUF. 
Under DR 18b Moseley and other prominent BUF members were interned for much 
of the war, and this according to Thurlow, “destroyed British fascism” (Thurlow 
1998: 158). Fascism in the form furthered by Moseley’s BUF would not recover after 
the War. 
With Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy defeated, the immediate post-war years 
proved barren for the British far right. The most prominent immediate post-War 
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figure was still Oswald Moseley. Moseley set up a new movement, known as the 
Union Movement (UM) from which he hoped to rebuild his pre-War support. 
However, by this time he had lost most of his “legendary messianic zeal” (Copsey 
2008: 5). More importantly, the British public who had lived through the terrors of 
war with Nazi Germany, and were tainted by the horrors of the holocaust and the 
subsequent Nuremburg Trials, had no stomach for any far right or extremist party. 
Therefore, what developed in the immediate aftermath of the war was a variety of 
groups, with followers which numbered in the hundreds, such as, the White Defence 
League (WDL) led by Arnold Lesse who was a pro-Nazi, and the League of Empire 
Loyalists (LEL) led by Arthur K. Chesterton (a cousin of the author G.K. Chesterton) 
who later became leader of the National Front (NF) (Sykes 2005; Thurlow 1998).  
These groups all had very different ideologies and political aims. For example, 
the WDL were openly neo-Nazi whereas the LEL and UM attempted to move away 
from any fascist or neo-Nazi labels. The LEL and UM attempted to do this by 
presenting themselves as patriots, defending British Imperial rights and fighting 
against ‘coloured’ immigration. During the 1950s and 1960s various other groups 
appeared such as, the Greater Britain Movement (GBM), National Socialist 
Movement (NSM) and an early incarnation of the British National Party (BNP). It 
was within these fringe movements that some of the leading far right members would 
serve their apprenticeships, most notably John Tyndall who would later become 
leader of the National Front (NF) and the BNP. Although, it is worth noting that 
during the 1950s and most of the 1960s the far right remained on the fringes, 
fragmented and irrelevant as political entities, and most pertinent to this study is that 
none of its groups registered any significant influence on British electoral politics 
(Copsey 2008: 6-21). 
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 It was not until the late 1960s and the 1970s that the far right would have any 
significant impact on the mainstream political arena. In the 1960s immigration 
became a mainstream political issue, a period during which it was argued that 
institutional racism played a major part in the politicisation of immigration (Solomos 
2003; Thurlow 1998; Taylor 1982; Edgar 1977). It was in this climate of increasing 
racial tensions and of politicians openly questioning immigration that the Race 
Relations Act (1965 and 1968) and the Commonwealth Immigrants Act (1962 and 
1968) came into effect. Moreover, on 20 April 1968, the influential Conservative 
politician Enoch Powell made his infamous ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech, which further 
politicised immigration (Solomos 2003: 48-75; Birmingham Post 1968). In his speech 
he warned of the dangers of immigration and according to Solomos, “helped to 
popularise the message that even tighter controls on immigration would not be enough 
to resolve the ‘race problem’” (2003: 61). At the time this statement resonated with 
public feeling towards immigration, which is evident in the widespread backing 
received by Powell. In fact, Powell received over 100,000 letters of support and 
thousands of dock workers in London downed tools and marched in support of him 
(Birmingham Post 1968). Even though the speech led to the removal of Powell from 
the Conservative front bench, his popularity and support grew (Birmingham Post 
1968). In fact Solomos argues that in the climate created in the wake of Powell’s 
interventions, calls for a halt to immigration and to deal with the problems associated 
with it grew louder in both the media and within parliament (2003: 62). More 
importantly, Powell inadvertently helped the cause of the British far right, and in the 
hostile anti-immigration environment of the late 1960s several far right organisations 
realised that if they could unite as one organisation they could appeal to voters who 
had become disillusioned with the Tory party and those who supported Powell.  
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On 7 February 1967 the NF was officially formed with A.K. Chesterton as its 
leader. The NF acted as an umbrella organisation bringing together various far right 
groups such as the LEL, BNP and GBM. The future leader of the BNP, John Tyndall, 
rose to prominence within the NF and presided over the party’s most successful 
period. During the 1970s the NF would achieve relative electoral success, evident in 
the increase in their vote from 11,449 in the 1970 General Election to 191,719 in 1979 
(see Table 3). However, the NF remained an insignificant force and was unable to 
gain any significant representation at both local and national levels.  
Table 3: NF General Election Results 1970 to 1983    
General Election Year     Candidates Votes % of Nat Vote  Lost Deposits 
1970 10 11,449 0.01% 10 
1974(F) 54 76,865 0.20% 54 
1974(O) 90 113,843 0.40% 90 
1979 303 191,719 0.60% 303 
1983 60 27,065 0.10% 60 
    




As with all previous far right attempts to come together under the same banner 
the party’s continuing ideological differences and leadership disputes meant that the 
NF was always one step away from fragmenting. There had been several leadership 
disputes and ruptures during the 1970s, but the decisive moment developed after the 
dramatic failure during the 1979 general election. Although the party had increased 
their national vote, they anticipated this would be their breakthrough year and had put 
forward 303 candidates. This did not materialise, and the NF got less than one per 
cent of the national vote and all candidates lost their deposits, which in-turn nearly 
broke the party financially and left it in terminal decline (Thurlow 1998: 261). 
Moreover, former members and leaders of the party began to openly attack the NF 
under Tyndall’s leadership. More importantly, with the election success of Margaret 
Thatcher and the rejuvenated Conservative Party in January 1979 which promised a 
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major clampdown on immigration, issue ownership of immigration could no longer be 
claimed by the likes of the NF. As a result of the election failure, a loss of support to 
the Conservative Party and continuing infighting within the NF the organisation 
began to splinter. Indeed, by the end of 1980 the NF split in two with Tyndall forming 
the New National Front (NNF). This split had a detrimental effect on the membership 
of the NF, although the membership figures reveal that the party had been in decline 
since its peak in 1972 (Table 4). 
Table 4: National Front Membership 1968-1980  







Source: Searchlight Magazine (1999) 
 
 
Therefore, by 1980 the far right in Britain was represented by organisations on the 
political fringe, similar to its pre-1968 position. It was out of the fragmented NF that 
the BNP arose. By 1982 former leader John Tyndall had completely disassociated 
himself with the NF, and on the 7 April 1982 at a press conference he formally 
announced the creation of the BNP. The BNP incorporated the NNF and various far 
right groupings such as the British Democratic Party, the Nationalist Party and many 
defectors from the NF. However, the relative success that the NF experienced during 
the 1970s would not continue in the 1980s and 1990s. Copsey notes, this should not 
be seen as a period when the far right merely limped on with little or no purpose, in 
fact it marked a battle between the BNP and NF for “the soul of British nationalism” 
(2008: 29). By the 1990s the BNP had become the largest far right party and the NF 
was effectively reduced to a minor fringe organisation. Nevertheless, during the 1980s 
the BNP did not fare any better. For example, their membership fell to around a 
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thousand, the party only sporadically contested elections, and under Tyndall’s 
leadership the BNP remained true to its core beliefs, and continued to use the methods 
which had been applied in the 1970s.  
 
 
The BNP under Tyndall continued with the programme and policies which mirrored 
the NF, meaning that the party failed to establish any real electoral presence or gain 
any legitimacy. Indeed, in the general elections of 1987 and 1992 the party only put 
forward 2 and 13 candidates respectively (Table 5). Moreover, at a local level the 
BNP also failed to have any real impact. However, there was one notable exception  
 
The BNP under Tyndall continued with the programme and policies which 
mirrored the NF, meaning that the party failed to establish any real electoral presence 
or gain any legitimacy. In the general elections of 1987 and 1992 the party only put 
forward 2 and 13 candidates respectively (Table 5). Moreover, at a local level the 
BNP also failed to have any real impact. However, there was one notable exception 
when the BNP won a local council seat in the borough of Tower Hamlets Millwall 
ward in 1993 after a by-election. This breakthrough occurred when Derek Beackon 
stood in the Isle of Dogs on a platform of ‘Rights for Whites’ and succeeded in 
becoming the first elected BNP councillor. Beackon was subsequently defeated in the 
local elections in May 1994, and there would be no other electoral success for the far 
right throughout the 1990s (Copsey 2008: 56-61).  
Up to 1999, the BNP’s failure to modernise and build on the success in 
Millwall led to discontent in the party, and after years of electoral failure under 
Tyndall’s leadership the BNP’s first ever leadership contest was announced. The 
outcome of the election in 1999 saw Nick Griffin, a prominent member within the far 




Candidates Number of MP's 
Percentage of 
Vote Total No. Votes 
     
1983 53 0 0 14,621 
1987 2 0 0 553 
1992 13 0 0.1 7,631 
1997 56 0 0.1 35,832 
2001 33 0 0.2 47,129 
2005 119 0 0.7 192,746 
      2010               338                              0              1.9           564,331 
    
        Source: House of Commons Library (2010) 
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right for over twenty years, become leader of the BNP. Griffin immediately set about 
reforming the BNP and setting it on a programme of modernisation (Copsey 2008: 
100-123). Under Griffin the BNP steadily increased support at both local and national 
elections, which was evident in their increased general election support (see Table 5) 
and the election of over fifty BNP councillors between 2001 and 2010.  
Prior to the leadership of the BNP by Nick Griffin, no far right party in Britain 
had ever achieved any significant electoral success. For instance, studies conducted 
prior to 2001 analysed the British far right in terms of their failure (see Eatwell 2000: 
Griffin 1996). However, since 2001 there was a dramatic increase in electoral support 
for the BNP. The BNP attracted over half a million voters at the 2010 general election 
(See table 5), which followed their most significant breakthrough at the European 




These results in the European elections were unprecedented in the history of the 
British far right. In 2009 the BNP had attracted just fewer than one million votes in 
the European election, and had two members elected to the European Parliament. 
 
This confirmed their growth and illustrated their ability to achieve success in a 
national election. The aim of this study is to address the British far right’s change of 
fortunes in the early twenty-first century. Indeed, the breakthrough in Nuneaton in 




Table 6: European Elections since 1999 
Year Total Number of Votes Number of MEP'S Percentage of the Vote 
1999 102,647 0 1.1% 
2004 808,200 0 4.9% 
2009 943,598 2 6.2% 
   
     Source: United Against Fascism (2009) and Hope Not Hate (2009) 
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Objectives 
This thesis explores the factors that created this unexpected success between 2001 and 
2010. Why, after some six decades of trying, did the British far right gain electoral 
success in the early twenty-first century? What had changed? How can the BNP’s 
change of fortune be explained? Building upon the current academic literature 
addressing this 2001-2010 electoral successes, a case study has been conducted, 
centred on the 2008 Nuneaton and Bedworth borough elections. Data collected from 
this location is used to test this breakthrough literature, which is the body of 
scholarship which has examined the success of the far right. Are the published 
findings, often taken from more generic and national studies, borne out by the 
Nuneaton evidence? Do the pertinent political variables identified elsewhere as the 
main drivers of the BNP’s electoral success stand up to the scrutiny provided by this 
Nuneaton case study? This thesis will explore the conditions that created this 
unexpected breakthrough.  
In this respect, this thesis claims an original contribution to knowledge 
through its presentation of new data addressing the 2008 Nuneaton and Bedworth 
Borough elections. It furthers the explanation of the BNP’s 2008 Nuneaton 
breakthrough by providing a local case study in a location of BNP success not 
previously examined. In this respect, this thesis seeks to add to the Rhodes (2009) and 
John et al. (2006), studies which themselves have begun to test the more generic 
national literature that has dominated the explanation of the BNP’s breakthrough 
previously. In short, this thesis tests the existing literature with local data gathered 
from the field. Does the Nuneaton case contradict or confirm what has been written 
on this subject to date? 
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Chapter overview 
The thesis is divided into nine chapters. The first chapter of this thesis will offer an 
analysis of the scholarship, looking at the breakthrough of the far right from 
comparative, national and local perspectives. It will highlight the broader debate in 
the literature concerning the far right’s breakthrough through the analysis of historical 
accounts, national studies, comparative studies, local studies, and an analysis of the 
main demand and supply side theories as highlighted in the literature. It details the 
most important demand and supply-side variables and the main arguments put 
forward to understand the success of the far right. This review of the literature serves 
to identify the key variables of breakthrough, which are then utilised as the tools of 
analysis in the substantive chapters of the thesis. 
The primary objective of this thesis is to examine why the BNP was successful 
in Nuneaton in 2008, testing the existing literature on this issue. Before the in depth 
analysis begins in the main chapters, this thesis highlights in chapter two why 
Nuneaton was chosen as a case study. It will demonstrate how the data was collected, 
analysed, and why this methodology was chosen. The chapter will set out the 
methodology which was used to test the hypotheses that the far right breakthrough in 
Barpool and Camp Hill wards identifies with the explanations in the literature.  
Chapter three tests the first of six explanations of breakthrough prominent in 
the literature. The first variable relates to socioeconomic factors. This chapter sets out 
the socioeconomic factors in Nuneaton, using the census data, local social and 
economic data, and offers an understanding of the demographics of the case study 
population, as well as those who voted for the BNP. It offers a detailed examination 
of both the social and economic background of the electorate in the two wards where 
the BNP gained electoral success in 2008, including unemployment and levels of 
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deprivation. Contradicting the mainstream literature of socioeconomics, the findings 
of this chapter highlight that electoral success came in Nuneaton’s two poorest wards. 
Elsewhere it suggested that BNP voters were in more affluent wards. The chapter 
does, however, support prevailing explanations of breakthrough in terms of other 
aspects of social profiling. BNP voters in Nuneaton tend to match others identified 
elsewhere in terms of social class, occupation and educational levels (Goodwin 2011; 
Rhodes 2009; John et al. 2006). It will also show that the data does to a large extent 
corroborate the view that BNP voters do represent a particular social profile, typically 
white and male. Finally this chapter will offer analysis of the social class of voters, 
looking specifically at occupation, housing status and educational attainment.  
Chapter four is one of the most important chapters in this study. It focuses on 
the immigration issue and how this became politicised in the years leading upto the 
BNP’s success in 2008. Particular focus is given to the ethnic demographics in 
Nuneaton, the growth of immigration as an electoral issue, the politicisation of race 
and the role of the BNP in acquiring issue ownership of immigration. It will 
demonstrate how immigration has become one of the most important issues affecting 
voter choices, and how voters have lost trust in the mainstream parties’ ability to deal 
with the ‘perceived’ immigration problem.   
Chapter five analyses Islamophobia and is also significant to the conclusions 
drawn from this analysis. It will look specifically at the location of the Islamic 
community in Nuneaton and the fear of Islam which developed in the 2000s. It will 
show how some voters have succumbed to anti-Muslim sentiment which was 
reflected in the questionnaire analysis. The chapter will make use of primary material 
produced through interviews and focus groups to demonstrate how the BNP message 
resonated with voters in Nuneaton. It will also highlight the BNP’s discourse, and 
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how the media and mainstream political hostility towards Islam, post 9/11 (al-Qaeda 
terrorist attacks in New York and Washington in September 2001) and 7/7 (the al-
Qaeda inspired attack on London in July 2005), fed into the BNP narrative. Indeed, 
this is one of the most important chapters which will highlight a clear link between 
rising Islamophobia and a rise in BNP support in Nuneaton. Finally, this chapter will 
demonstrate that any contemporary analysis of the BNP is not complete without 
analysing the effects of Islamophobia. 
Chapter six focuses on how the BNP joined the mainstream parties in the 
competition for votes. It will offer an analysis of several variables including, political 
opportunity structures, fragmentation, disaffection and the decline of local politics. 
The chapter will show that in the case of the BNP’s success in Nuneaton, the electoral 
system itself played little or no role in their breakthrough. Also important was the 
mainstream party convergence, and this chapter will demonstrate that this opened up a 
space for a protest vote for the BNP. It will also show that disaffection and 
disillusionment played a large part in creating apathy amongst some voters, and in 
some cases driving voters into the waiting arms of parties like the BNP.   
Chapter seven sets out how the modernisation of the BNP was important, at 
both a national and local level in garnering support during the local election of 2008. 
It will do this by looking at how the party’s modernisation widened its appeal, how 
the party focused on localised election campaigning, and how the BNP secured an 
element of political legitimacy which enabled them to fill a void as the mainstream 
parties crowded the centre ground. The examination of these factors will show how 
the BNP became normalised, and provided an alternative for some voters 
disillusioned with the mainstream political parties. 
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Chapter eight offers an analysis of the media and their role in legitimising the 
BNP in Nuneaton prior to 2008. Indeed, it will argue that the media was one of the 
most important platforms in setting a favourable environment which the BNP was 
able to exploit and achieve significant electoral gains. It examines both the local and 
the national tabloid press demonstrating how particular themes were reported. It will 
do this by offering a story and content analysis of the press in order to understand how 
important sections of the media were in constructing legitimacy for the BNP leading 
up-to 2008. It will focus on five main themes, highlighted through the analysis of the 
data produced in Nuneaton, which includes immigration, asylum, Islam, Muslims and 
terrorism. It will show how reports, in both the national and local newspapers, relating 
to these five themes, increased dramatically in the years leading upto the success for 
the BNP in 2008. Finally, it will show how the press used discourse which mirrored 
that of the BNP, and how it made particular issues more salient to the public. The lack 
of analysis on the role of the media in relation to the BNP demonstrates that there is a 
gap in the scholarship, which this chapter sought to address. 
The final chapter offers a summary of the key findings of this thesis. The 
research indicates that the BNP’s electoral breakthrough in Nuneaton was 
multivariable in nature, and it is reasonable to argue that particular variables were 
more significant than others. Immigration stands out as the most prominent factor. In 
addition, the role of the media, the press in particular, was of great significance in 
explaining breakthrough in Nuneaton through the sanitising and legitimising of 
negative stereotypes of immigrants, asylum seekers and Muslims. This case study also 
suggests that Islamophobia should be regarded as a key factor. Indeed, Islamophobia 
was an important part of the jigsaw and conflates with a number of variables tested in 
this thesis.  
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In sum, this research broadly corroborates the existing literature. It does 
however suggest that socioeconomics has been overplayed to a degree in previous 

















































Explanations on the breakthrough of the Far Right 
 
The Far Right Breakthrough – A Perfect Storm 
The last thirty years has witnessed the emergence of the far right in many European 
countries at a national, regional and local level. This rise has been unprecedented 
since the end of World War Two with far right parties experiencing a revival in 
France, Austria, Holland, Italy and Britain. The first post-1945 far right party to rise 
to prominence was Jean-Marie Le Pen’s French Front National (FN) during the 
1980s. This was followed in successive years by a wave of far right successes, most 
notably that which occurred in Austria with Jorg Haider’s Freedom Party forming a 
coalition government during 2000. Moreover, the National Alliance (AN) and Lega 
Nord (LN) in Italy, and Vlams Blok (VB) in Belgium, have also achieved relative 
success (Mudde 2007). More importantly to this research and as identified earlier, the 
BNP experienced an unprecedented rise during the 2000s with the election of over 
fifty local councillors across England, one seat in the London Assembly and two 
Members of the European Parliament (MEP) elected. Understanding the reasons for 
the recent breakthrough of the far right in this period continues to fuel debate. This 
chapter is about identifying explanations for this political success in the academic 
literature. What elements of this more broadly focused literature can be used as a 
starting point for the current investigation explaining the BNP’s success in Nuneaton 
in 2008? 
The literature on the far right’s breakthrough has been developed through a 
number of debates, looking at historical events in Germany and Italy, while more 
contemporary studies have focused on recent far right successes in France, Austria 
and Holland (Art 2011; Hainsworth 2008; Mudde 2007). As the literature review will 
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demonstrate, the early studies of the contemporary far right in Europe focused 
primarily on demand-side factors, whereas more recent studies have given more 
credence to supply-side factors, and have often combined both supply and demand-
side factors. Demand-side theory refers to the public demand for a far right party, 
specifically those factors centred on explanations for the changing preferences of 
voters, their beliefs and attitudes, focusing on the electorates socioeconomic 
development (Rydgren 2007: 241; Eatwell 2003: 48). Supply-side refers specifically 
to the messages which reach voters and involves the analysis of leadership, the parties 
and the media, and offers an explanation of how supply matches electoral demand 
(Rydgren 2007: 247; Norris 2005: 5; Eatwell 2003: 48). 
The structure of this chapter broadly follows the development of this broader 
debate over the far right’s breakthrough. The first section will identify the historical 
accounts which have focused on the successful breakthrough of the far right. The 
second section will then address the national studies and those which compare data 
between different countries. The chapter will then offer a detailed analysis of the main 
demand and supply side theories as highlighted in the literature. The final section will 
then look specifically at the localised breakthrough of the BNP, highlighting the 
literature which focuses on specific demand and supply side variables which will be 
applied in the case study of Nuneaton. 
 
Historical accounts 
Historical accounts relating to the success of the far right have been primarily focused 
on the rise of the Nazis, and who voted for them (Geary 1998; Brustein 1997; Noakes 
1980; Lipset 1960). One of the best known studies was completed by Lipset (1960) 
who in his analysis argued that the rise of the Nazis was primarily linked to the 
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socioeconomic crisis which had engulfed Germany in the 1920s and early 1930s. It 
was this crisis which increased the appeal of the Nazi Party to the lower middle class 
in Germany and enabled the Nazis to achieve power. Lipset in his analysis also 
highlighted many similarities between the rise of the Nazis and the French Poujadist 
movement led by Pierre Poujade in the 1950s. For example, Poujade was an unknown 
figure in French politics who led a protest against the changes in the French economy 
such as urbanisation and the rise of big business. Lipset also argued that like the 
Nazis, Poujade’s support came from small shopkeepers and rural communities, with 
strong anti-Semitic views and a pro-empire tendency. Many academics have also 
analysed the Poujadist movement and the roots of its populist appeal (Shields 2007; 
Davis 2002: Arnold 2000; Shields 2000; Eatwell 1998). In contrast, Eatwell (1998) 
unlike Lipset, argues that Poujadism like Nazism attracted a wide support which 
included working class as well as a lower-middle class electorate (for further 
examples see Brustein 1997: Noakes 1980). These studies of historical far right 
present an insight into who voted for the far right, pointing to the importance of 
variables such as their social background, education, and employment status. Most 
studies have adopted the multivariable approach, as, indeed, does the current study.     
Looking more specifically at the available literature on the history of the far 
right in the UK, these have historically focused on Oswald Moseley’s British Union 
of Fascists, and the rapid rise and of course the failure of the National Front (NF)  
(Rubin 2010; Sykes 2005; Thurlow 1998). Indeed, attempts to understand the relative 
success of the NF during the 1970s led to a growth in the literature. The research 
conducted provides some useful information on who voted for the far right and who 
became active members during this period (Husbands 1983; Harrop et el 1980; Billig 
1978). For example, studies have shown that those who supported the far right in 
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Britain were predominantly working class and the marginal self-employed, and that 
immigration was their greatest concern (Husbands 1983; Taylor 1982; Harrop et al. 
1980). Husbands (1983: 93) in his study also argued that the far right support 
historically in Britain was predominantly urban in nature, notably in cities where 
economic expansion came to a halt during the 1970s and in areas with declining 
industrial areas such as, London, Leicester, and Birmingham. The study also 
demonstrates that there was significant NF support in areas which had traditional, 
close-knit-working class communities, such as those which exist in East London, and 
Husbands argues that these locations are “areas with long standing traditions of ethnic 
intolerance” (1983: 93). This is with reference to the treatment of early immigrants 
such as the Irish community and the Jewish community in East London.  
Many of the studies completed on the British far right in the 1970s have 
demonstrated the significance of immigration in galvanising far right support (Copsey 
2008; Thurlow 1998; Husbands 1983; Taylor 1982; Fielding 1981; Billig 1978: Edgar 
1977). For example, Husbands found that immigration was central to the success of 
the NF in the 1970s, and in his research found that fifty per cent of respondents, who 
were NF sympathisers, blamed the deterioration of their neighbourhoods on 
immigrants and that an even larger number held negative and extremist views of black 
people (Husbands 1983: 116-122). This view was shared by Copsey who states that 
the period of growth experienced by the NF was triggered by anti-immigrant 
sentiment, most notably the new wave of “Afro-Asian arrivals” (2008: 19). Moreover, 
Thurlow argues that the NF made political capital out of the immigration issue in the 
1960s and 1970s with the highly publicised arrival of immigrants from Uganda (1972) 
and Kenya (1978), and the failure of the mainstream Labour and Conservative 
politicians to address the immigration issue, as well as racial populism espoused by 
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some of the mainstream politicians during this period (1998: 246). Furthermore, 
Edgar also argued that institutional racism and harsh state controls added to the 
feeling that immigration had become a problem, and the media and mainstream 
parties bolstered the NF cause with their response to the plight of the Ugandan Asians 
(1972) and the Kenyan Asians (1968) (1977: 120).  
Adding to the anti-immigrant sentiment was successive legislation, most 
notably the Commonwealth Immigrants Act (1962 and 1968), which was aimed at 
ending all new settlement from the commonwealth. However, this legislation did not 
have the perceived effect. Even though the mainstream parties were responsible for 
restrictive immigration legislation during the 1960s and 1970s they were viewed as 
unwilling and even incapable of dealing with the perceived ‘immigration problem’ 
(Thurlow 1998: 246). There is also the argument in the literature that Enoch Powell’s 
infamous ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech made on the 20 April 1968 further legitimised the 
NF. Indeed, the role of Powell in the rise of the NF was highlighted by Thurlow who 
argued that “there can be no doubt that the NF would not have survived if Enoch 
Powell had not unwittingly given it such a helping hand in its infancy” (1998: 249).  
Examination shows that it was not just Powell who lent a helping hand to the 
NF with the media and the mainstream political parties using language which further 
politicised the immigration issue, and entrenched institutional racism in Britain. For 
example, analysis of the literature on this period highlights many similarities with the 
political environment which developed post-2001, during which the BNP thrived. For 
example, as the chapters will show, the media and opposition politicians during the 
2000s argued that the Labour party had lost control over immigration. However, this 
alone cannot explain why the BNP were more successful than the NF, and although 
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the literature offers an understanding of the NF historically, British studies have 
tended to focus on the failure of the British far right.  
As well as understanding why support for the far right grew in the 1970s and 
highlighting the demographics of far right voters, there is a great deal of literature 
which focuses on the failure of the NF, with particular reference given to the role of 
groups opposed to the far right. For example, in Britain there is historically a strong 
anti-fascist movement, evident in the large anti-fascist groups such as the United 
Against Fascism (UAF), the Anti-Nazi League (ANL) and organisations such as 
Searchlight. It has been argued that anti-fascist movements played a major part in the 
failure of the British far right, in particular the demise of the NF during the 1970s 
(Thurlow 1998). However, this theory has recently been downplayed. For instance, in 
the case of the NF it is argued that as a party they were already in decline by the time 
the anti-fascist movements really took off. Indeed, Mudde argues that the theory that 
strong anti-fascist groups are important in halting the growth of the far right is weak 
and lacks any real empirical evidence (2007: 247). Instead, Mudde posits that there 
are many other plausible factors which should be considered before concluding a 
relationship between anti-fascist groups and the decline of the far right. For example, 
in some countries such as Holland and the Czech Republic, low levels of anti-fascist 
activity has a comparatively higher level of success than countries such as France and 
Hungary that have higher levels of anti-fascist activity (Mudde 2007: 246-247). 
Despite this, it will be shown below that the role of anti-fascist movements remain 
important in understanding the positive and indeed more importantly the negative 
effects of their campaigning, most notably on the demise of the BNP in the post-2010 
period.  
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As well as the role of groups opposed to the far right, many studies of the 
British far right have argued that historically there exists a culture which is not 
susceptible to extremes and that there is not a tradition of success for the British far 
right. This is one reason why the thesis that the far right success in Nuneaton can be 
attached to national tradition was not analysed as an independent variable in this 
study. The reason for the lack of national tradition in far right support in Britain stems 
from what many argue is the ‘civic culture’. It has been argued that the political 
culture and a tradition of strong liberal democratic institutions in Britain have 
hindered the far right, whereas on the continent it has been a galvanising factor 
(Startin 2014; Ignazi 2006; Eatwell 2000; Almond and Verba 1963). In the post-War 
period this culture has developed post-1945 with historical reference to World War II 
and Britain’s stance against the Nazis and the Italian fascists. In fact historians such as 
Thurlow (1998) argue that the NF success would have been hindered further by any 
open reference to Nazism and the success was not due to any Nazi or fascist agenda, 
rather the vote for the NF on the whole was a protest vote against immigration, 
cultural decline and the effects of urban renewal. Indeed, Thurlow concludes any links 
to fascism and Nazism would have hindered the case for the British far right and that 
British fascism effectively ended after World War two, stating that the relative 
success of the NF during the 1970s had little if anything to do with “any perceived or 
hidden fascist political programme” (1998: 261). However, it is worth noting that it 
has been argued elsewhere in the literature that all the indicators point to an influence 
of Nazi propaganda, and indeed neo-Nazi support and a leadership with neo-Nazi 
attachments (Copsey 2008; Sykes 2005; Taylor 1982; Fielding 1981; Billig 1978). 
For example, Copsey (2008) discusses former NF leader John Tyndall’s attachment to 
the National Socialist Movement (NSM), and Taylor (1982) concluded in his work 
John Grima  33 
 
that the NF was a party based on German Nazism. Taylor however, fails to provide 
evidence demonstrating that categorically the NF was conceived with the intention of 
enticing the British electorate to support a Nazi party and a Nazi ideology. 
Nonetheless, what these studies do offer is an insight into the culture thesis and how it 
can be applied in order to demonstrate the continued support for the far right. For 
example, the Italian Social Movement (MSI) and its successor the National Alliance 
(AN) made gains even though they are openly supporters of, and have links with 
Italy’s fascist past. In fact the historical legacy in Italy continues to drive support for 
the far right. However, as with all studies of culture it does not help to explain why in 
some countries which have a strong far right legacy, such as Germany and Spain, the 
far right have been unable to make any recent electoral gains, yet in Britain which has 
a long history without any real far right breakthrough, the BNP did experience 
breakthrough between 2001 and 2010. 
Therefore, although there is a history of far right parties and varying levels of 
support in Britain, as indicated in the introduction, there is not a national tradition 
similar to that witnessed in France or Italy. There has not been a consistent viable 
tradition questioning the fundamental values and institutions in Britain. For example, 
France has a far right tradition which dates back to the French Revolution. Since the 
revolution there has existed a reactionary tradition in France which challenged the 
values and institutions that were established.
2
 This has not been replicated in Britain. 
Indeed this is evident in the Dreyfuss Affair, Vichy and the rise of the Front National. 
It is also worth noting that there is no far right ideological or intellectual movement in 
Britain similar to the Nouvelle Droite (New Right) in France (Shields 2007; Wolfreys 
2003; Wolfreys 1993; Schain 1987; Vaughan 1987). In fact Vaughan argues that the 
Nouvelle Droite were central in preparing the ground for the FN “by clothing 
                                                          
2 For an explanation of the far right tradition in France refer to Shields (2007), Wolfreys (2003) and McClelland (1970). 
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widespread prejudices in unemotional language and endowing them with the prestige 
of scientific corroboration” (1987: 302). Moreover McClelland states that “French 
intellectual history is a fruitful locus of inquiry into the origins and nature of fascist 
thought” (1970: 14) which helps to explain the importance of tradition for the success 
of far right movements in France. Other factors why national tradition is not deemed 
important for this analysis is the lack of comparable success for far right parties on a 
scale witnessed in countries such as Italy and France, and the fact that in Britain these 
organisations are viewed as minor extreme fringe groups, even if the likes of the BUF 
achieved a membership of around 50,000 in the mid-1930s. Therefore, national 
tradition, or indeed the lack of national tradition in Britain, will not be the focus of 
this research and will not be tested as a variable when seeking to understand why the 
BNP were successful in Nuneaton.    
It is also evident that many studies of the British far right that have focused on 
their failure to have any electoral success prior to 2001 (Ignazi 2003; Eatwell 2000; 
Thurlow 1998). Most of these have surrounded the NF’s failure to secure any 
electoral gains during their high point in the 1970s. Many reasons have been 
highlighted for their failure, notably the role of anti-fascist movements, the lack of 
national tradition, the emergence of Margaret Thatcher and the resurgent 
Conservative Party, the NF’s failure to secure any worthwhile political legitimacy, 
and the NF’s failure to capitalise on their position and adapt to the political 
environment (Thurlow 1998; Eatwell 2000; Copsey 2008). Of course these are in 
complete contrast to the BNP under Nick Griffin’s leadership. Under Griffin the party 
were able to capitalise on their local successes, and they increased their legitimacy 
among a certain part of the electorate. This enabled the BNP to have a presence in 
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British politics at a local and at a national level in the 2000s. The ability of the BNP to 
adapt to the prevailing political environment is the central argument of chapter seven.  
 
Demand and Supply 
This next section turns its focus towards more contemporary studies of the far right. It 
will highlight the most important factors championed in the literature and offer a 
breakdown of the individual variables. First, it will outline the most important demand 
and supply-side factors and then highlight some of the major contentions surrounding 
the analysis of demand and supply-side factors.  
Many studies have offered an analysis of the major factors necessary for a far 
right breakthrough (Goodwin 2011; Hainsworth 2008; Mudde 2007; Eatwell 2003). 
As demonstrated in the previous section, historically qualitative studies have 
dominated research. However, it is evident from this research that academics are 
increasingly using qualitative and quantitative methods in order to understand the 
breakthrough of the far right. These studies have focused on the demand and supply 
side factors which it is argued have contributed to the far right at the breakthrough 
stage. The primary demand-side factors are the role of socioeconomic development, 
law and order, mass immigration and unemployment. The supply-side factors focused 
on are the role of the parties, their programmes, their leaders, political opportunity 
structures, and the role of the mainstream parties and the media in delivering 
messages to the electorate.  
A study combining these supply and demand-side factors is Roger Eatwell’s 
(2003) Ten Theories of the Extreme Right. Eatwell offers a critique of the five main 
supply-side factors and five main demand-side factors. The five supply-side factors 
are the single issue thesis, the protest thesis, the social breakdown thesis, the (reverse) 
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post materialist thesis, the economic interest thesis. The five main demand-side 
factors are political opportunity structures (POS), the mediatisation thesis, the national 
tradition thesis, the programmatic thesis and the charismatic leader thesis (2003: 48-
69). Eatwell’s analysis of the main factors was important in providing a list of factors 
that were tested using the data produced in Nuneaton. However, which factors, 
demand or supply, are more important in the success of the far right is not without 
contention. For example, although Mudde accepts that demand factors are central in 
creating the “perfect breeding ground” (2007: 201), and that socioeconomics are 
important, he suggests that it is the supply-side factors which offer the best 
understanding of the variables central for a far-right breakthrough.  
On the importance of supply-side Mudde states that, “Every European country 
has a fertile breeding ground for the populist radical right, yet only in some countries 
do these parties also flourish in elections. The answer to that puzzle is not to be found 
in the demand-side, but in the supply-side” (2007: 298). The importance of supply-
side factors was also developed in the theory by Herbert Kitschelt (1995). Kitschelt 
(1995) argued that the far right capitalised in countries where the mainstream parties 
converge and there is a failure to deal with the issues which the public perceive as 
important. It was these factors that according to Kitchelt opened up political space for 
the far right to move into and capitalise. Another study completed by Renton (2003) 
also focused primarily on the external supply-side factors. His analyses focused on the 
press, police and the role of the government in opening a space for the BNP during 
the 2003 local elections. A more recent study by Startin (2014) also highlighted the 
importance of supply-side variables. Startin (2014) focused on national tradition, 
political opportunity structures, charismatic leadership and the role of the media in his 
analysis of the far right in Britain and France.  
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The problem with many of these studies is not that they highlight the 
importance of supply-side factors, which they do, rather that they have demonstrated 
an over-reliance on supply-side factors. This approach in the literature is a narrow 
form of analysis, which is one of the major criticisms of the works. It also 
demonstrates the problem with selection bias because it distorts the results, and does 
not offer a true reflection of all the variables which should be tested in any analysis. It 
is also evident that many studies do not give credence to the important role of 
demand-side factors which are necessary in any far right breakthrough. The debate 
surrounding demand and supply-side factors continues to fuel academic argument on 
the emergence of the far right in a host country. This is where this analysis will aim to 
contribute to the debate and argue that it is a combination of factors, running in 
parallel, which can help explain the success of the far right.    
The issue of the literature failing to reflect the complex interaction of supply 
and demand-side variables was compounded by ‘single issue’ explanations prevalent 
in the 1980s and the 1990s. The single issue thesis focuses on one single factor. More 
than often the focus has been on the single factor of immigration, POS, law and order, 
unemployment or voter de-alignment (Pitcher 2006: Mudde 1999; Veugelers 1997; 
Schain 1987). Indeed, there is a plethora of literature analysing the breakthrough of 
the far right in France using the single-issue thesis, with most studies focused on the 
issue of immigration and how the FN has achieved ownership (Rydgren 2004; 
Veugelers 1997; Hargreaves 1995; Wihtol de Wenden 1994; Wihtol de Wenden 1991; 
Mitra 1988). For example, it is clear that the FN became the main benefactor when 
race and immigration became politicised (Davis 1999; Hargreaves 1995). Hargreaves 
identified how FN voters believe that immigrants are the cause of unemployment and 
that if immigration flows were halted it would be a “potential solution to practically 
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every difficulty facing the nation” (1995: 184-185). Although these studies are no 
doubt important in any analysis of the far right, it is worth noting that most scholars 
accept that the far right success cannot just be attached to one issue, but rather a 
combination of factors. Indeed, as Copsey states “the truth of the matter is that far 
right parties cannot be reduced to one single issue” (2008: 179). This does not mean 
that the single-issue thesis should be discounted as this research can and will offer 
detailed analysis of the important variables. However, this narrow form of analysis 
will not be used in the understanding of the far right in Nuneaton. Indeed, the method 
of developing and testing a combination of factors offers the best approach to 
understanding the electoral success of the far right. For this analysis careful 
consideration will be given to selecting which variables were analysed in detail for 
this research. Explanation for this will be offered in the next section.   
 
The Public demand 
This section highlights the main demand-side factors in the literature. It will focus 
first on the immigration variable. Second it will examine the literature which tested 
the role of socioeconomics. It will then analyse the literature which focused on the 
role of political disaffection and corruption, and finally it will assess how important 
fragmentation has been in the success of the far right. This will be important in 
demonstrating why these particular demand-side factors were analysed for this study.  
 
Immigration 
Immigration remains one of the foremost researched demand-side factors advanced in 
the literature and has been frequently analysed as the major factor in the recent 
success of the far right (Goodwin 2011; Art 2011; Rhodes 2009; Copsey 2008; 
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Mudde 2007; Givens 2005; Golder 2003). Indeed, Copsey argues that the immigration 
issue is “undoubtedly of central importance” (2008: 179). Therefore, the first factor 
that will be analysed is immigration.  
Over the last twenty years the far right have utilised the immigration issue. For 
example, there has been an ideological shift within the European far right which has 
sought to disassociate themselves with historical fascist and extreme right parties who 
espoused biological forms of racism. This is clearly demonstrated by the way far right 
parties now stress a form of cultural racism rather than the traditional form of 
biological racism (Copsey 2007 and 2008). This new racism is evident in the literature 
analysing immigration and the recent success of the far right, as is evident in much of 
the comparative literature on the far right (Mudde 2007; Givens 2005; Golder 2003). 
Golder (2003) analysed the effect of immigration and found that there was a 
conditional link between the number of immigrants and the success and failure of a 
far right party. The conditional link according to Golder was that the success of a far 
right party was only dependent on other factors, such as unemployment, when 
immigration was high, and it was on this basis that he argued that “immigration 
always helps populist parties” (Golder 2003: 460). Therefore, according to Golder 
(2003) it is immigration rather than the high unemployment which is the defining 
factor. Mudde (2007) in his research also analyses the link between immigration and 
the rise of the far right which will be significant for this research. However, his study 
which looked at the link between the number of asylum applications, the number of 
refugees and the success of the far right (See table 7, p.40), offers no significant 
relationship between the number of asylum seekers, refugees, and the success of the 
far right (Mudde 2007: 212-214). Rather, Mudde states that “while mass immigration 
certainly played a role in the electoral breakthrough of some parties, often as a 
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catalyst, it largely fails to explain the often huge temporal and regional differences in 
electoral support within single countries” (2007: 216).  
Furthermore, it is worth noting that Givens (2005) in her comparative study also 
found variations in far right support. For example, although there is a link in France 
and Austria between immigration and the far right success, in Germany there is no 
direct evidence to link the two. However, what these variations in the national 
breakthrough (or failure to breakthrough) of the far right highlight is the problems in 
the comparative analysis of Western Europe. For example, it cannot explain why in 
some countries with higher concentrations of immigration, and in areas with higher 
levels of minority ethnic groups, the far right have not been successful. What this 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be 
viewed at the Lanchester library, Coventry University. 
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comparative study demonstrates is that there are evident regional differences in far 
right support and many other factors must be analysed alongside immigration. This 
will be important in understanding why in some areas of Britain, with similar 
immigration patterns, the far right have been unsuccessful. 
As well as comparative studies which have highlighted the role of immigration 
there are also many national studies in the literature (Goodwin 2011; Copsey 2008; 
Shields 2007; Mclaren and Johnson 2004; Schain 1987). These have focused on the 
success of the far right and the positive effect immigration had on the far right vote in 
a host country. For example, Schain (1987) highlights the link between immigration 
and the rise of the FN in France, pointing to many electoral surveys which 
demonstrate its significance. Indeed, Schain states that in 1984, out of eleven per cent 
of those who voted for the FN, only twenty two per cent were concerned with law and 
order while forty eight per cent voted for the FN because of its immigration policy 
(1987: 237). Goodwin also offered an analysis of immigration and the vote for the far 
right. For example, Goodwin found that BNP voters are, “overwhelmingly concerned 
about immigration” and “almost nine out of every ten BNP voters rated immigration 
or asylum as the most important issues facing the country” (2011: 108). Goodwin also 
notes that the BNP was “rallying citizens who feel their positions or identities are 
under threat from immigration and rising ethno-cultural diversity” (2011: 119).  
A further study which analysed the impact of immigration on British society 
was conducted by Mclaren and Johnson (2004). They used data collected from British 
society surveys that were completed between 1995 and 2003. Their research for the 
British Social Attitudes 21
st
 Report found that there has been an increase in anti-
immigrant sentiment. In fact when they asked participants whether they thought the 
number of immigrants should be reduced in 1995 only two thirds of respondents 
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believed it should, yet this number had risen to three quarters of respondents by 2003 
(McLaren and Johnson 2004: 172). There was also an increase in the number of 
respondents who believed immigrants increased crime rates, rising from 25 per cent in 
1995 to 39 per cent in 2003 (McLaren and Johnson 2004: 173). They also stated that 
the reason for the rise in anti-immigrant sentiment was, “related to the overall increase 
in the numbers of immigrants, which appears to have stimulated a rise in media 
coverage of immigration, and perhaps more importantly produced an increase in 
government statements and proclamations on the subject, many of which were quite 
negative in tone and content” (Mclaren and Johnson 2004: 196).  
Understanding the rise in anti-immigrant sentiment will be very important for 
this research as will be highlighted in chapter four. However, it is worth noting that 
not all studies see a correlation between the amount of immigrants and the vote for the 
far right. For example, Mayer, in her analysis of who votes for the FN in Paris, found 
no correlation between the number of immigrants or the origins of immigrants, and 
the vote for the FN (cited in Givens 2005: 79). Nonetheless, what these studies do 
show is that the perception of immigration potentially remains one of the major 
themes running through any contemporary study of the far right. Further analysis of 
this variable in this thesis will be an important contribution in this field, and forms the 
basis of chapter four. 
 
Socioeconomics 
Another important demand-side factor which has been used in the historical and 
contemporary literature to account for the rise in support for far right is 
socioeconomics (Goodwin 2011; Rhodes 2009; Mudde 2007; Norris 2005; Eatwell 
2003; Betz 1994). One important theory is Eatwell’s (2003) economic and social 
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breakdown thesis which holds that the success of the far right locally is linked to 
growing social problems. These relate to a feeling of insecurity, inefficacy and 
economic problems, specifically the competition for local resources and the impact of 
economic change caused by globalisation. Undoubtedly, socioeconomic conditions 
remain an important factor in the rise of the far right. Indeed, Art in reference to the 
economic downturn notes that economic issues “undoubtedly give radical right parties 
an opening, but it will be up to them to seize it” (2011: 239). For example, the theory 
that high, or rising, levels of unemployment have been important in the success of the 
far right has been advanced in the literature (Azari 2004; Golder 2003; Jackman and 
Volpert 1996). Jackman and Volpert (1996) in their analysis of the conditions which 
have favoured the far right analysed all general elections between 1970 and 1990 in 
16 West European countries, and unemployment data provided by the Economic 
Commission for Europe. What Jackman and Volpert found was a positive correlation 
between unemployment and immigration, but argued that this did not mean that far 
right supporters are drawn from the unemployed, but rather this reflects the broad 
economic conditions which are favourable to the far right thus making them more 
appealing to the electorate (1996: 57). However, Azari (2004) offers a different 
approach, with a general analysis of the impact of unemployment and its important 
role in mobilising a protest vote. What is interesting is that in the four countries he 
used for his case studies he found no correlation between levels of unemployment and 
the success of the far right. Azari also found that a high level of unemployment has 
not been a galvanising issue, and unemployment does not correlate with a rise in 
support for the far right (Table 8). The debate over the ways and extent to which 
socioeconomic conditions contribute continues, which will be picked up in the 
Nuneaton context in chapter three. 
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  Source: Azari (2004: 21) 
It is also worth noting that Goodwin in his study examined who votes for the 
far right. This study provides an insight into the social and economic factors behind 
the rise in BNP support. For example, Goodwin states that the BNP “draws most of its 
support from members of the more insecure lower social classes” and that “it has been 
most successful in areas where there are large concentrations of employed skilled 
workers” (2011: 104-105). Further analysis of this finding will be offered in chapter 
three.  
The problem with the analysis of all variables tested in the literature is that 
there is always a relationship between the variables. Indeed, as the above research 
demonstrates, immigration and socioeconomic factors, like unemployment, remain a 
significant, if not universally accepted issue when linked to each other. In fact, it has 
been argued in the literature that the far right have benefited when the immigration 
issue is directly connected with socioeconomics, by creating a link in the public mind 
between immigration and increasing levels of unemployment (Golder 2003; Givens 
2005). For example, Golder (2003) in his analysis of the relationship between 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis 
can be viewed at the Lanchester library, Coventry University. 
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unemployment and large numbers of immigrants, found strong evidence to support 
this hypothesis. He argues that when unemployment rises and members of the 
majority population are exposed to social insecurity, immigrants are viewed as 
competitors for scarce resources. He states that this in turn increases “the voteshare of 
populist parties when there are large numbers of foreigners in the country” (Golder 
2003: 460). Golder’s interpretation is supported by Pierre Martin’s, who used 
electoral geography in order to demonstrate a link between the FN vote and 
immigration. In Martin’s analysis, where there is high unemployment and 
immigration there is clear evidence that the FN has been successful (cited in Givens 
2005: 79). Indeed, linking immigration to unemployment, therefore politicising the 
race issue, has been a major theme for the far right and was championed by Le Pen 
and the FN in the 1970s and 1980s, evident in their slogan, “A million unemployed is 
a million immigrants too many! France and the French First!” (Shields 2007: 185). 
Therefore, the literature does highlight significant socioeconomic factors, however, as 
explored, it is the link between immigration and particular socioeconomic factors 
which it is argued are significant in understanding why the far right were successful. 
 
Political corruption and disaffection 
Also prominent in the literature addressing the electoral breakthrough of the far right 
are ideas relating to corruption and the growth of a disaffected electorate. Indeed, 
these theories are evident in a large section of the scholarship on the far right (Ford 
and Goodwin 2014; Goodwin 2011; Copsey 2008; Shields 2007; John et al. 2006; 
Hainsworth 2000; Marcus 1995). For example, Goodwin in his analysis of the BNP 
states that BNP voters are “extremely dissatisfied with the government and main 
parties” (2011: 113). In his research he found that nine out of ten BNP voters were 
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dissatisfied with the mainstream parties (Goodwin 2011: 113-4). This view was also 
shared by Copsey who argues that the far right have capitalised by appealing to an 
electorate who feel “dissatisfied, disconnected and alienated from the political system 
and the established politicians” (2008: 184). Evidence of this will be provided in 
chapter six. 
The theory that the far right has capitalised due to a disaffected electorate has 
also been advanced in literature on the breakthrough of the FN (Marcus 1995; Shields 
2007; Hainsworth 2000; Arnold 2000). It is argued that Le Pen’s attacks on the 
established parties (the Rassemblement pour la République (RPR), the Union pour la 
Démocratie Française (UDF), the Parti Socialiste (PS) and the Parti Communiste 
Français (PCF)) who he famously referred to as the “Gang of Four” (Hainsworth 
2000: 9), appealed to a French electorate who had become dissatisfied with French 
politics. Hainsworth states that the FN played a populist outsider role, capitalising on 
the mainstream parties “inability to resolve key socioeconomic problems” (2000: 9). 
This was in reference to the economic crisis in France during the 1970s and 1980s 
which for many voters demonstrated a political reluctance to tackle these problems 
and represented a mainstream political failure. Indeed, this resonates with the 
sentiment which will be highlighted in chapter six, that elements of the British 
electorate believe the mainstream parties have failed. Therefore, the literature on 
disaffection will be an important area of analysis, and offer a significant comparison 
with the data produced in Nuneaton. 
 
Fragmentation  
In addition to testing the variables related to disillusionment and a disaffected 
electorate, the role of the fragmentation has also been highlighted in the literature. It 
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has been argued that the fragmentation of society has materialised in the collapse of 
traditional cleavages based on political, religious, economic and class lines (Copsey 
2008; Mudde 2007; Rydgren 2004; Eatwell 2003; Veugelers 1997). Eatwell (2003) in 
his study refers to this as ‘the social breakdown thesis’, relating to the collapse in 
traditional cleavages, which inevitably lead to an evident growth in insecurity and 
inefficacy. In response it is new actors, notably in this case the far right, who sought 
to step into the void. Indeed, Eatwell’s argument is based on the theory that new 
actors respond better than old ones to the new challenges, and that in recent years it is 
the far right who now “offer an answer to those demands and needs created by post-
industrialisation” (2003: 53-54). However, Eatwell (2003: 53) concludes that there is 
no evidence to suggest that the majority of the far right electorate are suffering due to 
the collapse of traditional social cleavages. The analysis of the weakening of the left-
right cleavage and voter de-alignment in France was also offered by Veugelers. In 
contrast to Eatwell (2003), Veugelers in his research argues that the current success of 
the French far right “testifies to a weakening of the left-right cleavage” (1997: 45). 
Veugelers offers some interesting conclusions, notably that the support for the far 
right from the weakening social cleavages is more evident in the persistence phase not 
the breakthrough phase (1997: 45). Consequently, these arguments will continue and 
the collapse of these traditional cleavages and voter de-alignment is viewed by some 
scholars as an important factor. Testing this in chapter six will help to understand 
voter dealignment in Nuneaton.  
So as demonstrated, analysis of the most important demand-side factors in the 
literature does show a correlation between these factors and the breakthrough of the 
far right, although not in all cases are the factors the same. Evidently, through the 
analysis of the literature on the demand-side, immigration, socioeconomics, 
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disaffection and fragmentation remain important factors within the literature and will 
be analysed in greater detail within this thesis.  
  
Supply-side factors 
In addition to the works which have analysed the role of demand-side factors there is 
a plethora of studies in the literature on the far right’s success which have focused on 
the role of supply-side factors (Startin 2014; Mudde 2007; Givens 2005; Eatwell 
2003; Renton 2003; Kitschelt 1995). This next section will therefore focus on the 
most significant supply-side factors highlighted by the literature which includes the 
role of the leader, the role of the party, the role of the media and finally the part 
political opportunity structures play in opening up political space for the far right. 
 
The role of the leader 
The first significant supply-side factor highlighted in the literature is the role of the 
leader. The role of the leader has often been seen as central to the success of any 
political party, be it the largest mainstream political party or those parties on the 
fringe attempting to enter the mainstream (Kane, Patapan and Hart 2009; Overy 2004; 
Bracher 1992). In response to the rise of the far right many theorists have analysed the 
role of leaders such as Hitler and Mussolini, and the part they played in the success of 
their movements which has often been ascribed to the role of the leaders. For 
example, there is research detailing the importance of Hitler’s ‘charismatic’ 
leadership in Nazi Germany and the leadership cult that surrounded him (Overy 2004; 
Bracher 1992; Kershaw 1987). Indeed, this has given much credence in the literature 
to the charismatic leader thesis (Startin 2014; Hainsworth 2008; Eatwell 2006; 
Eatwell 2003). This does not mean that the theory on charismatic leadership is not 
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fraught with problems. In fact, Eatwell questions what actually constitutes a 
charismatic leader, and whether charisma really played a major part in explaining 
support for the far right (2006: 66). Moreover, it has been argued that there is little 
evidence to support the idea that leaders are important for the success of far right 
parties (Van der Pas, de Vries and Van der Brug 2011: 470). 
The charismatic leader thesis maintains that the role of a media savvy leader, 
such as Jean-Marie Le Pen and Jörg Haider, is of central importance. Indeed, their 
ability to appeal directly to the electorate has been seen as important in the successful 
breakthrough of the far right. For example, Hainsworth argues that Le Pen and Haider 
“have been personally responsible for their party’s share of the poll” (2008: 106). The 
argument in the literature is that these leaders have helped increase their share of the 
vote and institutionalised their parties in their respective countries by exploiting their 
charismatic personalities, keeping control of their respective parties and taking 
opportunities for advancement in the political realm (Hainsworth 2008: 107). This 
theory has become more prevalent in the literature, with the decline in the party and 
the role of a strong, media friendly leader becoming more significant. Indeed, this was 
evident in British politics during the 2010 general election with Conservative leader 
David Cameron regarded as a media savvy strong leader, yet former Labour leader 
Prime Minister Gordon Brown was viewed as not media savvy (BBC 2010).  
It could be suggested that for the British far right between 1945 and 1999, 
there has been no leader capable of appealing to a wider electorate and preventing the 
far right from continually factionalising. Indeed, this is one of the main reasons it was 
argued the NF failed to move into the mainstream during the 1970s and the 1980s due 
to John Tyndall’s leadership, notably his links to new-Nazis (Copsey 2006; Thurlow 
1998). In fact Eatwell (1998) argued that the NF failed to gain real electoral success 
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and continually factionalised because of its failure to produce a charismatic leader 
who could inspire and appeal to a wider electorate.  
It is this which leads us to the second model of charismatic leader theory, that 
it is not just the role of the strong charismatic leader to appeal to the electorate 
directly; rather it should be argued that the title of ‘successful’ leader should also be 
applied to leaders who hold the party together and lead them to success at elections. 
For example, Mudde highlights this in the literature, stating that “political parties are 
not just electoral vehicles that contest elections... they are also organisations that 
recruit and socialise political personnel, design and run election campaigns, and 
ultimately (try to) influence public policy” (2007: 263). In fact the organisation of the 
party and its resources are central if it is going to be electorally successful. This was 
indicated by Ware who argues that “a party requires an organisation (or organisations) 
to utilise these resources in an effective way” (1996: 93). Therefore, although it is 
evident that the former leader of the BNP, Nick Griffin, is not an archetypal 
‘charismatic’ leader, he did lead an organisation which matched this criterion, as will 
be seen in chapter seven. Arguably, Griffin did not have the charismatic appeal of Le 
Pen or Haider, in that he is not media savvy and was often portrayed as a “brute in a 
suit” (Anon 2004b). However, Griffin does fit the mould of a ‘successful’ leader 
according to the second model because he did manage to hold a far right party 
together, and between 1999 and 2010 he modernised the BNP and transformed it into 
a party which appealed to sections of the British electorate. Griffin achieved this by 
ensuring stability and offering a programme which some voters evidently bought into 
(Ford and Goodwin 2010). This was a significant achievement for the British far right 
who historically have fragmented, and remained a minor fringe element with no 
significant electoral support. For example the party achieved more electorally than 
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both Moseley’s BUF and the NF. The fact that the party has now fragmented and has 
moved back to the fringes of British politics does in effect demonstrate Griffin’s early 
success as a leader, if not a charismatic one, in keeping the party united and presiding 
over the far right’s most successful period in British politics (Startin 2014). The 
modernisation of the BNP, and a period of stability under Griffin, will form the basis 
of chapter seven. 
 
The Party 
The role of BNP leader Nick Griffin was important for the growth of the party from 
2001 onwards. In the analysis of the British far right the growth of the party, which 
included a study of the BNP’s increased legitimacy and election success, it is evident 
that the success cannot all be attached to the party leader. Therefore it is the role of 
the party and how this has been analysed in the literature which shall be looked at 
next. Several recent studies have focused on the BNP and how the party has 
transformed, including its ability to attract new members and activists (Goodwin 
2011; Ford and Goodwin 2010; Rhodes 2009; Goodwin 2007; John et al. 2006). It is 
argued that the party strategy and the rise in political legitimacy were important 
factors in the breakthrough of the BNP. This is a point highlighted by Copsey who 
states that the role of political legitimacy is “a point often neglected” (2008: 186).  
From 1999 onwards there was greater emphasis on the party gaining political 
legitimacy, evident in the BNP’s modernisation programme. This transformation 
strategy mirrored the ideological and strategic formula used by the French FN, but 
they sought to create a uniquely British version of a ‘nationalist-populist’ party 
(Hainsworth 2008; Goodwin 2007; Copsey 2007). Hainsworth refers to this as the 
“ripple effect” (2008:31) whereby the FN provided a model for various far right 
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parties to use as a template. There is no argument that the BNP used this template to 
raise their profile in British politics. For example, they moderated their language, 
modernised their political agenda, and aimed to recruit more ‘respectable’ members as 
candidates for the party and ‘normalise’ the party’s strategy (Copsey 2007: 61). 
Pointing to historical attempts at legitimisation by organisations such as the NF, 
Thurlow argues this was partly due to the positive effect of the Race Relations Act 
(1968), which forced the NF to tone down their language and “move from extremism 
to a more rationally presented expression of similar sentiments” (1998: 247). It is also 
evident from the literature that the need to moderate language in order to appeal to 
mainstream electorate and increase the party’s legitimacy was realised by many in the 
BNP, and was no doubt important when Griffin became leader (Copsey 2008). 
Therefore, the importance of this supply-side factor and the way the party’s attempts 
at legitimacy under the leadership of Nick Griffin need to be analysed in the context 
of the BNP success in Nuneaton. 
 
The Media 
A further supply-side factor which has more recently been raised in the literature is 
the role of the media. This variable has historically in Britain received little attention 
in the literature excepting Husbands (1983) study of the NF in the 1970s. The media 
often only warrants a brief mention rather than an in depth analysis. However, more 
contemporary studies have analysed the role of the media in greater depth (Startin 
2014; Goodwin 2011b; Ellinas 2010; Wilks-Heeg 2008; John et al. 2006; Eatwell 
2003). Eatwell analysed the media variable in his chapter on the mediatisation thesis. 
This focused on how the media pander to the far right, and how the media play an 
important role, if not directly, by highlighting issues relating to immigration and 
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asylum “through their agenda-setting function” (Eatwell 2003: 61). Renton also 
offered an analysis of the media, looking at both the local and national press and how 
they “fuelled hysteria” surrounding immigration and created the impression of 
“constant racial tension” (2003: 79). This is with reference to the media coverage of 
asylum seekers in the tabloid and local press. This assessment was shared by Wilks-
Heeg who states that the BNP gained support, “as a direct result of the growing 
salience of issues associated with immigration since the late 1990s, particularly the 
growth of, frequently hysterical, tabloid reporting on issues concerning asylum 
seekers” (2008: 8). Wilks-Heeg also argues that, “media interest in the BNP prompted 
by its local electoral successes has enabled party representatives to air their views via 
the mainstream broadcasting media, providing the BNP with a voice previously 
denied to it in part by the ‘no platform’ policy of the National Union of Journalists” 
(Wilks-Heeg 2008: 8). Moreover, John et al. also conducted an analysis of the media 
and argued that the “media plainly exert a major influence on popular attitudes 
towards immigration and race” (2006: 22). They found a relationship between the 
BNP and immigration which demonstrated that when the issue of immigration peaked 
in the media, articles relating to BNP also peaked (John et al. 2006: 22). This finding 
strengthens the view that the media can add legitimacy to the BNP when the issue of 
immigration is discussed because the two, for some voters, become synonymous.  
It has been argued that the language used by the media on issues such as 
immigration and asylum have mirrored the issues and discourse espoused by the far 
right (Startin 2014; Grayson 2014; Ford and Goodwin 2014; Ellinas 2010; 
Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2007; Mudde 2007; Eatwell 2003; Renton 2003). For 
example, Mudde states that the mass media can encourage support for the far right at 
the breakthrough stage by influencing the salience of issues, positive reporting of the 
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far right actors, and using the same language which is espoused by the far right parties 
(2007: 248-250). Mudde also notes that negative media coverage has also benefited 
the far right, and although the mainstream media have often labelled the far right as a 
lunatic fringe they still “provide them with a favourable forum” (2007: 251), evidence 
of which will be provided in chapter eight.  
In addition to the mainstream media, the role of new technologies, such as the 
internet, has recently become a central factor for any political party that wants their 
message to reach the electorate. In fact, for the BNP, it has been one of their most 
important means of communication. This is clearly demonstrated in a study conducted 
in 2007 which showed that the BNP website had more than seven times as many 
visitors click on to their site than the Labour Party’s, and almost three times as many 
as for the Conservative Party (Hope 2007). Indeed, Hainsworth states that the internet 
has enabled the far right parties to reach out to young adults, who are more active on 
the internet, and those active via this medium using blogs, chat rooms and highly 
visible internet sites, which is “a significant part of the pattern of extreme right 
communication, outreach and recruitment” (2008: 108).  
Despite arguments about the role of the media this area of analysis is fraught 
with problems. Notably how do you measure the influence of the media and how 
many hits on the internet resulted in a vote for the BNP? The exact science may be 
hard to prove, but there is no doubt that media coverage, and not always positive 
media coverage, whether through television, newspapers or on the internet, has a 
significant impact and can be favourable to the far right. Certainly the banality of the 
language used by elements of the media, reporting on immigration and asylum, 
allowed the BNP ideas to thrive.  
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Political Opportunity? 
Finally, another variable which has been prevalent in much of the literature is the role 
of political opportunity structures (POS) in the initial breakthrough of the far right 
(Startin 2014; Hainsworth 2008; Mudde 2007; Eatwell 2003). This approach focuses 
on factors external to the far right party, notably the extent to which the mainstream 
parties inadvertently help the far right, and how open political institutions are to the 
far right in the host countries. In relation to the mainstream parties this has often 
focused on the way the mainstream parties have been willing to go into coalition with 
far right parties. For example, this was evident in the early breakthrough of the FN in 
Dreux, and with the Austrian FPÖ and Italy’s MSI both joining coalition governments 
(Mudde 2007).  
In addition to gaining legitimacy through coalition with mainstream parties, 
there is also the argument relating to how open political institutions are to the far 
right. The literature has focused on the role of majoritarian and proportional 
representation (PR) electoral systems in particular. Indeed, the first-past-the-post 
(FPTP) system used in British general elections has been viewed as a major factor 
hindering any chance of a far right mainstream breakthrough. It has been argued that, 
in general, the first-past-the-post parliamentary system penalises minor parties and 
favours larger centre parties, such as the Labour Party and Conservative Party (John 
and Margetts 2009; Mudde 2007; Norris 2005; Eatwell 2000; Copsey 1996; Griffin 
1996). There has also been a great deal in the literature relating to proportional 
systems and how these have benefited minor parties and the far right in particular. As 
Renton points out, elections run according to the rules of PR, for example the London 
and European elections, and the introduction of new boundary changes which affected 
local council elections in Britain all favour minor parties (2005: 25). Certainly, the 
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electoral success of BNP candidate Richard Barnbrook at the 2008 London Assembly 
Elections, and the two MEP’s elected in 2009 European elections, are testament to 
this. London Assembly member Barnbrook was elected using the additional member 
system, which combines FPTP with a proportional system, with just 6.42 per cent of 
the vote, just above the electoral threshold for the assembly which is 5 per cent 
(London Elects 2008). Furthermore, some local council elections have multi-member 
wards and these are being conducted on a three-representatives-per-seat basis which 
has also favoured the BNP in some locations, as in some elections the BNP was often 
the third party.  
Scholars have added weight to this theory, and suggest that in comparison the 
system of PR has been vital for the recent breakthrough of the far right across 
Western Europe (Shields 2007; Marcus 1995). The FN’s success, for example, during 
the 1986 French legislative elections has been linked to President Mitterrand’s 
Socialist government’s decision to alter the system to PR in order to split the 
mainstream right. As a consequence of this change the FN had 35 members elected to 
the French Assembly in 1986. Although the Socialists reverted back to the old system 
for future elections it is argued that Mitterrand by changing the system allowed the far 
right to gain a foothold and further legitimised the FN (Shields 2007; Marcus 1995; 
Vaughn 1995).  
Givens (2005) analysis of electoral systems and electoral thresholds likewise 
highlighted the significance of such factors. Although Givens found that in some 
countries it was more difficult for the far right to breakthrough, the findings did 
produce different results in Austria and Germany. For example, although the 
threshold in Austria is four per cent the FPÖ succeeded in breaking into the 
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mainstream. However, in Germany where the threshold is just one per cent higher, the 
far right have been unable to breakthrough (Givens 2005: 87-156).  
Evidently, from the above review of the literature, supply-side factors such as 
POS, the media, the role of the leader and the party can help explain why the far right 
are successful or not. Therefore, analysis of both demand and supply-side factors 
combined will be significant in any understanding of far right success, and will be 
important for this thesis.  
 
Local Supply and Demand 
So far this chapter has focused on the most significant demand and supply-side factors 
analysed at a national level. This next section will now centre on the literature relating 
to the local success of the far right, and how the primary demand and supply factors 
have been applied to this area of research. The decision to include a separate section 
here was based on the fact that there have been a limited number of studies which 
focus on individual case studies where the BNP have achieved electoral success. This 
local focus permits the above theories generalised from national and European 
comparative research to be tested against more tangible political events. As this thesis 
aims to sit alongside these local case studies of the BNP’s electoral breakthrough, it 
would be wise to first ascertain the findings of this available literature. 
The success of the BNP in the first decade of the twenty-first century has 
heightened interest amongst academics and political commentators, several of which 
have conducted local case studies (Rhodes 2009; Wilks-Heeg 2008; Bowyer 2008; 
Goodwin 2007; John et al. 2006; Sykes 2005). For example, one case study which 
will offer an important comparison with this analysis of the BNP in Nuneaton and 
Bedworth is that completed by James Rhodes (2009). In his study The Political 
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Breakthrough of the BNP: The Case of Burnley, Rhodes analyses the breakthrough of 
the BNP in Burnley from 2001 onwards and assesses whether this offers ‘a typical 
case’ of a far right breakthrough. The analysis of factors presented as a result of this 
local research demonstrates a clear crossover between demand and supply side 
factors. Indeed, an examination of this literature demonstrates the importance of 
considering demand-side factors and supply-side factors in tandem. In Burnley, for 
example, such studies highlight the need to consider the role of demand-side factors, 
most notably immigration, socioeconomics and political disaffection, combined with 
supply-side factors including the media and political opportunity structures (Rhodes 
2009; Wilks-Heeg 2008). Indeed, as the literature demonstrates, the effect of one set 
of variables cannot be truly analysed without the other set being considered.  
Before considering these case studies, it is worth first highlighting what has 
been learnt from comparative local data. One study into of the success of the BNP at a 
local level was the report by John et al. which analysed both supply and demand-side 
factors (2006). The study made extensive use of ward data collected from one 
hundred and fifty eight wards in twenty six local authorities, where the BNP stood 
two or more candidates. The significance of this analysis is the extent to which it 
analysed a wide range of demand and supply-side factors affecting these wards. For 
example it analysed the socio-economic sources of BNP support which included 
social class, income and poverty, education, age, ethnic composition and the numbers 
of asylum seekers, as well as the role of the media and other political parties in 
influencing attitudes to immigration and race. The study also used survey data 
accessed from the 21
st
 Report on British Social Attitudes (Mclaren and Johnson 2004) 
relating to the rise in anti-immigrant sentiment. The research produced some 
interesting results, notably the BNP do best in predominantly white areas, where 
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people are seeking an alternative to the mainstream parties, and that the BNP have 
gained support in many areas close to large Muslim communities (John et al. 2006: 
28-29). This analysis was not focused on one case study; rather it was a general study 
of ward data. Nonetheless, the research findings will be important in the comparison 
with the data collected from wards this thesis will analyse.  
A further analysis by Bowyer (2008) looked at data collected from all the 
wards that held local elections in May 2002 and May 2003. Bowyer’s quantitative 
analysis was primarily aimed at demonstrating the key facts that influenced support 
for the BNP in these local elections using aggregate data matched to contextual data. 
In his study he tests dependent variables (support for the BNP amongst the white 
electorate) and independent variables (Ethnic composition; population density; 
average education; labour market conditions; housing market conditions; crime rate; 
political context) in order to establish a relationship. One interesting conclusion from 
his analysis is that the BNP is “more likely to contest elections and to win votes in 
districts with relatively large ethnic minority populations, especially those with 
relatively large Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities” (Bowyer 2008: 618). He also 
found that the BNP is more likely to succeed in economically deprived, urban areas, 
where housing is short and of poor quality, with house prices not rising or below the 
national average (Bowyer 2008: 19). The analyses carried out by Bowyer (2008) and 
John et al. (2006) are important in highlighting and assessing the most important 
variables that should be applied to study of a far right breakthrough. The following 
sections will now analyse in greater detail the literature which highlights specific 
demand and supply-side factors from a localised perspective.  
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Local Supply 
This section will focus on the literature which identifies those supply-side factors that 
have been viewed as important within a local context. In order to do this it will focus 
on factors which include the role of the far right party themselves, the decline in local 
democracy, and the role of the media and mainstream parties in legitimising the far 
right. 
One important supply-side factor which has gained credence in the recent 
literature is the role of the parties themselves. As demonstrated earlier, the role of the 
party was highlighted by Eatwell (2003) in his programmatic thesis. It has also 
become a significant factor within the literature on the local breakthrough of the BNP 
(Goodwin 2011; Wilks-Heeg 2008; Rhodes 2007; Goodwin 2007; John et al. 2006). 
The thesis holds that the actions of the parties themselves should be analysed, and that 
through their actions the far right have been able to capitalise by exploiting local 
issues. In addition, Copsey (2007) also offers a critical examination of the BNP’s new 
ideological position. The main hypotheses here is that in order to explain the rise of 
the BNP, the party’s actions must be incorporated in any study of the far right. This is 
a view shared by Goodwin who argues that any satisfactory analysis must include the 
BNP’s environmental conditions as well as the BNP’s role in mobilising support 
(2007: 243).  
Examination of the BNP transformation demonstrates how the party focused 
on local issues affecting local people when fighting election campaigns. In many 
areas where the BNP have achieved a breakthrough they have been seen as the 
champions of local issues. It is argued that this was a major factor in the initial 
breakthrough stage of the BNP (Rhodes 2009; Wilks-Heeg 2008; Copsey 2008). The 
BNP successfully attached themselves to local issues which affected local 
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communities. For example, in Burnley the BNP have campaigned publicly on various 
local issues such as halting the closure of swimming pools, calling for a 20 mph speed 
limit on housing estates, and in Oldham by focusing on attacks on the white 
population (Rhodes 2009; Wilks-Heeg 2008; Renton 2003). Indeed, this electoral 
method is not new to the BNP and authors, such as Wilks-Heeg (2008) and 
Sivanandan (1994) indicate that, the success of the BNP on the Isle of Dogs in 1993 
was primarily due to the successful use of Liberal Democrat tactics. This view was 
also shared by Copsey who stated that the BNP simply campaign on local grievances, 
and became the champions of local issues in the same way the Liberal Democrats had 
previously (Copsey 2008 54-55). As will be demonstrated, in chapters six and seven, 
this strategy contributed to the success of the BNP in the Nuneaton wards of Barpool 
and Camp Hill wards.  
As well as the role of the party, evidence gathered in Burnley suggests that the 
BNP’s success was linked to the decline in local democracy (Rhodes 2009; Wilks-
Heeg 2008; Sivanandan 1994). Since Sivanandan suggested that the 1993 BNP 
election victory in the Tower Hamlets Millwall ward could be attributed to voters 
feeling they have lost their voice in local government (1994: 64), this theory has 
effectively gained validity in the literature. It is argued mainstream political parties 
have become weaker at a local level, as a consequence (Rhodes 2009; Wilks-Heeg 
2008; John et al. 2006). In the case of Burnley, Wilks-Heeg (2008) highlights the 
failure of the mainstream parties to counter the BNP’s arguments, or mobilise 
effective election campaigns against them in certain wards. It has also been argued 
that disaffection with the Labour Party has often been compounded by the failure of 
the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats to mount any credible challenge to 
the Labour Party in many areas such as Burnley and Stoke-on-Trent, effectively 
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enabling the BNP to act as the only credible opposition (Rhodes 2009; Wilks-Heeg 
2008). Furthermore, Rhodes highlights the way the BNP have become the only 
credible opponents because a vote for the Conservative Party in Burnley, a traditional 
Labour heartland, has often been seen as a wasted vote and more importantly, for ex-
Labour voters, it was seen as more acceptable to vote for the BNP rather than vote 
Tory (2009: 31). As far as the Liberal Democrats were concerned they often reached 
power-sharing agreements with the Labour party in order to keep out both the BNP 
and indeed the Conservative Party, which in effect left no credible opposition in the 
town (Rhodes 2009: 31). This in turn created a vacuum in Burnley from which the 
BNP were able to benefit.  
A further factor is the politicisation of race, with some scholars arguing that 
this was a key factor in the breakthrough of the BNP in Burnley (Rhodes 2009; 
Copsey 2008; John et al. 2006). In the case of Burnley it has been argued that it was 
the role of the Independents led by former Labour councillor Harry Brooks during the 
1990s that helped create an environment in which racial politics became the 
acceptable norm. This surrounded the apparent distribution of scarce resources in the 
town during which it was argued the ruling Labour party favoured the Asian 
minorities. With the collapse of the Independents in Burnley during early 2000s, the 
BNP were able to capitalise on what Rhodes (2009: 34) notes was a “rightward 
political shift”. As will be seen, this banal use of language on issues such as 
immigration and asylum was an important political factor in Nuneaton leading up-to 
the 2008 local elections.   
It has been argued that the media play a central role in politicising the race 
issue and this is clearly evident at both a local as well as a national level. According to 
the literature, the media have been very important in portraying immigration and 
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asylum in a negative manner and Islam in a provocative manner since the attacks of 
11 September 2001 (Copsey 2008; John et al. 2006; Renton 2003). Indeed, John et al. 
(2006) argue that the media have been important in influencing voters’ attitudes on 
race and immigration. However, as stated it is difficult to ascertain the amount of 
influence the media can have on the electorates’ decision to vote for the far-right or 
how attitudes on race can be converted into a number of votes. Therefore, this area of 
analysis will be challenging to any researcher attempting to understand the issues. 
However, as will be demonstrated later in the media chapter, the media variable was 
significant in the level of legitimisation it gave to the BNP in Nuneaton.   
 
Local Demand 
Besides the arguments advanced in relation to supply-side factors, the role of the 
demand-side factors, most notably socioeconomics, have been prevalent in attempts to 
understand the success of the BNP at a local level. Eatwell offers an interpretation of 
these demand-side factors in his analysis of the social breakdown thesis and the 
economic interest thesis (2003). The above theory offers a template for researchers in 
the analysis of the local electoral success of the BNP. Indeed, many recent studies 
have analysed social and economic deprivation (Rhodes 2009; Bowyer 2008; John et 
al. 2006). For example, John et al. (2006) make extensive use of survey tests and one-
off data in their attempt to demonstrate the socioeconomic sources of the BNP 
support. Their main area of study is focused on 5 particular themes; social class; 
income and poverty; education; age; ethnic composition and numbers of asylum 
seekers. One important finding from their study was that in the wards they analysed 
the poorer the ward the less chance the BNP had in achieving electoral success (John 
et al.: 2006; also see Rhodes 2009). However, it should be noted that many analysts 
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do argue that socioeconomic comparisons should not be overplayed. The reason for 
this is that many towns and wards experience similar social and economic problems 
yet they have not experienced a far right breakthrough (Rhodes 2009; Eatwell 1998). 
For example, in Coventry, which has a higher proportion of immigrants, a higher 
ethnic population and similar socioeconomic problems in many areas, the BNP have 
been unable to mount any serious challenge in local elections. Nevertheless, for the 
purpose of this analysis the socioeconomic background to the success of the BNP will 
be analysed in order to offer an important comparison with other areas where the BNP 
were also successful.   
Further arguments, advanced in the literature on the local breakthrough of the 
far right, have focused on the significance of issue based politics, most notably 
immigration. For example, in a similar fashion to the FN, the BNP have utilised the 
growing anti-immigration theme, and have launched campaigns against increasing 
immigration and the effects immigration has on local resources. It could effectively be 
argued that they did manage to impact on the Conservative Party’s ‘issue ownership’ 
of immigration, which the NF were unable to do successfully in the 1970s. Indeed, it 
has been argued in the literature that the NF failed to achieve issue ownership during 
the 1970s due to Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative Party (Mudde 2007; 
Husbands 1996; Shields 2007; Taylor 1982). However, the problem with issue 
ownership is that it does not always guarantee success for mainstream parties. This is 
apparent in the case of Chirac and his Rassemblement pour la République (RPR) and 
Giscard’s Union pour la Démocratie (UDF). The RPR and UDF adopted much of the 
immigration rhetoric of the FN, in a similar fashion to Thatcher in 1979, yet this had 
the opposite effect and only served to further legitimise Le Pen and the FN (Mudde 
2007; Hainsworth 2000). Moreover, the analysis of immigration and the process of 
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legitimisation will be significant in understanding the success of the BNP. It will also 
demonstrate how important the legitimisation of the BNP and its ideas were in 
galvanising BNP support in Nuneaton. 
As shown above, immigration is an important variable, which will be analysed 
in the context of local support for the BNP in Nuneaton. However, for the purpose of 
this research the issues of immigration and Islamophobia will be analysed in their 
own context and clearly differentiated. Indeed, the chapter on Islamophobia will 
demonstrate just how central rising anti-Muslim sentiment was in galvanising support 
for the BNP in 2008. There is a growth in the literature which has analysed the impact 
of Islamophobia as a single issue, an issue which has grown in importance since the 
attacks of Sept 11
th
 in New York and the 7/7 bombings in London (Zuquete 2008; 
Davids 2009; Cesari 2009; Mahamdallie 2002). The analysis of the literature does 
offer some insight into the importance of Islamophobia amongst BNP supporters and 
the wider electorate (Goodwin and Evans 2012; Goodwin 2012a; Bunglawala 2006; 
John et al. 2006; McLaren and Johnson 2004). Indeed, the evidence produced in this 
thesis will show how the BNP have, since the early 2000s, aligned themselves with 
the growing anti-Islamic movement which has grown alongside rising Islamophobia. 
The issue of Islamophobia and the BNP’s effective campaigns against what they 
argue is the “creeping Islamification of Britain” (cited in John et al. 2006: 10) have 
centred on attacking Islamic culture, specifically highlighting cultural differences. 
There is evidence in the literature that there has been a rapid growth in prejudice 
against Muslims in Europe and America since 9/11. For example, John et al. (2006) in 
their analysis found a connection between the number of ethnic Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi first and second generation immigrants, and support for the BNP in 
various wards. This was also highlighted in Bowyer’s 2008 study. Furthermore, the 
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study by McLaren and Johnson (2004) tested the hypotheses that anti-Muslim 
sentiment is directly related to anti-immigrant views. McLaren and Johnson found 
that fifty one per cent of respondents stated that if more Muslims came to live in 
Britain they would start to lose their identity and twenty five per cent said they would 
be unhappy if a relative married a Muslim (2004: 183-184).  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has identified the existing literature on the breakthrough of the far right. 
It examined the various explanations for the breakthrough of the far right at both a 
national and local level, in Europe and more importantly in the UK. It has detailed the 
most important variables and the main arguments put forward to understand the 
resurgence of the far right, highlighting the significance of demand and supply-side 
factors. Indeed, it is evident from the literature review that investigation considering 
both supply and demand-side factors produces more rigorous findings. The literature 
demonstrated that for the purpose of this research a combination of supply and 
demand-side factors will offer the best method in understanding the local success of 
the BNP in Nuneaton. This does not mean that one factor may be more important than 
another in the breakthrough stage. Through further analysis this work will seek to 
provide answers, highlight patterns favourable to the far right in the breakthrough 
phase, and support current theories on the far right.  
It is apparent in many of the studies, such as Rhodes’s (2009) study of the 
Burnley breakthrough, that a comparative analysis of ward data will only strengthen 
any analysis. Therefore this thesis will seek to position itself within the current 
literature and make a useful contribution to knowledge in this area. Due to the 
absence of in-depth research of ward data in Nuneaton this research will also provide 
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an understanding of the main factors that were important in Nuneaton that led to the 
BNP’s success in 2008. In order to test the most important factors the demand-side 
factors which were analysed included socioeconomics, political disaffection and 
immigration, while on the supply-side it will include the role of the party itself, the 
role of the media, the role of the mainstream political parties at both a local and 
national level and POS. Finally in the course of this analysis a further significant 
factor, Islamophobia, was analysed. The analysis of these factors was central in 
understanding why the BNP experienced success in the local elections of 2008 in 
Nuneaton. In summary, this study analysed ward data and new survey data from the 
Camp Hill and Barpool areas of Nuneaton and the data collected was used to test 
demand and supply-side factors. The analysis of the empirical evidence produced in 



















As outlined in the previous chapter the aim of this work is to seek an understanding of 
why people voted for the BNP in Nuneaton during the 2008 local elections. In order 
to meet this objective, this study will provide an analysis of ward data and new survey 
data from the case study location, and offer a localised perspective of the far right 
breakthrough in Nuneaton. The data will then be used to corroborate or contradict the 
existing literature currently explaining the BNP’s early twenty-first century electoral 
success and offer a new perspective on the success of the far right.  
 
Why Nuneaton? 
This location was selected primarily because, on commencement of this study in 2008 
the BNP had for the first time captured local council seats in the borough of Nuneaton 
and Bedworth. Two BNP councillors, Martyn Findley and Darren John Haywood 
were elected in the Barpool and Camp Hill wards respectively. The BNP had 
therefore broken through in a location which had historically never witnessed far right 
success. Nuneaton offers many similarities for comparison, demographically and 
geographically, with other locations which experienced BNP breakthrough. More 
importantly it also offers many differences which this work will highlight. This 
includes the level of poverty in the wards and the size of the minority ethnic 
population in the town. Given that no previous research has addressed the BNP’s 
campaigning in Nuneaton, it was decided that this location was ripe for providing new 
data and a new perspective on this electoral success. 
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A case study approach 
It is for the reasons stated above that a case study was conducted as part of a 
comparative methodology. The comparative approach is simply a method which 
enables the researcher to compare one case with another in order to develop a greater 
understanding of the similarities and differences. The reason for using the 
comparative approach as part of this case study does in itself raise the question, why? 
As indicated earlier, one of the main reasons for a comparative study is that it can 
help the researcher understand similarities and differences between one case and 
another, and therefore remains an important tool of analysis. Moreover, Hague and 
Harrop argue that “a comparative approach broadens our understanding of the 
political world, and giving potential for explanation and even prediction” (2004: 69). 
This view is also shared by Landman who notes that “scholars compare to provide 
context, make classifications, test hypotheses, and make predictions (2003: 40). More 
importantly, Hague and Harrop state that it “enables us to find out about the places we 
know least about” (2004: 69). Therefore, the decision to use the comparative 
methodology was taken as it would allow the findings from Nuneaton, which has not 
been the subject of in-depth research into far right support, to be compared. In fact the 
findings from similar case studies which have analysed the local success of the BNP 
were compared with the Nuneaton case study.  
This does not mean that there are problems with the comparative method, as 
highlighted in the literature (Bara and Pennington 2009: Hague and Harrop 2004; 
Landman 2003; Lijphart 1971). For example, Bara states that “comparative analysis is 
always constrained by the number of cases with reliable available data” (2009: 61), 
while Lijphart argues that the principle problem facing the comparative method is that 
there are “many variables, [a] small number of cases” (1971: 685). These factors were 
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therefore taken into consideration when conducting this study, and only reliable 
outcomes were offered for comparison with only the most important variables focused 
on, and several cases used as part of the comparative study. Finally, it is worth noting 
that Lijphart argues that “given the inevitable scarcity of time, energy, and financial 
resources, the intensive comparative analysis of a few cases may be more promising 
than a more superficial statistical analysis of many cases” (1971: 685). Therefore the 
main focus of the research was on the case study location which was compared with a 
limited number of locations, such as Burnley and Stoke, where the BNP also 
experienced similar success at a local level. 
The decision to use a case study approach was based on the idea that it would 
offer the researcher a method for the intense collection of data. It also enabled the 
researcher to use the data collected to test the variables and develop an understanding 
as to the reasons for the BNP’s success by testing existing arguments in the literature 
as well as developing new arguments. There has been a large quantity of scholarly 
work produced relating to the case study approach (see for example Kelly 2012; 
Flyvbjerg 2006; Gerring 2004; Yin 1981; Lijphart 1971). Gerring states that a case 
study is “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger 
class of (similar) units” (2004: 342). This view is shared by Kelly who also highlights 
the advantages of the case study method stating that “they can generate or test 
hypotheses” and that “they allow us to gain detailed descriptions and understanding of 
a particular person, setting or event” (2012: 121). It is on Kelly’s point that the case 
study approach was most fruitful in that it enabled this study to engage with Nuneaton 
voters and develop an understanding as to why they voted for the BNP in 2008.  
There are of course other methods available to researchers, however as 
Flyvbjerg notes “the case study is a necessary and sufficient method for certain 
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important research tasks in the social sciences, and it is a method that holds up well 
when compared to other methods in the gamut of social science research 
methodology” (2006: 242). This view was also shared by Lijphart who also stated that 
“the great advantage of the case study is that by focusing on a single case, that case 
can be intensively examined even when the research resources at the investigators 
disposal are relatively limited” (1971: 691). Indeed Nuneaton was extensively 
analysed and the data collected was used to test the main arguments for the success of 
the far right. It is also worth stating that in order to conduct this case study a mixed-
method approach was taken in order to produce the data necessary to complete this 
research.  
This chapter will now highlight the methods used to analyse the case study 
location, and how they were applied to test the variables highlighted in the chapter 
above (Socioeconomics, Immigration, Islamophobia, political opportunity structures, 
the role of the BNP, the media). In order to demonstrate the methods used to carry out 
this research, the following chapter will be divided into five sections. First, it will 
offer an overview of the methodological framework for this research, specifically 
showing why the mixed-method approach was taken. Second, it will focus on the 
analysis of the literature, secondary and primary sources, as well as statistical data 
which will be used to support the comparative analysis. It will then highlight the 
method of using questionnaires, and how the questionnaire was designed and 
distributed, offering a brief analysis of the questionnaire’s efficacy. The next section 
focuses on interviews and focus groups, notably the use of semi-structured and group 
interviews in this study. Finally, this chapter will discuss the utility of using archival 
research, notably analysing the local and national newspapers. It will show how this 
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methodological framework was used to produce the data necessary to complete this 
thesis. 
 
The Mixed-method approach 
A mixed-method approach was determined to be the most suitable framework of 
research for this topic. This method was chosen because it maximises the data 
available, and produces a wide range of data collected from various sources, 
providing opportunities for comparison. It also provides the researcher with the best 
tools to investigate the subject from different angles, bringing together a range of 
views with the potential to generate new or different explanations. As Brewer and 
Hunter (1989) state, there is now “virtually no major problem-area that is studied 
exclusively within one method” (cited in Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998: 5). The 
benefits of a mixed-method approach was also highlighted by Creswell and Plano 
Clark who state that, “mixed methods research provides strengths that offset the 
weaknesses of both quantitative and qualitative research” (2011: 13). 
The main advantages of a mixed-method approach to this research are that it 
produces data and results for analysis, by combining a range of data sources and 
methods. It is also evident that analysing factors using one method stimulates further 
work, and enables the researcher to expand on the most important factors using other 
methods employed in the mixed-method approach. Indeed, “multimethod research 
offers the distinct advantage of quick, close coordination and comparison of different 
methods and their findings” (Brewer and Hunter 2005: 5). The combination of 
methods also offers testability and context into the research, and provides a wider 
range of data which could not be produced using just one method. Indeed, qualitative 
data can help clarify the meaning of the responses to the survey. The examination of 
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the literature also helped to narrow down the variables used in this research, which 
were tested in a broad sense via a questionnaire. This provided the materials to 
formulate more specific questions for the interviews and focus groups, which, in turn, 
helped pinpoint relevant data extracted from the archives. 
Social scientists have analysed the role and importance of mixed-method 
approaches to research (Seale 2012; Creswell and Plano Clark 2011; Greene 2007). 
Creswell and Plano Clark argue that mixed-methods can “provide sound frameworks 
for collecting, analysing, mixing, interpreting and reporting quantitative and 
qualitative data to best address specific types of research purposes” (2011: 105). 
Greene also states that using more than one method provides “multiple ways of seeing 
and hearing” (Greene 2007: 20). This view is shared by Evans and King, who observe 
that the use of quantitative and qualitative research enables the researcher the chance 
to, “explain and understand social life” (2006: 125). In short, these scholars agree that 
the mixed-method approach is pragmatic, with the different methods providing an 
opportunity to investigate the same research questions from different perspectives. As 
Brewer and Hunter note,  
“this multimethod strategy is simple, but powerful. For if our various methods 
have weaknesses that are truly different, then their convergent findings can be 
accepted with far greater confidence than any single method’s findings would 
warrant. Each new set of data increases our confidence that the research results 
reflect reality rather than methodological error” (2006: 5).  
 
There are many arguments both for and against using mixed-methods, notably the 
differences between qualitative and quantitative methodological differences when 
conducting research and which is the most fruitful.
3
 However, as Spicer states, “you 
should not assume that combined methods are inherently better than research based on 
                                                          
3 Refer to Spicer (2012: 479-490) who discusses the arguments for and against combining methods of research.   
John Grima  74 
 
a single method in all circumstances, but combine qualitative and quantitative 
methods where this is appropriate to your research question” (2012: 490). It is on this 
final point that it was decided that a mixed-method approach would be used to 
produce the data in this case study. It enabled the researcher to test the existing 
research as well as look for new perspectives provided by the new data. 
As part of the mixed-method approach applied in this study, a questionnaire, 
interviews, and archival research were used to gather data in order to test the most 
important variables. First a literature review was conducted in order to identify the 
test variables. The questionnaire was then used to collect data which would provide 
for quantifiable analysis of the variables. Interviews were used in order to capture the 
opinions and attitudes of Nuneaton voters and politicians. The interviews and focus 
groups were also used in order to expand on the data collected using the 
questionnaire, and provided qualitative data to test the variables. Statistical analysis 
was conducted as part of the review of the literature, as well as the analysis of both 
primary and secondary sources which were used to support this thesis. Finally, 
archival research was conducted to ascertain the data necessary for the examination of 
the media variable. The data produced using the research techniques above was used 
to test the variables important in the success of the far right. These are the methods 
that were utilised in this research, with the important addition of slightly more 
emphasis on utilising socio-economic data, along with a focus of an analysis of the 
media output for the final chapter. 
The mixed-method approach used for this thesis enabled the study to examine 
the most important factors that have been significant in directing voter choices in 
Nuneaton. The mixed-method approach to research was also significant in producing 
data which highlights the social and political factors that helped galvanise BNP 
John Grima  75 
 
support in 2008, and demonstrate that no single factor can be put forward to explain 
the success of the far right. It is evident that despite the scale of existing literature on 
the far right breakthrough there is still a lack of analysis accounting for local 
variations that affect support for the far right in Britain. Therefore, this analysis will 
investigate the variables that have been important in galvanising support for the far 
right in a particular area, and determine the factors which are potentially unique to 
Nuneaton. The next sections will now look at these methodological techniques in 
greater detail.  
 
Academic Literature Review and Statistical Data analysis 
Secondary sources 
An analysis of secondary sources was central to the formulation of this thesis. Indeed, 
the first task of this project was assessing the existing academic work on the 
breakthrough of the far right in order to single out the most important demand and 
supply side explanations of this breakthrough. 
One of the most important aspects of this research was testing the existing 
literature analysing far right breakthrough. Therefore the overriding criteria for 
selecting relevant variables led the researcher to concentrate on the academic 
consensus, specifically which should be tested in any explanation of far right 
breakthrough. The six variables chosen had thus been repeatedly tested, historically, 
comparatively and nationally, in order to seek an understanding. It is the case that 
some variables had been assessed more widely than others. For example immigration, 
socioeconomics, political opportunity structures (POS) and the role of the far right 
party are the principle variables in any analysis of the far right. However, more 
recently, studies have begun to analyse other variables in greater detail, including the 
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media and Islamophobia. As shown in the review of the literature, the national 
tradition variable was omitted. This was based on previous studies of the far right in 
Britain which have indicated a lack of national tradition of far right parties in Britain 
on a scale witnessed in countries such as Italy and France, and the lack of evidence to 
support the testing of this particular variable. What are left are the six most widely 
supported variables highlighted across the existing literature. It is these six issues that 
were tested in the Nuneaton case study, and which individually form the focus of the 
six substantive chapters of this thesis. 
 
Published primary sources 
The importance of the published primary material has also been highlighted in the 
literature in the previous chapter. For example, Creswell states that the literature in a 
research study is important because, “it provides a framework for establishing the 
importance of the study, as well as a benchmark for comparing the results of a study 
with other findings” (1994: 21). This view was also shared by May who observes that 
this data, “enable us to understand the dynamics of society – perhaps along race, 
class, age and gender lines – as well as charting trends within society” (2001: 73). 
Therefore, the research of both primary and secondary sources for this study was 
significant. 
The significance of the analysis of primary and statistical sources is evident in 
the data it produced to support this study. For example, understanding the 
demographics and characteristics of the case study population was an essential 
element of the archival research and provided a comparison with other locations 
which have experienced BNP breakthrough. There is a considerable amount of 
information available on the demographic characteristics of the case study location. 
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This included information on the local population’s age, gender, race, and 
socioeconomic background. These data were provided by state run organisations, and 
various agencies working on the local and national government behalf. For example, 
demographic data is provided by the Office of National Statistics (ONS), which 
provides local and national data, including the census and local output data relating to 
a number of social areas, such as poverty, housing, education and crime. More 
specific local data was also provided by Nuneaton and Bedworth Borough Council 
and the Warwickshire Observatory
4
. This examination of the demographic data was 
important because it enabled the researcher to test the theory highlighted in the 
literature, which indicated that particular social and economic conditions must be 
present for the far right to succeed. 
Primary published sources used to compliment this thesis were also provided 
by various anti-fascist organisations explaining BNP breakthrough, and the BNP 
themselves. The analysis of the BNP literature provided a large amount of material. 
This literature was collected during the course of this analysis, and was available from 
online archives which included BNP affiliated sites. Indeed, understanding the role of 
the party, its leader, the modernisation of the BNP and local BNP campaigns was 
important in this study. Examination of the BNP included the use of the main BNP 
website, which has a significant amount of online materials, Nuneaton councillor 
Martyn Findley’s website and blog for Barpool, access to sites such as Spearhead, 
which was the main site of former leader John Tyndall, and through the BNP 
magazine The Voice of Freedom, of which copies have been resourced or are 
available online. Material was also produced by accessing archives which included 
online election materials and data on the BNP, through groups such as 
                                                          
4
 Warwickshire Observatory provides information and intelligence about Warwickshire and its people. They are a centre of 
excellence in research, data collection and analysis, supporting evidence-based policy-making across the public sector in 
Warwickshire. They have conducted many localized studies which provide important data to support this research. 
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Electionleaflets.org, Searchlight, United Against Fascism, and Hope-Not-Hate. These 
sources were important in providing supporting evidence for arguments made in this 
thesis. Therefore extensive research was conducted throughout this study of online 
materials and printed material in order to test any argument made or to corroborate 
and compare the findings from this case study. Indeed it presented another dimension 
to the data produced in this study. This focused primarily on material relating to the 
breakthrough of the far right, but also on data which would strengthen the analysis of 
Nuneaton as part of the comparative analysis, and enable the testing of the main 
variables. The researcher also made use of organisations such as Zetoc, which is a 
monitoring and search service for global research publications, as well as 
organisations such as the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) and the Institute 
for Race Relations (IRR) which provided valuable updates on research and 
publications beneficial to this study. The data collected were then analysed as part of 
the mixed-method approach and were used to support and strengthen the findings 
produced by the questionnaire and the interviews.     
This does not mean that consideration should not be paid to the weaknesses of 
some sources. Indeed, all researchers should understand how statistics are constructed 
and for what purpose. This is necessary in order to avoid any assumptions about 
social life derived from the data. In fact, there is increasing concern amongst some 
social scientists over the government’s control of official statistics. For example, one 
particular problem with the use of government statistics is the political manipulation 
of figures, evident in the production of crime figures, with only certain crimes being 
recorded, and others being excluded (see May 2001: 86). However, while 
consideration will be paid to potential problems, for the purpose of this research the 
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data were used to verify the quantitative and qualitative data produced by the other 
methods outlined below.   
 
Questionnaires     
One important element of the mixed-method approach was the construction, 
distribution and analysis of a questionnaire. The questionnaire represents one element 
of the mixed-method approach and was applied in order to test the variables. The data 
collected were used to develop an understanding of the BNP’s success in Nuneaton, 
test the explanations in the existing literature, and strengthen the argument and 
conclusions drawn from the analysis of the qualitative data.  
As highlighted, previous studies have used questionnaires as a method for 
collecting primary data, taking the form of small localised surveys or nationwide 
surveys. Social surveys as an analytical tool were important to this research. Indeed, 
questionnaires have become a tried and tested method for obtaining quantitative data 
from individuals, relating to their opinions and views on particular issues and themes. 
Questionnaires have been widely used by governments and businesses, in the form of 
the census and market research. They offer a technique which can be used to produce 
a significant amount of data from respondents. They are usually inexpensive to 
administer, and the data can be analysed efficiently, and relatively quickly, once 
questionnaires are returned. As Wilkinson and Birmingham state, questionnaires can 
provide an effective and cheap method for the collection of data in a “structured and 
manageable form” (2003: 7). This view is shared by Arksey and Knight who state 
that; “questionnaires can also be used as a quick and dirty way of getting a sense of 
the issues to be explained in interviews” (1999: 33). Therefore, the questionnaire was 
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selected due to its relative simplicity to construct, its cost effectiveness, and the 
abundance of data it provides.  
The use of questionnaires is not without criticisms. For example, there are 
problems of deciding who should be included in the sample, limitations on the data 
collected, and that mail or self-completion surveys often have low response rates. 
Buckingham and Saunders have a contrasting view, stating that “questionnaires are 
quite limited in the kinds of information they can generate, and the weaknesses of a 
questionnaire survey can sometimes be complemented by the strengths of some other 
research techniques” (2004: 44). Taking these factors into account, a questionnaire 
was selected for the purpose of a mixed-method approach. The significance of the 
mixed-method approach was highlighted by Wilkinson and Birmingham who state 
that “a well-planned and well-executed questionnaire campaign can produce rich data 
in a format ready for analysis and simple interpretation” (2003: 8). Moreover, any 
negative aspects introduced into the analysis by this method are mitigated by the fact 
that other research techniques are used alongside the questionnaire as part of the 
mixed-method approach. Focus within the next section will look at the design and 
distribution of the questionnaire. 
 
Questionnaire design 
The main aim of the questionnaire (Appendix II) was to develop an understanding of 
why people vote for a particular party in a particular area. The design of the 
questionnaire, which included the selection of the questions, how they are written, 
their layout, piloting, and the distribution and return of the questionnaire, is important 
if it is to be considered an effective tool in the research process. This is a point argued 
by Wilkinson and Birmingham who state that “well-designed questionnaires can 
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allow relationships between the data to be identified” (2003: 39). The significance of 
questionnaire design was also indicated by May, who stated that “they must be turned 
into questions that respondents can understand and are able to answer”, and that 
“having collected and analysed the data, the researcher is then in a position to decide 
whether the hypotheses have been confirmed or falsified and what this means for the 
theory” (2001: 91).  
A further key factor is deciding on how the data collected from the 
questionnaire will be analysed. For the purpose of this study the data was analysed 
using the statistics software package, Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS). The design of the questionnaire was imperative for this research, and offered 
the best method of producing inexpensive, quality data. Indeed, the questionnaire was 
designed with the purpose of providing data to test the variables highlighted in the 
literature. The aim of the questionnaire was to examine patterns that developed from 
the responses, and test relationships between the main variables. An online 
questionnaire was used to collect quantitative data for comparison as it was decided 
that this was the most practical and simplest way to collect and process the data.  
In order to test the variables the questionnaire was designed drawing on the 
most important questions which had been used in previous questionnaires and 
replicated. It therefore drew upon the work completed in previous studies (Goodwin 
and Evans 2012; Ford and Goodwin 2010; Rhodes 2009; John et al. 2006; Mclaren 
and Johnson 2004). For example, particular questions relating to demographics, the 
social and economic background of respondents and voting history were included. It 
also sought to build on some of the ideas that were developing in this research and in 
the literature relating to fear and rising Islamophobia, and the questionnaire included a 
question specifically aimed at generating data that would test the argument that fear of 
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Muslims was an important driver of BNP support in Nuneaton. It also utilised the 
Survey Question Bank which provides a list of relevant and replicated questions, as 
well as access to data collected using government surveys.
5
 The design of the 
questionnaire remained focused on simplicity which was important for understanding 
and ease of completion. The questionnaire was divided into three sections; About you, 
About Your Vote, and a final section called Your View. It was designed in this way in 
order to provide the opportunity to test some of the most important variables that were 
identified in the literature and it has been argued are necessary for any far right 
‘breakthrough’ or local success.  
The questionnaire also used a variety of methods and approaches to 
questioning. This included closed questions (simple yes or no, male or female), 
multiple choice questions (respondents will be given a choice of answers) and limited 
open-ended questions. The use of open-ended questions enabled respondents to 
express themselves freely, and provide the opportunity to respond to questions, and 
provide answers, which is not possible with closed questions. Oppenheim states that 
open-ended questions give people the chance to “say what they think and do so with 
greater richness and spontaneity” (1992: 81). This view was shared by May who 
observes that “open questions give respondents a greater freedom to answer the 
question because they answer in a way that suits their interpretation” (2001: 102). 
This spontaneity provided a response of unexpected richness for this work evident in 
the qualitative data produce from the final section Your View. The questionnaire also 
utilised the Likert scale (1932), which enabled the participant to respond using a scale 
                                                          
5 The Survey Data Bank is a single point of access to a wide range of secondary data including large-scale government surveys, 
qualitative studies and census data from 1971 to 2011. The Survey Bank also promotes data sharing to encourage the reuse of 
data, and provide expertise in developing best practice for research data management. 
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of one to five possible responses. These ranged from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly 
disagree’.  
When designing the questionnaire in this study, the length and the time it takes 
to complete the survey were also considered. Wilkinson and Birmingham state that 
“as a general rule of thumb, a questionnaire should take no more than about twenty 
minutes to complete” (2003: 16). This is due in part to the need to keep questionnaire 
respondents focused and engaged with the subject of the survey and therefore more 
inclined to complete it. The Nuneaton questionnaire was designed so that all of the 
questions would take between 10-15 minutes to answer online. This was proven and 
streamlined through the use of piloting. The questionnaire was piloted amongst 
colleagues from a range of disciplines and used a number of browsers in order to test 
its usability. Indeed, piloting the questionnaire was an important element of the 
design, offering the opportunity to correct mistakes and ambiguities in the 
questionnaire layout. Although most inaccuracies were identified, as will be indicated 
in chapter three, one minor correction to the questionnaire was not identified during 
the pilot, with the age of 36 being included in two age categories, 25-36 and 36-48. 
Piloting enabled the researcher to test the online questionnaire, which included the 
time it took to complete the questions. This enabled the survey to be altered 
accordingly, including the format of the questions and the order in which they should 
appear. It was important to focus on what this study wanted to examine, what data 
were required, and whether the target population of the questionnaire would inform 
this research. However, although the pilot was tested using a number of browsers, 
such as Mozilla Firefox and Internet Explorer, it soon became evident that some 
browsers did not work correctly when the questionnaire went live. This meant that 
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some users were unable to access the questionnaire. The exact number of potential 
respondents who experienced issues with their browsers is unknown.  
 
Selecting a sample 
Alongside designing the questionnaire, another important aspect was deciding on the 
sample. This was vital in producing data fundamental to the understanding of the BNP 
success in 2008. For instance, the sample was aimed at representing the target 
population. A good sample can help improve response rates and ensure the data will 
be valid. To ensure this many factors were considered, including the degree of 
accuracy, variation in population, levels of measurement and the extent to which sub-
groups will be analysed (Blaikie 2000: 208). Therefore, the sampling method used 
was an important aspect of this research.  
There are many types of probability sampling, and this technique was applied 
when deciding the sample. Indeed, Buckingham and Saunders argue that “you should 
consider using probability sampling wherever this is feasible” (2004: 124). One of the 
main reasons offered is that probability sampling is viewed as more likely to provide 
representativeness when compared with non-probability sampling (Seale 2012: 135). 
The types of probability sampling include, simple random sampling, systematic 
sampling, stratified random sampling, and multi-stage cluster sampling. For the 
purpose of this research it was decided that the simple random sampling system 
would be used. This form of probability sampling was applied to a selection of 
registered electors taken from the full edited electoral register in Nuneaton, with all 
having the equal probability of inclusion in the sample, and a chance to receive a 
posted invitation to take part in the online questionnaire. This section of the local 
population was targeted because the aim is to understand voting patterns and why 
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people vote for particular parties. It is for this reason that the electoral register was 
used. Drawing a sample from the population of Nuneaton, looking at their 
characteristics, and making a generalisation from this sample about Nuneaton, was 
important if the questionnaire was going to produce the data required. Therefore, 
every one of voting age, representative of the population who were on the edited 
electoral register in Nuneaton, had an equal chance of being selected.  
The size of the sample was also an important challenge for the researcher. 
Sampling size has been examined by scholars, such as Blaikie who argues that, “a 
common misunderstanding in sampling is that a sample must be some fixed 
proportion of the population, such as 10 per cent” while too small a sample “can 
produce inaccurate generalisations” (2000: 208-209). Considering this factor, it was 
decided to send invitations to as many potential voters as possible to increase the 
validity of the sample.  
In order to inform potential participants of the online questionnaire, invitations 
were distributed in Nuneaton using the postal service (Appendix I). The questionnaire 
invitations were sent out to an equal number of electors (1500) in the eight wards in 
Nuneaton. The completed questionnaire was then published online using Google Docs 
Coventry (see Appendix II).
6
 This also included a link which allowed participants to 
take part in a free prize draw, an incentive for participants, and it was hoped this 
would increase the number of respondents. The final number of invitations distributed 
was 12,000, which equates to around one in three of the electors on the edited 
electoral register. The sample was selected from members of the public who 
potentially would vote in 2012 and those who had voted in 2008. The sample was 
selected using the edited version of the electoral register, which consisted of over 
                                                          
6 The online survey was conducted using Google Docs which is a free Web-based application in which questionnaires, 
documents and spreadsheets can be created, edited and stored online. 
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31,000 names and addresses of residents in Nuneaton who were registered to vote. 
Then using a simple random sampling tool, potential voters were selected, with an 
equal number sent via the postal services, inviting participants to take part in the 
online survey, using a shortened link to the questionnaire. A copy of the invitation 
leaflet is reproduced in Appendix I, which invited electors to take part in the online 
questionnaire. It is worth noting here that the invitation did provide a telephone 
number for respondents of the invitation to call if they could not complete the online 
questionnaire and required a paper copy. 
 
The Questionnaire data and Response 
This section will highlight the questions used in the questionnaire, and the data it 
sought to collect. Due to the large amount of data produced by the questionnaire it 
was important to remain focused on what the thesis is attempting to find. This was 
necessary if the researcher is to avoid being ‘swamped’ by data, and in order to 
remain focused on developing an understanding of the results produced by the data.  
The first section of the questionnaire, About You, was aimed primarily at 
collecting demographic data, which is an important starting point in any quantitative 
study. This enabled the researcher to gather participants’ demographic data relating, 
for example, to gender, race, age, education, and employment status. The second 
section About Your Vote was designed in such a way that it provided the opportunity 
to collect rich data for this research project. It began by asking who the respondent 
voted for in 2008 and 2012, specifically why they voted for a particular party or local 
candidate. This included questions relating to socio-economics, law and order, 
immigration, variables relevant to testing the explanations in the literature. The final 
section, Your View offered respondents’ the opportunity to provide a qualitative 
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response to why they voted for a particular party or candidate, which was not asked 
specifically in the questionnaire. This section provided some rich qualitative 
responses, which were important in the understanding of voting behaviour and 
attitudes in Nuneaton.  
One important element when conducting any research using a questionnaire is 
the response rate. Considering the size of the sample selected, 12,000, and the fact 
that a prize draw was included in order to improve response rates, the overall response 
was low, with only 308 responses received. Reasons offered for the low response rate 
can be related to the exceptionally low turnout of around 20 per cent for the local 
elections, which may have had a detrimental effect on the questionnaire, and indicated 
the level of apathy at the time. A further explanation for the low response rate could 
be related to the use of an online questionnaire. For instance, many people are 
unwilling to fill out an online questionnaire due to fears they would not remain 
anonymous. Moreover, as stated earlier, in the immediate period following the 
distribution of the invitation, the researcher received queries from some respondents 
who found that their browser would not allow them to open the online questionnaire. 
This was not evident in the pilot when using the browsers Mozilla Firefox and 
Internet Explorer. Nevertheless, the questionnaire remains an important element of the 
methodological framework. The relatively low response rate, around 2.5 per cent, still 
offers important and comprehensive data for analysis and a 2 to 3 per cent response 
rate is not uncommon, considering the questionnaire was an unsolicited request 
amongst a randomised sample. More significant for this research was that analysis of 
the 308 responses enabled the researcher to collect demographic data and identified 
significant findings in relation to testing the variables, which will be highlighted in the 
following chapters.  
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 In terms of who responded, the questionnaire did provide a representative 
sample. For example, the gender split of the sample was around 60 per cent male and 
40 per cent female. As far as the ages of respondents were concerned, around 55 per 
cent of all respondents were between the ages 36 and 64 years old. As will be 
indicated in the following chapter, the age groups and gender of the participants does, 
according to the data provided by the Nuneaton and Bedworth District Profile (2009), 
generally reflect the age and gender of the population in Nuneaton (Refer to chapter 2, 
pp.139-141). Therefore, the sample should be considered reliable and representative 
of the population in Nuneaton. 
 
Interviews and focus groups 
As part of the mixed-method approach, interviews and focus groups were also used. 
Interviews are an important qualitative technique, and this has been highlighted in the 
literature. Henn, Weinstein and Foard (2006) argue that interviews help the researcher 
capture opinions and points of view, and that interviews help to substantiate and 
inform the research collected from books, journals, newspapers and other secondary 
and primary written materials. Punch also argues that interviews are an important tool 
for the researcher, stating that they are “a very good way of accessing people’s 
perceptions, meanings, definitions of situations and constructions of reality. It is also 
one of the most powerful ways we have of understanding others” (1998: 174-5). This 
view is also shared by Byrne who states that “qualitative interviewing is particularly 
useful as a research method for accessing individuals’ attitudes and values – things 
that cannot necessarily be observed or accommodated in a formal questionnaire” 
(2012: 209).  
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As with the questionnaires, the interviews proved a core element of the 
research methodology. However, unlike questionnaires, interviews allowed 
interviewees to be more expressive, and as Wilkinson and Birmingham state, 
“participants often see interviews as opportunities to voice opinions and ‘let off 
steam’ about subjects” (2003: 63). This is a view shared by Bell who states that the 
interview can “yield rich material and put flesh on the bones of questionnaire 
responses” (Bell 2005: 157). Indeed, the best way to find out why a person voted for a 
particular party is to ask them the question. The interview process enhanced the data 
collected for this research, and produced data which helped explain the recent success 
of the far right in Nuneaton. It also enabled the researcher to corroborate and build 
upon the questionnaire data. 
Analysis of the literature indicates that generally there are four main types of 
interviews in social research. These are the structured interview, the semi-structured 
interview, the unstructured interview and the group interview. For the purpose of this 
research semi-structured interviews and group interviews were selected. For the semi-
structured interview (one-to-one interviews) questions were standardised for 
consistency. The adopted approach allowed the interviewer freedom to further 
question the respondents in more detail. The group interviews (focus groups) were 
designed to encourage participants to discuss with one another particular subjects.  
The benefits of one-to-one interviews and focus groups will now be discussed. 
First, regarding focus groups, scholars have highlighted the benefits of this 
interviewing technique. For example, May notes that focus groups allow for the 
researcher to explore group norms and dynamics on subjects they are analysing (May 
2001: 121-126). Punch also shares this view and suggests that “well facilitated group 
interaction can assist in bringing to the surface aspects of a situation which might 
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otherwise not be exposed”, and that “this makes group interviews an attractive data 
gathering option when research is trying to probe those aspects of people’s behaviour” 
(1998: 177). This view is shared by Flick who states that, “participants are likely to 
express more and go further in their statements than in single interviews” (2011:118). 
Similarly this view is also shared by Wilkinson and Birmingham who argues that in 
focus groups the “discussion will be richer, deeper and more honest and incisive than 
any interview with a single participant could produce” (2003: 92). This does not mean 
the focus group does not have disadvantages. For example, unlike one-to-one 
interviews they do not provide in-depth and personal information and there can be 
participants who dominate discussion and do not allow other participants to 
participate fully. It was for this reason that two interview techniques were used to 
collect qualitative responses.  
In relation to one-to-one interviews, like the focus groups, they were used to 
gather information on participants’ opinions, attitudes and test relationships between 
variables. Scholars have highlighted why interviews are an important technique for 
research. For example, Arksey and Knight state that “interviewing is a powerful way 
of helping people to make explicit things that have hitherto been explicit – to 
articulate their tacit perceptions, feelings and understandings” (1999: 32). This view 
was shared by Gray, who also states that interviews allow the participants “an 
opportunity to reflect on events without having to commit themselves in writing, often 
because they feel the information may be confidential” (2004: 214). Therefore, 
interviews were an important tool in allowing responses to be clarified. As Arksey 
and Knight note “interviews are one method by which the human world may be 
explained, although it is the world of beliefs and meanings, not of actions, that is 
clarified by interview research”, (1999: 15).  
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 Analysis of this research technique highlights particular problems with 
interviews, notably the problem of its reliability. Indeed, when interviewing the 
researcher is relying on the participant to remember facts and memories from 
elections from several years before. There is also the problem that some voters may 
exaggerate particular issues. One way this was avoided was to highlight particular 
themes, language and responses which were similar, or in many cases the same when 
analysing transcripts. These responses offered the researcher data of greater value due 
to its replication. However, there is no guarantee on validity and reliability of 
research. This is where mixed-method approach applied in this study can help to 
eliminate these potential problems.  
Taking potential problems into account, the data were produced through the 
use of one-to-one interviews with local politicians, community leaders, BNP members 
and activists, and voters in Nuneaton. The use of semi-structured interviews gave the 
interviewer the opportunity to question interviewees, but also enabled the 
interviewees the opportunity to share their views without any restrictions. The 
interviewees were encouraged to relate their own reasons for the success of the far 
right in Nuneaton, within an environment where they felt comfortable to express any 
views. This method also allowed the interviews to flow naturally, with the aim of 
achieving a true reflection of the interviewees’ sentiments relating to the main 
variables. These were designed in such a way as not to deter recipients during the 
interviews from answering as truthfully as possible. The data collected through the 
one-to-one interviews was important in testing the explanations for the breakthrough 
of the BNP in Nuneaton.  
One of the major problems of any study into the British far right is the 
problem of finding participants, who are at first willing to admit supporting the far 
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right, and second, willing to explain truthfully their reasons for giving electoral 
support to a far right party. This was one of the most difficult areas of this analysis. 
For example, encouraging BNP councillors, activists, members, and voters to 
participate, offered many challenges. First, BNP councillors proved the most reluctant 
to be interviewed. In fact, after several attempts to contact the councillors the idea that 
these interviews could be secured was abandoned. There is a reluctance of the 
councillors to talk to academics because of a perceived mistrust of the establishment, 
which Universities are more than often linked to. Although interviewing the two 
councillors at the heart of the BNP’s 2008 electoral victory in Nuneaton would have 
been of considerable benefit, it is the views of electors that most needed to be 
captured in order to inform this thesis. Alongside other electors and activists of other 
parties, the study interviewed one former BNP activist, and several BNP members and 
voters (refer to Appendix I for full participant list).  
Recruitment for the one-to-one interviews was important. Participants were 
invited to take part using the online documents attached to the questionnaire, 
including a link to an invitation to take part in one-to-one interviews and focus 
groups. Although this did not prove as fruitful as anticipated amongst BNP 
supporters, some Labour voters were recruited for the focus groups via this method. 
Potential voters were also contacted using local contacts in Nuneaton and through 
local community meetings. This proved more positive, with eight BNP voters, 
members and activists taking part. The two local Labour councillors, the local 
Member of Parliament, and one local community leader were approached directly, 
and also agreed to participate.  
In addition to one-to-one interviews, this study benefited from the data 
produced by two focus groups. The first focus group included four participants which 
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included one BNP voter, two Labour Party voters, and one who voted Independent. 
The second focus group included three Labour party voters. The two focus groups 
were set up to discuss many of the points that were raised in the returned 
questionnaires, and expand on particular areas of analysis. They differed from the 
one-to-one interviews in that they enabled participants with different views to discuss 
the issues raised in this study, which was important in recall-aiding and in participants 
stimulating responses which may otherwise have been omitted in a one-to-one 
scenario.    
Alongside identifying the most appropriate methods for this research, the 
study also paid attention to its ethical responsibilities. In particular, concerns 
regarding confidentiality and accessibility were considered. Ethical approval was 
gained from Coventry University in 2011. Prior to any interview taking place, 
informants were advised of the study’s objectives, how the data would be used, that 
they were guaranteed anonymity, and they could withdraw at any time. This was set 
out clearly in the participant information sheet, which was also accompanied by an 
informed consent form. The form asked participants if they had read the participant 
information sheet, understood that the participation was voluntary and could withdraw 
at any time without reason, and that all information was treated in the strictest 
confidence. It also stated clearly that all data would be recorded, anonymised, 
transcribed, and then the recording destroyed. 
Once the interviews and focus groups were completed they were transcribed in 
full. The transcripts were then analysed. The interview data was examined using a 
conventional content analysis.
7
 The analysis began by reading all the qualitative data 
collected, key words and themes were then highlighted, and relationships between the 
                                                          
7 For further details relating to the conventional content analysis and thematic content analysis refer to Hsieh and 
Shannon (2005), and Seale (2012: 366-392).  
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data were established. This included a full examination of the key themes relating to 
the main variables this study was testing. This data was then analysed again indicating 
themes which were replicated in the qualitative responses. While analysing the 
transcripts it also became evident that other themes began to emerge. For example it 
became clear that there was a fear of Muslims and Islam in the responses from BNP 
supporters. These findings were very significant for this study and provided valuable 
data which highlighted the link between Islamophobia and support for the BNP in 
Nuneaton.  
Through the use of interviews and focus groups it was possible to produce 
data which were used to test the importance of the variables in this study. The 
interviews and focus groups were used to demonstrate the link between particular 
variables and increasing BNP support in the area. Indeed, using the results gathered 
from the interviews and focus groups, the case will be made that immigration, 
Islamophobia and the media were of greater significant in explaining support for the 
BNP. The next section will now focus on archival research, and how this will be 
applied to this analysis. 
 
Archival research 
A final research technique applied to support this thesis was the analysis of the 
archival data. Archival research was required due to the integration of various 
materials and documents relating to this research. This included the analysis of textual 
material and digital texts. These resources were varied in their type and number, and 
were available from a range of sources. This includes a substantial amount of primary 
and secondary sources, which were accessed in the production of data for this study. 
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This next section will highlight the archival research conducted, and how important 
this technique was to this study.  
There was a range of sources available, which were used to support this 
research. These sources included local newspapers available from online archives, 
archives available on microfilm, and national newspapers available online and 
collected in the course of this research. In order to utilise these sources of data the 
local newspaper archives were searched. These were accessed using the digital 
archives, available online and the local archives in Nuneaton central library, which are 
stored on microfilm.  
As highlighted in the literature review, examination of previous studies 
demonstrates that some scholars support the view that tabloid hysteria surrounding 
immigration, asylum and Islamophobia had benefited the BNP (Goodwin 2011b; John 
et al. 2006; Eatwell 2003; Renton 2003). This is because as Goodwin notes, BNP 
voters “tend to read tabloid newspapers which are hostile toward immigration, namely 
the Daily Mail, Daily Express and The Sun. In 2009, nationally more than half of BNP 
voters read one of these newspapers (or the Daily Star), suggesting that xenophobic 
coverage is an important factor in understanding what drives support for the extreme 
right” (2011b: 107). Therefore, this study also tested the explanations in the literature, 
which shows the BNP voters read certain tabloids in order to demonstrate that this 
was also replicated in Nuneaton amongst BNP voters.  
In order to carry out the analysis of the media, archival research was 
necessary. This included research of the local and national newspapers. These sources 
were used to provide data for analysis, relating to the salience of news stories which 
can help explain the growth in support for the BNP prior to the elections in Nuneaton 
in 2008. The main local newspapers were analysed first, utilising the archives based 
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in Nuneaton, and newspaper articles available online. Examples of the local 
newspapers that were used for this analysis include the Heartland Evening News 
(which became the Nuneaton News in 2009), as well as the Coventry Telegraph. 
Issues of the Coventry Telegraph are available online, between 2001 and 2012, 
whereas the Heartland Evening News (Nuneaton News) was available on microfilm at 
Nuneaton Central Library. The analysis of the Heartland Evening News (Nuneaton 
News) was detailed, and included a key word search on 13 years of newspapers, 
printed daily, between 1999 and 2012. This period was chosen because in 1999 Nick 
Griffin became leader of the BNP and began his modernisation process, and 2012 
witnessed the BNP vote collapse in the town. Focus then turns to news stories from 
the main national tabloid newspapers. The newspapers at a national level which were 
analysed included tabloids, The Sun, Daily Mail, Daily Express and Daily Star. These 
were to a large extent available through online digital archives. These were used to 
analyse the media and its effect on BNP support in Nuneaton. Deciding on which 
newspapers to analyse was based on those papers which previous analyses have 
indicated tended to be read by BNP voters (Goodwin 2011b). Moreover, the 
newspapers chosen are also amongst the top ten most read newspapers, according to 
the National Readership Survey conducted in 2013. However it is worth noting here 
that not all newspapers used as part of the discourse analysis in chapter eight were 
included on the questionnaire. Two newspapers which are in the top ten most read 
national newspapers, the Daily Express and the Daily Telegraph, were not included. 
Whilst not an exhaustive list of newspapers was used, those used do provide a 
snapshot of the most popular tabloids read by voters and further analysis of the 
interview data does suggest that the newspapers were amongst those which BNP 
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voters typically tend to read. Indeed the data produced and analysed in chapter eight 
does indicate that BNP voters tend to read the main tabloids.      
Analysing the data produced for this study of the media involved both a 
content and discourse analysis of printed and written media sources. The content and 
discourse analysis were very important elements of the research conducted.  
According to Kolbe and Burnett a content analysis is “an observational research 
method that is used to systematically evaluate the symbolic content of all forms of 
recorded communication. These communications can also be analysed at many levels 
(image, word, roles, etc.), thereby creating a realm of research opportunities” (1991: 
243). Many scholars have analysed and discussed the benefits of a content analysis. 
For instance, Krippendorff stated that a content analysis provides “aggregate accounts 
of inferences from large bodies of data that reveal trends, patterns and differences” 
(1989: 404) and that it “may also parallel other research techniques and check or shed 
light on the validity of either’s findings” (1989: 406). This view was also shared by 
Elo and Kyngäs who argued that a “content analysis allows the researcher to test 
theoretical issues to enhance understanding of the data” (2008: 107). A further 
justification for the use of content analysis when examining the newspaper content 
has also been offered. For example a content analysis was chosen because as 
Lombard, Snyder-Duch and Bracken note, it is “specifically appropriate and 
necessary for (arguably) the central work of communication scholars, in particular 
those who study mass communication: the analysis of messages” (2002: 587), a 
viewed also mirrored in the work of Krippendorff who states that “content analysis is 
indigenous to communication research and is potentially one of the most important 
techniques in the social sciences” (1989: 403). In fact Krippendorff notes that 
“content analysis allows researchers to establish their own context for inquiry, thus 
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opening the door to a rich repertoire of social-scientific constructs by which texts may 
become meaningful in ways that a culture may not be aware of” (1989: 404). 
However, there are challenges to content analysis which were considered. Elo and 
Kyngäs 2008 note that one challenge of content analysis is “the fact that it is very 
flexible and there is no simple, ‘right’ way of doing it” (2008: 113).
8
 Nevertheless, 
with these limitations considered a content analysis was conducted as part of this 
study, and it remains a valuable tool when analysing newspaper content. This was 
highlighted by Seale and Tonkiss who state that content analysis is a clear and 
systematic way to study data for both analysis and interpretation, but more 
importantly it has a “high degree of validity reliability in terms of precise sampling, 
providing clear empirical evidence for research findings, and in allowing for 
replication and generalisation” (2012: 460).  
The first element of the newspaper content analysis involved simply analysing 
the appearance of particular words or themes. This is referred to as a manifest content 
analysis and was focused primarily on the usage of particular words in the local 
newspapers (Tonkiss 2012; Hsieh and Shannon 2005: Downe-Wamboldt 1992). 
Tonkiss states that the “common starting point for analysis is to locate key categories, 
themes and terms” and that “identifying recurrent or significant themes can help you 
to manage the data and bring a more systematic order to the analytic process” (2012: 
413). In order to analyse the written press the keywords or themes for this research 
were derived from the interview data and questionnaire data. The five reoccurring key 
words or themes were immigration, asylum, Islam, Muslim and terrorism, and this 
represented the coding scheme used to analyse the local newspapers. The main aim of 
the content analysis was to determine whether there was a rise or fall in the number of 
                                                          
8 For further examination of the limitations of content analysis, specifically commitment to be quantitative and 
replicability, refer to Krippendorff (1989). 
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stories in the local written newspapers and online news relating to the five key 
themes. In fact as the findings indicated in chapter eight, the number of stories 




Following the content analysis a detailed examination of the discourse was 
conducted. The use of discourse analysis in this study was also important. As 
Alvesson and Karreman note, “language (and language use) is increasingly being 
understood as the most important phenomenon, accessible for empirical investigation, 
in social and organisational research” (2000: 1126). There is of course debate on 
exactly what the word discourse means. However, as Starks and Trinidad state, “the 
objective of a discourse analysis is to understand what people are doing with their 
language in a given situation. Thus, the coding phase for a discourse analysis entails 
identifying themes and roles as signified through language use” (2007: 1376). 
Therefore the coding for chapter eight, which looked at the written press, was applied 
based on specific themes. This focused on specific stories relating to the five key 
themes. The aim of the discourse analysis was to demonstrate how the press reported 
on the five themes including the demonising of immigrants and coverage of the BNP 
in the local written press. Choosing the stories which reflected discourse in relation to 
the five themes was conducted by printing and analysing all stories written on the five 
themes in the local press and through a search of the national press reporting on these 
issues. What the analysis of the newspaper discourse demonstrated was evidence of 
systematic ‘othering’ and Islamophobia. A detailed examination of the newspaper 
discourse will be offered in chapter eight.  
This data was also used to test the effects of the ‘perceived’ immigration 
problem, national perceptions relating to bogus asylum seekers, and rising 
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Islamophobia. It analysed both local and national press coverage during the first 
decade of the twenty first century, focusing primarily on the reporting of immigration 
and asylum. This work also benefited from BNP material and election data for the 
local area. As shown above, the role of the media was important. The production of 
the empirical data from the archival research enabled this research to test the 
variables, alongside the data produced by the other methods applied in this thesis. It is 
evident that no one data set provides all the necessary information, but rather data was 
used and applied to each individual variable, in a valid and justified method.  
 
Summary 
This chapter has set out the methodological framework that was followed in this 
research, and was essential to complete this research. It utilised the techniques 
outlined in this chapter including questionnaires, focus groups, interviews and 
archival research in order to produce the data required. It demonstrates how the data 
was collected and applied to test the explanations for the success of the BNP in 2008. 
Through the use of semi-structured interviews and focus groups, this study 
seeks to shed new light on the theoretical arguments, and add to the existing 
knowledge that has sought to explain why the far right were attracting a wider 
support. This chapter has offered an overview of the questionnaire, why it was used, 
how it was designed, and how the data were collected. Analysis of this data in the 
subsequent chapters was used to strengthen and test the argument that a particular set 
of variables must be in place if the far right are to experience any level of electoral 
success. Testing the variables using the questionnaire, interview techniques and 
archival research, also allowed the data to be triangulated. On reflection, the most 
disappointing aspect of collecting the data, using the questionnaire and interview 
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techniques, was the low response rate and the reluctance of former BNP councillors to 
participate, although this is not surprising considering the level of questionnaire 
fatigue and apathy. However, this does not mean that these methods should not have 
been used to produce data, or that the data collected is any less valid. The data 
produced offered the researcher the opportunity to develop ideas and themes in the 
focus groups and interviews. It is these individual and group interviews that provided 
the richest primary data. Archival research and the literature analysis also 
complimented the other research techniques, and highlighted the arguments, tested the 
explanations, and demonstrated the relationship between variables. In fact it is 
possible to draw many positives from the data collected, as the following chapters 
demonstrate.   
Applying the methodology set out in this chapter, enabled this study to 
highlight and test the main factors that were imperative in the success of the BNP in 
the Barpool and Camp Hill wards of Nuneaton in the 2008 local elections. It focused 
specifically on the variables, immigration, unemployment, political disaffection and 
corruption, fragmentation, the role of the BNP and its leader, the media, political 
opportunity structures, and the analysis of rising Islamophobia in order to understand 
further why the BNP succeeded in 2008. The Nuneaton data was put into context with 
the broader political environment, and through comparison of local studies that have 
been completed on BNP breakthrough. The findings from this test of the literature 
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Chapter 3 
   
Socioeconomics and the BNP in Nuneaton 
 
As seen in the previous review of the literature, the link between socioeconomics and 
the rise of the far right continues to be viewed as an important explanation of success. 
Indeed, this was highlighted by Eatwell in his economic interest thesis which looked 
at the association between far right voting and economic interests (2003: 56). Scholars 
have also analysed the social and economic profile of BNP voters (Harrison and 
Bruter 2011; Ford and Goodwin 2010: Rhodes 2009; John et al. 2006). Ford and 
Goodwin (2010) argued in their study, that BNP supporters have a clear social profile: 
“they are predominantly middle-aged working-class men with few educational 
qualifications. Although they are concentrated in working-class jobs, BNP voters are 
not particularly poor – they are no more likely to live in government-provided 
housing, and are only slightly more likely to be unemployed” (2010: 3). Moreover, 
Harrison and Bruter argue that it is “socio-economic problems such as widespread 
unemployment, large scale deindustrialisation, inflationary pressures, a widening gap 
between rich and poor all seem to build up frustration and anxiety about what the 
future may hold, providing a fertile ground for parties of the extreme right” (2011: 
13). This chapter will test these explanations using current theories in the literature 
and using the data available for Nuneaton. More significantly to this research, it will 
test the theory that specific socioeconomic factors can help provide ‘fertile’ ground 
for the far right. It will serve to test the first suggested demand-side explanation of the 
rise of the BNP, assessing whether evidence from Nuneaton supports the 
socioeconomic hypothesis advanced by the authors highlighted above. 
In order to test these socioeconomic explanations, this chapter will concentrate 
on how voters ranked social and economic issues. Moreover, the social and economic 
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environment in which the BNP gained electoral success in 2008, and how the 
economic circumstances of voters influenced their decision to vote for a particular 
party will be examined. First, the chapter will analyse the social and economic data 
relating to Nuneaton. Second, it will examine unemployment and the effects of the 
economic downturn on voter choice. The focus will then turn to the link between 
social class and BNP support, analysing employment, housing and education. Finally, 
an analysis of whether BNP voters are more greatly represented by a particular age 
group within society is offered. Throughout this work the analysis will demonstrate 
that although most BNP voters in Nuneaton represent ‘a particular social group’, it 
does not offer any evidence for why they supported the far right, rather it 
demonstrates how socioeconomic factors in Nuneaton were beneficial to the BNP.  
All together, the analysis undertaken within these four sections suggests that 
although the BNP voters do indeed belong to a ‘particular’ social group, belonging to 
this social group is not in itself an explanation for supporting this party. It is a case of 
socioeconomic factors providing a suitable and required environment for strong BNP 
support, but they are not a central catalyst persuading voters to vote in this manner. It 
is a case of socioeconomic factors in Nuneaton providing ‘fertile ground’ for the BNP 
to exploit, but, as it will be seen, the variables assessed in the following chapters of 
this thesis offer more immediate explanations for the BNP’s 2008 success.   
 
Deprivation, Poverty and Unemployment in Nuneaton 
This section will offer an analysis of the social and economic data available for 
Nuneaton. Like many other parts of the country where the BNP have achieved 
‘success’ or ‘breakthrough’, Nuneaton has particular problems related to deprivation, 
poverty and unemployment. For example, the levels of deprivation in several of the 
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wards in Nuneaton are amongst the highest in England, and it was within these 
socioeconomically deprived areas two BNP councillors were elected (specifically the 
wards of Barpool and Camp Hill).  
 
Barpool and Camp Hill Wards 
First it is important to offer an understanding of the case study location which will be 
tested. Nuneaton and Bedworth is one of five boroughs in the County of 
Warwickshire, which includes North Warwickshire, Rugby, Warwick and Stratford-
upon-Avon (Map 1.), and sits in the north of the county.  
Map 1. The County of Warwickshire 
 
      Source: Warwickshire County Council (2009) 
 
Despite its small geographic size, this borough has the second largest population in 
the county, resulting in a high population density of 15.3 persons per hectare, 
compared with the average in Warwickshire which is 2.6 persons per hectare 
(Nuneaton and Bedworth Borough Council 2010). The borough is largely urban in 
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nature. The towns, due to their position at the centre of Warwickshire’s coal fields, 





Centuries as a consequence of the Industrial Revolution, with new industries 
developing in the region. This included mining, a textile industry and munitions 
factories. This industrial background has similarities with the Burnley BNP case 
study, as highlighted by Rhodes (2009), which had a large textile and manufacturing 
industry. Moreover, like Burnley and many other former industrial towns, Nuneaton 
has seen these jobs diminish in the post-war de-industrialisation period, with local 
employment being replaced by service based jobs. In fact, Rhodes highlights that 
Burnley suffered from “acute socioeconomic deprivation” which resulted from the 
collapse of the town’s manufacturing base (2009: 27-28). This was a key feature 
expressed by BNP voters in the town and offers an interesting comparison with 
Nuneaton, which has also seen the collapse of large scale industries. Although this 
does not explain why the BNP were successful in these locations by itself, it does help 
to explain, as seen below, the underlying causes of disillusionment and disaffection 
related to socioeconomic deprivation.     
 In addition to the county data, analysis will now focus specifically on the 
social and economic data for the two case study locations, Barpool (Map 2) and Camp 
Hill (Map 3). This will be fundamental when comparing the breakthrough in locations 
such as Burnley with the success of the BNP in Nuneaton. First it offers an overview 
of the Camp Hill location followed by the Barpool area. It will look specifically at the 
data produced using the Census, and the data relating to deprivation from Super 
Output Areas (SOA). SOAs are simply the reporting of small area statistics in specific 
geographical locations. The SOA analysis of deprivation looks at four variables which 
includes, the proportion of male unemployment, the proportion of overcrowded 
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households, the proportion with no car/van ownership, and the proportion that are 
considered to be in a low social class.  
Camp Hill is one of the most deprived wards in Warwickshire and is located in 
the north of Nuneaton, sharing a border with Barpool, and according to the Census 
completed in 2011, the population of Camp Hill Ward was 7,321 (ONS 2011). 
According to the report completed for Warwickshire County Council, Camp Hill is 
ranked as the second most deprived Super Output Area (SOA) in Warwickshire, and 
amongst the worst 10% of the 32,482 SOAs in England (Warwick Observatory 2004). 
Moreover, analyses of the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) shows that four of the 
five locations in Camp Hill ward are ranked within the top 30 per cent most deprived 
SOAs in England. In fact, the Village Centre in Camp Hill is ranked within the top 5 
per cent nationally, and is the second most deprived SOA in Warwickshire (Warwick 
Observatory 2011a). The ward has a very poor level of housing, which includes 
estates that were originally built in the 1950s and 1960s. The area has experienced 
particular problems including poverty, high unemployment, low quality public 
housing, and the ward shows signs of neglect (Warwick Observatory 2011a). It was 
within this socioeconomically deprived area that the BNP councillor Darren John 
Haywood was elected to the local council. Haywood secured 36 per cent of the vote in 
the 2008 local elections and became the first BNP councillor to represent the ward of 
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Map 2. Camp Hill Ward, Nuneaton and Bedworth 
 
Source: Warwickshire Police Authority (2006)  
 
The second area that is the focus of this study is the ward of Barpool (Map 3). 
The Barpool ward is in the north of the borough of Nuneaton and Bedworth bordering 
Camp Hill. According to the Census completed in 2001, the population of Barpool 
Ward was 7,451 (ONS 2001). The analysis of the index of multiple deprivation data 
for Nuneaton and Bedworth indicates that in 2009 Barpool was ranked as the most 
deprived SOA in the County of Warwickshire. Barpool was also ranked at 1,087th out 
of the 32,482 SOAs in England, which placed it in the top 4 per cent of the most 
deprived SOAs nationally (Warwickshire Observatory 2007). It is clear from the data 
that Barpool, like Camp Hill, suffers from a lack of decent housing, and has also 
experienced particular problems including poverty and high unemployment. The ward 
also has a high proportion of elderly residents, who claim pension credits, and 
families who claim free school meals (Warwickshire Observatory 2007). 
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Map 3. Barpool Ward, Nuneaton and Bedworth 
 
Source: Warwickshire Police Authority (2006) 
 
Furthermore, the IMD shows that 91.8 per cent of families in Barpool claim Child 
Tax Credit, which is in comparison considerably higher than the County figure of 
74.2 per cent. The data also shows that in Barpool one in five children is considered to 
be living in poverty (Warwick Observatory 2011a). It was in these socioeconomic 
conditions that the BNP councillor, Martyn Findley, was elected to the local council 
after securing 34 per cent of the votes in the 2008 local elections (Nuneaton and 
Bedworth 2010a).  
Evidently, in Camp Hill and Barpool there are particular problems relating to 
poverty and deprivation, and the analysis of deprivation is central to this research. 
Indeed, Barpool and Camp Hill offer many similarities and differences with other 
locations where the BNP was successful. For example, John et al. (2006) in their 
analysis found that when the income of a ward increases so does the BNP vote, and 
for this reason the correlation cannot be applied to the wards which they analysed. 
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They argued that that “overall, it seems, the poorer the ward the less likely the BNP 
are to do well” (John et al. 2006: 15). This view is shared by Rhodes who in his study 
of the BNP breakthrough in Burnley found that “while BNP support has been 
concentrated within some of the most deprived boroughs in England, within these 
districts it has been drawn from those living in the relatively more affluent wards” 
(2010: 82).  
Contradicting this literature, the ‘more affluent’ hypothesis is not supported by 
the evidence collected by the current thesis. Clearly, the wards of Barpool and Camp 
Hill are not the most affluent wards in Nuneaton. Indeed, John et al.’s analysis 
suggesting that as the proportion of claimants in a ward goes down the BNP vote goes 
up, does not resonate with the situation in Nuneaton (2006: 15). For example, in 
Nuneaton, where the BNP succeeded in being elected in 2008, there is a high level of 
deprivation and poverty, compared to elsewhere in the borough. Barpool and Camp 
Hill are two of the poorest wards in Nuneaton. This is a view shared by one local 
Labour councillor who when questioned on the level of deprivation in the ward, and 
whether this was a factor in the BNP’s success replied: 
Well I would say yes, and statistically I picked up on this when door knocking, 
the BNP votes were in the poorest voting districts. So, and I know just from 
speaking to ex-BNP supporters, they had nowhere else to go, they were in the 
most deprived streets, and I think those parts of Barpool and Camp Hill are 




This Nuneaton evidence does not mean that poverty and deprivation were not factors 
in Burnley. Indeed, Rhodes argues that the BNP in Burnley achieved a breakthrough 
against the backdrop of poverty, unemployment and deprivation and a feeling that 
Burnley had been “neglected by Labour” (2009: 29). It is also evident that, like 
                                                          
9 This is the code representing author’s interviews. To view the list of interview participants in greater detail please refer to 
Appendix I. 
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Nuneaton, Burnley includes wards which are ranked amongst the most deprived in the 
country. For example, Rhodes in his analysis of Burnley highlighted that the town 
was rated the 37
th
 most deprived district in the country, and that a quarter of the 
population reside in areas which are within the 10 per cent most deprived in the 
country (2009: 28). However, the studies by John et al. (2006) and Rhodes (2009: 30) 
demonstrate that although BNP support was concentrated in the poorest boroughs in 
England, like Nuneaton and Bedworth, it was the more affluent wards which 
surrounded these that attracted the greatest numbers of BNP voters. Therefore, in 
Nuneaton the case studies do not necessarily fit this ‘typical’ location model, due to 
the high levels of poverty and deprivation in the case study wards, but it does so far as 
BNP support appears to be the greatest in “economically deprived, urban areas” 
(Bowyer 2008: 617). Indeed, this analysis correlates with the evidence offered by 
Bowyer in that the BNP breakthrough occurred in locations which are urban and 
economically deprived.   
Therefore, we can see by this brief analysis of the location, examining 
deprivation and poverty, that the BNP achieved success in one of the poorest 
boroughs in Warwickshire, but more importantly in the two of the most economically 
deprived wards. The next section will analyse socioeconomic factors in greater detail, 
beginning with an analysis of unemployment and economic decline. 
 
Unemployment and the far right vote 
Alongside deprivation and poverty, it is also important to analyse the attitudes 
towards unemployment and the effects of the economic downturn. Indeed, as the 
literature previously identified, unemployment and economics can play a role in 
creating conditions favourable to a far right breakthrough (Givens 2005; Golder 2003; 
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Jackman and Volpert 1996). Therefore, this next section will examine the local 
economy, unemployment, and the demise of the town’s traditional industries.  
Historically in Nuneaton many people were employed in Warwickshire’s coal 
fields, textile industry and munitions factories. As with many former industrial towns 
it has suffered greatly due to de-industrialisation. Evidently, the collapse in industry in 
Nuneaton has followed a similar pattern to that experienced in Burnley due to de-
industrialisation, with an increase in low-skilled jobs and low-income households. For 
example, Rhodes pointed to the collapse of industry in Burnley which led directly to a 
decline in manufacturing jobs and a rise in “low-paid, low skilled work within the 
service industries” (2009: 28). Rhodes also highlighted how by 2002 56 per cent of 
households in Burnley had gross earnings of less than £15,000, which when you 
compare with the national as a whole, 44.2 per cent, shows the increased level of 
those earning low wages (2009: 28). There is evidence to support the view that 
Nuneaton has also suffered similar economic and social upheaval which mirrors 
Burnley, evident in the numbers of unemployed, low paid, and low skilled workers. 
For example, in the area of Barpool North and Crescents 24.7 per cent of households’ 
earnings were below £10,000, and in Camp Hill Village Centre locality 23.5 per cent 
of household earnings are below £10,000 (Warwick Observatory 2004). Indeed, the 
data show that in Nuneaton and Bedworth 12.3 per cent of households earned less 
than £10,000, which was higher than the County as a whole (Table 9).  
Table 9: Low Income Households 2004     
  
Households earning 
less than £32,000 % 
Households earning 
less than £10,000 % 
Households 
earning less than 
£5,000 % 
Nuneaton and Bedworth 64.5 12.3 4.3 
Warwickshire 59.3 11.1 4.1 
                Source: Warwickshire County Council CACI Paycheck Data (2004 )  
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Moreover, the analysis of the typical gross annual wage in the County of 
Warwickshire demonstrates that wages for residents of Nuneaton and Bedworth are 
amongst the lowest in the County, at £21,652, with Tamworth and Coventry being 
slightly lower (Table 10). 
Table 10: Typical gross annual wage, full time workers, 2006 
 Residence Workplace 
 
North Warwickshire £21,998 £23,560 
Nuneaton and Bedworth £21,652 £19,908 
Rugby £24,307 £22,510 
Stratford-on-Avon £28,130 £24,934 
Warwick £27,683 £25,180 
Warwickshire £25,099 £23,562 
Hinckley and Bosworth £22,060 £19,908 
Coventry £21,487 £25,167 
Tamworth £21,274 £23,400 
South Staffordshire £22,420 £22,099 
England  £25,008 £24,948 
 
Source: Nuneaton and Bedworth Borough (2008) 
 (Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), National Statistics)  
 
However, there are many areas where the BNP have stood, and there is an increased 
level of poverty and wage disparity, yet they have not succeeded in garnering 
increased electoral support. It will therefore be necessary to examine further in this 
section the impact of de-industrialisation, unemployment and the recession in rising 
support for the BNP, and whether there is any evidence of a causal relationship.  
In addition to low skilled and low paid workers, there have been attempts by 
scholars to demonstrate a relationship specifically between unemployment and the 
success of far right parties across Europe. The evidence from Nuneaton supports this 
link. For example, Nuneaton and Bedworth Borough had highest levels of claimants 
on job seekers allowance in the county, and in the Barpool and Camp Hill wards the 
percentage of the adult population claiming Job Seeker’s Allowance (JSA) are both 
considerably higher than the County average (Warwick Observatory 2011a). In fact, 
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the percentage jumps dramatically for those living in both Camp Hill and Barpool. In 
2009 Barpool North and Crescent, which is representative of the Ward, had the 
highest JSA claimant rate in the whole County, 11.9 per cent (Table 11). This is 
nearly three times higher than the national average. The data also demonstrates that 
the JSA claimant rate in Camp Hill was also higher than the average rate at 8.6 per 
cent (Table 11).   
Table 11: Job Seekers Allowance Claimants 2009 (Average) 
UK 3.90% 
Warwickshire 3.80% 
Nuneaton and Bedworth 5.50% 
Camp Hill 8.60% 
Barpool North and Crescents  11.90% 
  
Source: Nomis (2009)/Warwick Observatory 
(2009) 
 
Furthermore, the analysis of BNP supporters who responded to the questionnaire 
identifies that 30 per cent were unemployed (Table 12). However this should not be 
overstated, as 70 per cent were employed or stated other, and those who voted for the 
Green Party were also likely to be unemployed at 33 per cent (Table 12).   
The importance of unemployment, as well as arguments that it is statistically 
insignificant, has been highlighted in the literature. For example, Goodwin states that 
the “working class and unemployed are more likely to vote for the party” (2011: 108), 
whereas Bowyer states that “neither the unemployment rate nor the percentage of the 
workforce employed in the manufacturing sector had a statistically significant effect 
on latent support for the BNP” (2008: 617). 
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Table 12: Why did you vote for a particular party or candidate during the local elections in 
 your town in 2008? [Your current employment status?]  
  
Your current employment status? 
Total 
Employed                                                          
full-time 
Employed 
part-time Other Student Unemployed 
Who did 
you vote 
for in the 
2008 local 
elections? 
Labour   60 15 31 6 12 124 
  48% 12% 25% 5% 10% 100% 
Conservative   31 9 28 0 2 70 
  44% 13% 40% 0% 3% 100% 
Liberal 
Democrats 
  17 3 5 0 2 27 
  63% 11% 19% 0% 7% 100% 
BNP   15 4 4 0 10 33 
  45% 12% 12% 0% 30% 100% 
Green Party   1 0 3 0 2 6 
  17% 0% 50% 0% 33% 100% 
UKIP   4 1 0 0 0 5 
  80% 20% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
Independent   1 0 1 0 0 2 
  50% 0% 50% 0% 0% 100% 
Did not vote   14 11 3 7 4 39 
  36% 28% 8% 18% 10% 100% 
Other   1 0 1 0 0 2 
  50% 0% 50% 0% 0% 100% 
Total   144 43 76 13 32 308 
  47% 14% 25% 4% 10% 100% 
            Source: Nuneaton Questionnaire 2012 
 
Analysis of the data produced by the questionnaire and interviews does to some extent 
corroborate Goodwin’s view. However, although the data shows that 30 per cent of 
BNP voters were unemployed, it was not the most important issue for BNP voters 
who responded to the questionnaire, and 57 per cent were either in full-time or part-
time employment (Table 12). In comparison, 73 per cent of Labour voters either 
strongly agreed or agreed with the statement, ‘The party will reduce unemployment’, 
whereas only 50 per cent of BNP voters either strongly agreed or agreed (Table 13). 
Although it is worth noting that in comparison to BNP voters only 10 per cent of 
Labour voters stated they were unemployed. The view that unemployment was 
important for Labour voters was indicated by one respondent who when asked the 
question, what he believed was the most important issue facing Nuneaton, simply 
replied “unemployment” (FG2P1 2012). In support, another Labour voter in response 
to the same question also stated that “unemployment” was the most important issue 
facing the town (FG2P3 2012). 
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Table 13: Why did you vote for a particular party or candidate during the local elections in 








you vote for 




25 48 38 7 2 120 
21% 40% 32% 6% 2% 100% 
Conservative 
9 18 28 6 1 62 
15% 29% 45% 10% 2% 100% 
Liberal 
Democrats 
0 8 12 5 1 26 
0% 31% 46% 19% 4% 100% 
BNP 
9 7 14 1 1 32 
28% 22% 44% 3% 3% 100% 
Green Party 
0 2 4 0 0 6 
0% 33% 67% 0% 0% 100% 
UKIP 
1 1 2 0 0 4 
25% 25% 50% 0% 0% 100% 
Independent 
0 0 2 0 0 2 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 100% 
Did not vote 
2 2 4 2 3 13 
15% 15% 31% 15% 23% 100% 
Other 
0 0 2 0 0 2 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 100% 
Total 
46 86 106 21 8 267 
17% 32% 40% 8% 3% 100% 
   
      Source: Nuneaton Questionnaire 2012 
 
The analysis of unemployment demonstrates that this factor is indeed present, but it 
should not be overstated as BNP voters themselves prioritised other issues. It is within 
the context of the economic and social change that it appears to have had a greater 
effect.  
It was also evident from respondents, that BNP supporters do not believe that 
the mainstream parties had the answer to economic woes. Rather the majority of BNP 
voters view themselves as victims of global economic changes rather than the 
beneficiaries. For example, one BNP voter and activist argued that the white British 
lower classes and the unemployed are being left out in the global economic race, and 
that the government no longer care, stating that: 
Attitudes to the long term unemployed are wrong. I mean most people given the 
choice wouldn’t be unemployed. They want to work; they do not do it through 
choice. It just seems like the government always attack them and want to sting 
you with something. It is like one thing after another. If you are on benefits or 
John Grima  116 
 
unemployed, after one year or two years they are after you. Why don’t they just 
bring the workhouse back, you know what I mean? They just seem to punish the 
wrong people (O2OI2 2012). 
 
Although unemployment was not the priority for these informants, it was noted. 
Additionally as is shown in chapter four, unemployment comes more to the fore when 
it is linked with the issue of immigration. This link was examined in the review of the 
literature, and will be analysed in further detail, with particular reference to the 
analysis of the immigration variable in chapter four.  
 Additionally, the data show that particular areas in Nuneaton have been 
greatly affected by economic fragility, and the downturn caused by the recession. 
Indeed, many respondents highlight the economic problems faced by the town. For 
example, one Labour voter spoke about his view of the town, with reference to the 
downturn in 2008, stating that, “if you walk through Nuneaton town centre the 
amount of shops that are shutting down or shut, which includes big name companies, 
has clearly increased. There are now so many empty shops... There is clearly less 
money about. People just don’t have the income to spend now” (FG2P3 2012). 
Although this voter was affected by the negative effects of the economy, they were 
not drawn to the BNP’s argument. However, as noted in the literature (Bowyer 2008; 
John et al. 2006), there is a belief that the recession, deprivation and economic neglect 
of some locations left many people open to the BNP’s message. Indeed, one Labour 
councillor related the success of the BNP and the collapse in the Labour Party support 
in Nuneaton to the economic downturn in 2008, stating that, “In 2008 people wanted 
to blame someone for the economic crisis, so they pointed the finger at Labour” 
(O2OI3 2012). This view was also aired by one BNP voter, who was scathing of the 
Labour Party, specifically the local council’s economic policy. He stated that: 
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The Labour Party created nothing. They created cosmetic illusions of 
prosperity. They built a fountain, they prettied the town up with flowers, but it 
was the community who still had to pay for them. They spent money to look 
good… I mean it was not just a Labour thing. I have always found the local 
councils to be self-serving. They like the position, the authority, and they like 
somebody else to pay for it. They [local council] whinge about the government 
not giving them enough money so they can put council taxes up more. And if 
you look around it has just not worked, instead they just wasted our money 
(O2OI1 2012). 
 
This BNP voter clearly demonstrates the lack of belief in the economic policies of the 
local council.  
However, by analysing the questionnaire data it appears that for most BNP 
voters the economy was not high on the agenda. For example, when respondents were 
asked if they voted for a party because they can sort out the local economy, BNP 
supporters were less inclined to agree with this statement, with 41 per cent only 
agreeing or strongly agreeing (see Table 14).  
Table 14: Why did you vote for a particular party or candidate during the local elections in 




Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree  
Who did you 




20 48 47 5 1 121 
17% 40% 39% 4% 1% 100% 
Conservative 
14 25 20 2 1 62 
23% 40% 32% 3% 2% 100% 
Liberal Democrats 
1 7 14 3 0 25 
4% 28% 56% 12% 0% 100% 
BNP 
7 6 17 1 1 32 
22% 19% 53% 3% 3% 100% 
Green Party 
0 3 3 0 0 6 
0% 50% 50% 0% 0% 100% 
UKIP 
1 2 1 0 0 4 
25% 50% 25% 0% 0% 100% 
Independent 
0 0 2 0 0 2 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 100% 
Did not vote 
1 2 6 1 3 13 
8% 15% 46% 8% 23% 100% 
Other 
0 1 1 0 0 2 
0% 50% 50% 0% 0% 100% 
Total 
44 94 111 12 6 267 
16% 35% 42% 4% 2% 100% 
   
            Source: Nuneaton Questionnaire 2012 
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In fact, 59 per cent of respondents who voted for the BNP either ticked neutral 
disagree or strongly disagree. Moreover in response to a similar question, but related 
to the national economy, the response was comparable with 53 per cent ticking the 
neutral or disagree boxes (Table 15). Although, it is worth noting that there is a 
negative response to the Labour Party when the economy is mentioned or discussed, 
with one BNP supporter arguing that “Labour governments [and] nearly all Labour 
Councils seemed politically and financially corrupt and self-serving” (O2OI1 2012). 
Table 15: Why did you vote for a particular party or candidate during the local elections in 








you vote for 




23 47 40 7 4 121 
19% 39% 33% 6% 3% 100% 
Conservative 
17 29 13 4 1 64 
27% 45% 20% 6% 2% 100% 
Liberal 
Democrats 
1 6 14 3 2 26 
4% 23% 54% 12% 8% 100% 
BNP 
10 5 15 1 1 32 
31% 16% 47% 3% 3% 100% 
Green Party 
0 2 2 2 0 6 
0% 33% 33% 33% 0% 100% 
UKIP 
1 2 1 0 0 4 
25% 50% 25% 0% 0% 100% 
Independent 
0 0 2 0 0 2 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 100% 
Did not vote 
1 2 4 3 3 13 
8% 15% 31% 23% 23% 100% 
Other 
0 0 2 0 0 2 
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 100% 
Total 
53 93 93 20 11 270 
20% 34% 34% 7% 4% 100% 
   
Source: Nuneaton Questionnaire 2012 
 
Therefore, it is evident from this analysis that although unemployment and the 
economy are important to voters, BNP voters did not rate unemployment or the 
economy high on their list of reasons why they voted for the party when compared 
with immigration and Islam, as will be demonstrated in chapters two and three. 
Moreover, the research has found no evidence of voters consciously identifying the 
recession of 2008 with the rise of the BNP. However, this does not mean that those 
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who voted for the BNP showed a lack of interest in unemployment or the economy. In 
fact 47 per cent of BNP voters who responded did believe the BNP would solve their 
economic problems. Rather, it is this section of the voting population who are at the 
sharp end of any dramatic social and economic upheaval, and they believe the 
mainstream parties have failed in their economic policy. Indeed, the evidence in this 
section points to the fact that for those who voted for the BNP, it is the loss of trust in 
the mainstream parties’ economic policies which created a space for the BNP, rather 
than whether or not the BNP could resolve economic problems. This loss of trust in 
the mainstream parties will be analysed in greater detail in chapter five.  
 
Class and the vote for the BNP 
A further socioeconomic factor identified in the literature review was the connection 
between those who vote for the far right and their social class. John et al. (2006), in 
their examination of the link between social class and support for the BNP, found that 
the BNP typically appealed in areas with a high number of low-middle class voters. 
For example, they found that 54.5 per cent of BNP voters came from the lower middle 
class and skilled working class, and that the BNP received little or no support in 
locations with higher numbers of state beneficiaries and low-paid workers, and less 
well in areas which contained high numbers of middle class or upper class voters 
(John et al. 2006: 14). This view was shared by Rhodes, who in his research of 
Burnley found that BNP support was predominantly in areas which included higher 
levels of the lower middle classes, and less so in areas which had a larger number of 
poor workers and welfare beneficiaries (2006: 30). These views differ from the 
argument put forward in the literature by Goodwin and Evans (2012) who argue that 
BNP supporters “are the most proletarian, providing evidence that support for the 
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party is driven mainly by semi-skilled and unskilled workers, and citizens dependent 
on state benefits” (Goodwin and Evans 2012: 14). Although, the literature offers some 
contrasting results to those found in Nuneaton, they still provide relevant conclusions 
for comparison. For example, as indicated earlier, the BNP gained success, and had 
two councillors elected in the poorest wards in Nuneaton. Therefore, this next section 
will develop an understanding of the social class of the BNP supporters in Nuneaton 
by analysing local ward data, and the data produced by the questionnaire. This will 
look specifically at employment by occupation, housing, and education in Nuneaton 
in order to develop an understanding of the social class of BNP voters.  
 
Employment 
Employment has often been used as a tool to measure class. The examination of the 
evidence in Nuneaton does to a large extent corroborate the finding. In areas where 
the BNP garner support the electorate is less likely to come from a managerial or 
professional background, and are more likely to be from a semi-skilled or unskilled 
employment background. Indeed, John et al. in their study found that 45.5 per cent of 
BNP supporters they analysed were working class or people living at subsistence 
level, and 54.5 per cent were lower middle class or skilled working class, while no 
respondents declared themselves as managerial or professional (2006: 14). The 
analysis of the employment data does to a large extent corroborate these finding. For 
example, Nuneaton and Bedworth Borough has the lowest number of workers 
employed in management roles or as senior officials in Warwickshire, at 11.9 per 
cent, which is considerably lower than the County average of 14.5 per cent. 
Moreover, the number of residents employed as process plant and machine operatives 
in the Borough in 2009 equated to 13.2 per cent, which remains high when compared 
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with the Warwickshire County average of 7 per cent (Warwickshire Observatory 
2009). This has changed little since 2001 when the number employed as process and 
machine operatives stood at around 12.9 per cent (Table 16). However, the analysis of 
the borough level data does not show the true extent of employment roles, specifically 
the differences between borough wide average data and specific ward level data 
relating to Barpool and Camp Hill wards. According to the 2001 Census, the numbers 
of people in management or senior positions are considerably lower than the borough 
average in Barpool, and both wards have, in comparison with the national average, a 
higher than average number of unskilled workers (Table 16). The data also shows that 
in Barpool 18.3 per cent of people are employed in elementary occupations, which 
was statistically higher than the national average of 11.8 per cent (Table 16). 
However, what is interesting when analysing the data is that in Barpool and Camp 
Hill you have the highest number of workers in skilled trades’ occupations; in fact 
both wards are above the national average.  
Table 16: Barpool and Camp Hill 
Occupations of all people in 
employment, April 2001           




Managers and senior officials % 
7.8 12.2 12.1 15.3 
Professional occupations % 
4.7 7.1 8 11.2 
Associate professional and technical 
occupations 
% 
8.7 8.9 10.9 13.8 
Administrative and secretarial 
occupations 
% 
11.4 11.2 12.6 13.4 
Skilled trades occupations % 
16.9 14.8 13.8 11.6 
Personal service occupations % 
7.9 7.9 7.1 6.9 
Sales and customer service occupations % 
7.8 8 7.6 7.7 
Process; plant and machine operatives % 
16.6 15.9 12.9 8.4 
Elementary occupations % 
18.3 14.1 15 11.8 
                            Source: ONS (2001) 
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The analysis of the questionnaire data does offer some correlation with the class 
profile of BNP supporters and employment by occupation. Indeed, by looking at the 
data produced by the questionnaire, out of all respondents who said they voted for the 
BNP, not one respondent was employed in a professional or management role (Table 
17). Those who voted for the BNP were to a large extent employed in the semi-skilled 
or unskilled job sectors, with 60 per cent either working in skilled manual, unskilled 
manual or service industries (Table 17). It was also evident that the largest group 
employed were those working in the skilled manual group, which equated to 27 per 
cent of all those employed. It is worth noting that the data relating to those who were 
retired or unemployed was not independent and therefore the data cannot be 
considered for comparison.  
Table 17:  Who did you vote for in the 2008 local elections? [If you are employed what is 
your job type?     
      Who did you vote for in the 2008 local elections?     
If you are employed what 













































































































































































































Total 124 70 27 33 6 5 2 39 308 
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Housing 
As well as looking at employment in the understanding of the social profile and class 
of BNP supporters, it is also necessary to offer a brief analysis of housing in 
Nuneaton, particularly within the wards of Barpool and Camp Hill. Housing has been 
used as a tool to offer class analysis, be it through the house prices in a location, 
levels of home ownership, or the levels of social housing. The significance of housing 
was analysed by Bowyer who argued that “local housing market conditions also seem 
to have an important effect on the electoral strength of the BNP” (2008: 617). 
Therefore, the analysis of housing conditions in Nuneaton will be important to this 
research.  
Analysis of the data for Barpool and Camp Hill indicates that there are poor 
levels of housing which includes a mixture of social and private housing, and estates 
that were built in the 1950s and 1960s. In a recent study of Camp Hill, it was stated 
that “the characteristics of this locality are dominated by those of the two large 
housing estates, with high proportions living in terraced houses, in social rented 
housing or in households with no car or van” (Warwick Observatory 2011a). The data 
also show that Nuneaton has a greater representation of low income families living in 
estate based social housing, with over 15 per cent living in socially rented 
accommodation, although 76.6 per cent of the population either owns their house 
outright or it is owned with a mortgage or loan (Warwick Observatory 2009).  
Turning to the questionnaire data, analysis shows that only 58 per cent of self-
declared BNP voters in Nuneaton own their own home, whereas, 63 per cent of 
Labour Party respondents and 83 per cent of Conservative Party supporters own their 
own home (Table 18). It is also evident from the data that although 58 per cent of 
BNP voters owned their own home, they were statistically more likely to live in social 
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housing, with 24 per cent of respondents declaring they live in social housing of one 
kind or another (Table 18). Again the evidence points to Nuneaton’s BNP support 
coming from the lower social class rather than lower middle class as indicated by 
some scholars in the literature. 
Table 18: Who did you vote for in the 2008 local elections? [What is your current housing 
status?] 
  















for in the 
2008 local 
elections? 
Labour   77 12 13 9 13 124 
  62% 10% 10% 7% 10% 100% 
Conservative   58 1 8 2 1 70 
  83% 1% 11% 3% 1% 100% 
Liberal 
Democrats 
  16 7 2 1 1 27 
  59% 26% 7% 4% 4% 100% 
BNP   19 3 8 0 3 33 
  58% 9% 24% 0% 9% 100% 
Green Party   4 1 1 0 0 6 
  67% 17% 17% 0% 0% 100% 
UKIP   5 0 0 0 0 5 
  100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
Independent   1 1 0 0 0 2 
  50% 50% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
Did not vote   14 8 3 14 0 39 
  36% 21% 8% 36% 0% 100% 
Other   1 1 0 0 0 2 
  50% 50% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
Total   195 34 35 26 18 308 
  63.3% 11.0% 11.4% 8.4% 5.8% 100.0% 




A further area of analysis highlighted in the literature related to house prices and how 
they correlated with BNP support (Bowyer 2008). The examination of house prices in 
Nuneaton does produce some significant data for analysis. For example, it is evident 
that house prices in Nuneaton and Bedworth are amongst the lowest in Warwickshire, 
in fact nearly 50 per cent cheaper than the county average (Table 19). These results in 
Nuneaton are also comparable with the data collected in Burnley which contains 
housing with average prices well below the national average (Table 19). 
John Grima  125 
 
 


















North Warwickshire 275,949 159,851 128,303 130,990 172,948 
Nuneaton and Bedworth 209,660 129,987 107,843 105,735 134,675 
Rugby 277,743 166,874 139,400 118,866 182,692 
Stratford on Avon 367,842 221,411 188,460 145,017 250,954 
Warwick 347,174 208,558 190,689 163,218 225,263 
Hinckley and Bosworth 241,362 150,808 129,211 104,595 169,414 
Coventry 292,948 156,563 118,501 116,761 140,573 
Tamworth 220,609 139,847 129,082 125,853 151,929 
South Staffordshire 298,503 153,056 154,221 126,560 201,417 
Birmingham 312,327 156,875 126,820 131,000 153,374 
 
 Source: Nuneaton and Bedworth Borough Council (Land Registry) 
 
However, Nuneaton differs from Burnley because it has not witnessed a collapse in 
the town’s housing stock, and although some areas of Nuneaton have housing which 
is below average house prices, and high levels of social housing, it has not suffered a 
huge demise in its housing stock in a similar fashion to that experienced in Burnley. 
Rhodes stated that in Burnley over a quarter of properties were “deemed unfit for 
purpose” (2009:28). However, in Nuneaton although the house prices have not 
collapsed elements of Nuneaton’s housing stock, notably elements of social housing 
and private rented accommodation, does fall below national standards, and it is on this 
point that the area of Camp Hill has many similarities to Burnley. For example, 
according to the report conducted by Nuneaton and Bedworth council which set out 
the borough’s housing strategy, Camp Hill is a “poor physical environment (poor 
quality houses, public realm and built environment) were defining the characteristics of 
the area” (Nuneaton and Bedworth Borough Council 2015:45). Indeed, according to the 
report, parts of Nuneaton have housing which does not meet the Decent Homes Standard 
set out by the government in 2004. Of course it is hard to produce evidence that 
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housing effects the levels of BNP support, indeed as Bowyer argued, neither the 
ward-level homeownership rate nor the percentage living in social housing effect 
levels of support for the far right (2008: 617). However, Bowyer does state that of all 
the housing factors it is the district’s median house price which is negatively related to 
BNP support (2008: 617). Therefore, although housing cannot singularly determine 
why people vote for a particular party, the analysis of housing, when looking at the 
socioeconomics of a locality, can help the researcher to understand the ‘fertile’ 
environment in which the far right gain success. 
 
Education and Far Right support in Nuneaton 
Education is also an important factor in any analysis of social class. As highlighted in 
the review of the literature, BNP candidates were more likely to win votes in the 
wards where the electorate was educated to a lower level (Ford and Goodwin 2010; 
Bowyer 2008; John et al. 2006). For example, John et al. found that the BNP won 
more votes in the wards with a working age population who have fewer than 5 GCSEs 
or equivalent (2006: 15). These findings, that the BNP won more seats in wards with 
voters who had a low educational attainment, were also supported by Ford and 
Goodwin in their analysis, who stated that, “the party’s support levels are higher in 
constituencies with low education levels” (2010: 3).  Bowyer also argued that “in line 
with expectations, the percentage of a ward’s population with high educational 
qualifications is negatively associated with support for the BNP” (2008: 617). Bowyer 
links this with the ‘modernisation loser hypothesis’, which predicts that those without 
a good standard of education do not have the skills to survive in the new global 
economy and therefore are more supportive of the far right (2008: 617).  
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It is evident from the data relating to levels of education in Nuneaton, that 
these are below both the regional and national average. For example, analysis of the 
data provided by Nomis shows that in Nuneaton only 22.4 per cent achieved NVQ4 
and above, compared with the national average of 32.9 per cent (See table 21). It also 
shows that the number of people with no qualifications is 16 per cent, which is well 
above the national average of 10.6 per cent (Table 20). What these statistics do show 
us is that the level of higher education is low in Nuneaton, and it therefore supports 
the argument in the literature that the success of the BNP often occurs in areas with 
low levels of education.  
 
Table 20: Nomis Labour Market Profile Nuneaton and Bedworth   
Qualifications (Jan 2011-Dec 2011) 
      Source: Nomis/ONS 2011 
 
Analysis of educational attainment within the borough of Nuneaton and Bedworth 
also reinforces the importance of education. For example the Camp Hill area is ranked 
125
th
 out of 32,482 SOAs (1 being the worst) when looking at deprivation linked to 
education, skills and training. This has statistically placed it within the bottom 0.5 per 
cent of all SOAs when analysing deprivation (Warwickshire Observatory 2011). 
Moreover, in Barpool ward the levels of education are also very low, with eleven of 
the fourteen SOAs in this locality among the 30 per cent most deprived nationally in 
terms of education, skills and training. The data also highlight that only 33.8 per cent 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be 
viewed at the Lanchester library, Coventry University. 
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of pupils are achieving five or more grades A* to C at GCSE, compared to the 
County’s average of 56.9 per cent.  
The analysis of the education and training of the adult population in Nuneaton 
also offers some data for analysis. The number of adults who are educated to degree 
level or higher is less than half the County average, while 38.8 per cent have no 
qualifications, which is ten per cent higher than the County average (Warwick 
Observatory 2011a). Furthermore, analysis of the ward data also highlights that the 
number of adults without formal qualifications was higher than the county average. In 
the Barpool North and the Crescents area, over 50 per cent of the adult population do 
not have any formal qualifications (Warwick Observatory 2009).  
What the analysis of the education level data demonstrates is that, in the wards 
where the BNP gained electoral success in 2008, the level of education attainment is 
lower according to the data provided by the Warwickshire Observatory (2011). In fact 
this mirrors the findings highlighted in the literature, and the questionnaire data also 
correlates with previous studies (Ford and Goodwin 2010; John et al. 2006). For 
example, the data shows that out of thirty three BNP voters who responded to the 
questionnaire, only two declared that they had a University Degree, whereas fifteen 
were educated to GCSE or below (Table 21). The analysis of the data also shows that 
respondents who supported the BNP were in the main educated to the level of 
college/A-level, 48 per cent, and that this group of voters had the largest percentage of 
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Table 21: Who did you vote for in the 2008 local elections? [What is your educational status?]  
  
What is your educational status? 
Total 
University/            
Degree 
College/             
A-level 





Who did you 




Labour   34 38 40 2 10 124 
  27% 31% 32% 2% 8% 100% 
Conservative   18 29 20 0 3 70 
  26% 41% 29% 0% 4% 100% 
Liberal 
Democrats 
  12 9 5 0 1 27 
  44% 33% 19% 0% 4% 100% 
BNP   2 16 10 4 1 33 
  6% 48% 30% 12% 3% 100% 
Green Party   3 2 1 0 0 6 
  50% 33% 17% 0% 0% 100% 
UKIP   1 2 2 0 0 5 
  20% 40% 40% 0% 0% 100% 
Independent   1 0 1 0 0 2 
  50% 0% 50% 0% 0% 100% 
Did not vote   8 15 11 1 4 39 
  21% 38% 28% 3% 10% 100% 
Other   0 1 1 0 0 2 
  0% 50% 50% 0% 0% 100% 
Total   79 112 91 7 19 308 
  26% 36% 30% 2% 6% 100% 
            
Source: Nuneaton Questionnaire 
2012 
 
This analysis of education, in regard to social class, appears to correlate with 
the literature, which highlights that BNP voters are comprised of members who, in 
comparison to the mainstream party voters, have relatively low educational levels, 
which is even more evident when the University/degree figures are considered. 
Therefore, what this analysis demonstrates is the link in Nuneaton between the levels 
of education, and the vote for the far right. Indeed, it should be argued that in 
reference to Nuneaton a lack of education, rather than housing or employment, is a 
more conclusive explanation.  
This section has examined the most important factors relating to class, 
including employment, housing and education. The examination of the data in 
Nuneaton found that to a large extent that BNP voters are of a similar unskilled 
working class background in Barpool, challenging the school of thought highlighting 
lower-middle class BNP support found in some of the literature. Of course analysis of 
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workers in Camp Hill differs from Camp Hill in that 12.2 per cent are employed as 
managers and senior officials. Therefore, although this is a significant finding, this 
does in no way offer any real conclusive answers as to why they voted for the BNP. 
This is because many voters are of the same class and live in the same wards but do 
not vote for the far right. Many, for example, live in social housing and do not vote 
for the far right. Moreover, the analysis of housing shows that BNP voters are not just 
living in social housing but are also home owners, of course house prices in Barpool 
and Camp Hill do remain amongst the lowest in the borough. Education was also 
examined and the data shows that this appears to be one of the most important 
determinants, and can be viewed as an indicator as to where BNP support was the 
strongest. Essentially, this analysis of class demonstrates that there was an underlying 
environment providing fertile ground for BNP support, but it is the variables 
considered in the following chapters that prove more dynamic in persuading voters to 
switch their allegiance.  
 
The BNP and Age 
Completing this survey of socio-economic factors, this final section will now analyse 
whether voters of a particular age group were more susceptible to the BNP’s 
argument in the 2008 election. As indicated in the literature review, studies have 
analysed how important age is in understanding who votes for far right parties. For 
example, John et al. (2006) in their analysis did find a correlation between age and 
support for the BNP. They found that in the wards they analysed, those with “high 
numbers of 45-69 year olds were more likely to show higher levels of BNP support”, 
and those wards with a higher number of young people, the BNP were less likely to 
garner support (John et al. 2006: 16). The data produced from this analysis does 
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somewhat correlate with John et al.’s findings in that only 2 per cent of self-declared 
BNP voters were in the 18-24 age bracket (see Table 22). Moreover, Goodwin and 
Evans in their research also found that there are not many young BNP supporters, but 
rather most are aged between 46-65 years of age (2012: 14).  
According to the Nuneaton and Bedworth District Profile (2009) population 
pyramid there is a swelling of the population between the ages of 39-49. This means 
that the majority of the voting population is within this age group. However, the 
analysis of the questionnaire data in Nuneaton shows that the largest group of BNP 
voters were in the younger age bracket 25-36, with 36 per cent declaring they had 
voted for the party (Table 22). The figure drops to around 27 per cent in the 36-48 age 
groups. Although it is worth noting that as mentioned in the methodology there is an 
element of error within the data collected. This was due to the age of 36 being 
included in two age categories. However it is not considered to be statistically 
significant and did not impact on the findings overall. With that in mind it is worth 
noting that the data produced in the analysis of Nuneaton does offer similarities when 
compared with the data from the literature, in that younger voters are less likely to 
vote BNP, 6 per cent of 18-24 year olds, whereas voters between the age of 25-48 
were more likely to vote for the BNP, with 63 per cent of voters stating they voted for 
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Table 22: Who did you vote for in the 2008 local elections?    
 Which group best describes your age?  
  
Which group best describes your age? 
Total 18-24 25-36 36-48 49-64 65+ 
Who did you 
vote for in the 
2008 local 
elections? 
Labour   11 16 38 44 15 124 
  9% 13% 31% 35% 12% 100% 
Conservative   1 4 19 24 22 70 
  1% 6% 27% 34% 31% 100% 
Liberal 
Democrats 
  2 8 4 8 5 27 
  7% 30% 15% 30% 19% 100% 
BNP   2 12 9 4 6 33 
  6% 36% 27% 12% 18% 100% 
Green Party   0 2 0 4 0 6 
  0% 33% 0% 67% 0% 100% 
UKIP   0 0 1 4 0 5 
  0% 0% 20% 80% 0% 100% 
Independent   0 1 0 1 0 2 
  0% 50% 0% 50% 0% 100% 
Did not vote   13 9 10 6 1 39 
  33% 23% 26% 15% 3% 100% 
Other   1 0 0 1 0 2 
  50% 0% 0% 50% 0% 100% 
Total   30 52 81 96 49 308 
  10% 17% 26% 31% 16% 100% 
            
Source: Nuneaton Questionnaire 
2012 
 
The problem with the data in relation to age is that the data is not statistically 
significant. It cannot offer any evidence as to why people from a particular age group 
may be drawn to the BNP. However, the data does help to provide an understanding 
of the demographic profile of BNP supporters Therefore, to summarise, the data does 
to some extent corroborate the theory that BNP voters are represented largely by 
particular age groups, however it does not explain why voters of a particular age 
group were more inclined to vote for the BNP in 2008.  
 
Conclusion  
This section has examined and tested the factors highlighted in the literature in 
relation to socioeconomics. It has demonstrated that the BNP achieved electoral 
success in the most deprived wards in Nuneaton. It has also shown that there is a loss 
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of trust in the mainstream parties when it comes to economic policy. It found that 
amongst BNP supporters the economy was consciously not the most important reason 
why they voted for the BNP, even if the economic problems affected this group the 
most.  
With reference to class and the understanding the demographic profile of BNP 
supporters, this work has found evidence that those who voted for the BNP in 
Nuneaton do, to a large extent, represent a particular social profile. The data from the 
analysis of social class in Nuneaton shows that the BNP voters in this area were 
predominantly lower working class, and the level of poverty and deprivation in Camp 
Hill and Barpool is below what many authors have referred to in other locations.  
Finally, this chapter analysed age and education. The analysis of age did not 
really offer any real correlation. However, of those who did reply it did show BNP 
voters were greatly represented by the 25-36 age group. More importantly, the 
analysis of education levels did offer, when compared with other case study locations, 
a correlation between the levels of education and support for the BNP in Nuneaton. 
The examination also corroborated the findings from previous analysis of far right 
success in Britain, that BNP supporters are more likely to have lower levels of formal 
education. For example, it found that the on average BNP voters are comprised of 
members who have relatively low educational levels with only 6 per cent stating they 
were educated to degree level. Although this is not conclusive due to the fact the level 
of college education was not clearly stated it does still provide a link in Nuneaton 
between the levels of education, and the vote for the far right. It could therefore be 
argued that the lack of education, rather than housing or employment, should be 
regarded as a more significant socioeconomic determinant of BNP support.  
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This said, what does need to be recognised is that these economic and social 
problems are faced by many people, and not all choose to vote for the far right. It is 
also evident that the economic outlook and opportunities for many of the areas where 
the BNP succeeded in 2008, have in fact got dramatically worse with the prolonged 
recession, yet the BNP vote did not increase, but rather the party vote collapsed in the 
local elections of 2012. Therefore socioeconomics appears to be an indirect or 
underlying variable providing fertile ground for BNP campaigning and analysis of 
these factors assists the profiling BNP voters, but it is limited in actually determining 
why people vote for this party.  
Socioeconomic factors alone cannot offer an explanation as to why the BNP 
was successful in 2008, but they do promote the idea that the BNP took advantage of 
‘fertile ground’. As the following chapters demonstrate, it is when other factors, 
notably immigration, Islamophobia and disaffection combine that the BNP are able to 
take advantage of this ‘fertile’ ground. Indeed, as Eatwell notes, “demand factors are 
undoubtedly the necessary prior condition for extreme right success. But they are 
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Chapter 4 
Immigration and the BNP in Nuneaton 
 
  
The analysis of socioeconomic factors in the previous chapter highlighted its 
importance in producing fertile ground for the BNP in Nuneaton. This chapter 
analyses how the BNP took advantage of this fertile ground due to an increase in anti-
immigrant sentiment. It argues that immigration, within this socioeconomic 
environment, acts as a catalyst linking various variables which were beneficial to the 
BNP.  
The literature demonstrates that immigration and race are core issues for the 
far right and their supporters (Art 2011; Goodwin 2011; Rhodes 2009; Mudde 2007; 
John et al. 2006). For example, Goodwin indicated that over 90 per cent of BNP 
voters in his study were concerned with immigration (2011; 108). John et al. 
explained why immigration was a key factor in rising support for the BNP by offering 
a correlation between the growth of the immigrant community and BNP support 
(2006: 16-17). Goodwin shares this assessment noting, “hostility toward immigration 
and political dissatisfaction are particularly important drivers of BNP support” (2011: 
115). These explanations highlighted in the literature will be tested against the 
immigration variable in Nuneaton.   
The chapter will demonstrate that immigration was central in the success of 
the BNP in Nuneaton. It will show that immigration was important, but not as a single 
issue. Instead, it acted as a catalyst feeding into other variables, such as Islamophobia, 
socioeconomics and disaffection. First this chapter will focus on the ethnic 
demographics in Nuneaton and show that part of the electorate believes that 
immigrants do not mix. It will then demonstrate how significant the BNP were in 
highlighting the ‘perceived’ immigration problem, and how the BNP narrative was 
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expressed by respondents in Nuneaton. Following this, the chapter analyses the 
perceived problem with immigration and shows that it relates to the national rather 
than the local. Finally this chapter demonstrates that immigration is an important 
issue, but only when a link is established with other variables. 
 
The ethnic-demographics in Nuneaton 
This first section will begin by analysing the ethnic-demographics of Nuneaton. As 
mentioned, there have been many studies analysing the ethnic-demographics in order 
to understand the setting in which far right support increases (Goodwin 2011; Rhodes 
2009; John et al. 2006). John el al. argued that the immigration population is 
important, notably the size of the Asian population, and “up to a certain percentage 
(around 7 per cent), electoral support for the BNP increases with the percentage of 
Asians in the local population” (2006: 16). Therefore, it will be necessary to first offer 
an analysis of the ethnic demographics of Nuneaton in comparison with other 
locations where the BNP was successful. 
Demographically Nuneaton has a relatively small minority ethnic community 
representing around 7.7 per cent of the total population. The largest declared ethnic 
group are the Asian, or Asian British population, which represented around 4.9 per 
cent of the total population in Nuneaton and Bedworth in 2008, rising to over 5 per 
cent in 2011 (Table 23). Overall, the size of the resident minority ethnic population in 
total rose by nearly 3 percentage points between 2001 and 2011, to 7.7 per cent 
(Nuneaton and Bedworth Equality and Diversity Profile 2012). This includes migrant 
workers from Eastern Europe, mainly represented by a small Polish population (Table 
23).  
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Table 23: Nuneaton and Bedworth 
Borough 2001-2011 Ethnicity     
Ethnicity 2001% 2011% 
White British 93.5 88.9 
White Irish 0.7 0.6 
White Gipsy/Irish Traveller 0 0.1 
Mixed: White and Black Caribbean 0.3 0.5 
Mixed: White and Black African 0.1 0.1 
Mixed: White and Asian 0.2 0.3 
Asian: Indian 3.3 4.6 
Asian: Pakistani 0.2 0.4 
Asian: Bangladeshi 0.1 0.1 
Asian: Chinese 0.1 0.2 
Black/African/Caribbean/ Black 
British: African 0.1 0.4 
Black/African/Caribbean/ Black 
British: Caribbean 0.2 0.3 
Other Ethnic Group (Polish) 0 0.9 
Other Ethnic Group (Nepalese -
Includes Ghurkha) 0 0.2 
Other Ethnic Group (European 
Mixed) 0 0.2 
Other Ethnic Group (Other Western 
European) 0 0.2 
Any other ethnic group 1.2 1.8 
    Source: 2001-2011 Census, ONS 
 
According to the 2001 census the white population in 2001 represented 95.1 per cent 
of the population, whereas 92.3 per cent of the population classed themselves as 
white, white Irish or white other in 2011 (Census 2001 and 2011). By comparison 
with other locations where the BNP broke through between 2001 and 2008, Nuneaton 
and Bedworth borough has a small minority ethnic population. For example, in 
Burnley the minority ethnic population account for 11.1 per cent of the town’s 
population (Lancashire County Council 2011). Burnley has a sizeable proportion of 
the minority ethnic groups originating from South Asia, approximately 8.5 per cent, 
who are concentrated in the Daneshouse and Stoneyholme area of Burnley 
(Lancashire County Council 2011). However, analysis of the data in Burnley shows 
that in 2001 the South Asian minority ethnic population was approximately 7 per cent, 
which is in line with John et al.’s (2006) explanation that the BNP have typically been 
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successful in locations which have an Asian population of around 7 per cent (Burnley 
Task Force 2001: 2).  
The explanation offered by John et al. argues that if the immigrant population 
in a community increases to around 7 per cent, so does support for the BNP, which 
offers some correlation with the data for Nuneaton. Indeed, there is an increase in the 
minority ethnic population in Nuneaton by over 2 per cent between 2001 and 2008. 
However, the percentage of south Asians in Nuneaton (4.9 per cent) is lower than in 
Burnley (8.5 per cent) and has not yet reached John et al.’s threshold.  
Analysis of Nuneaton where the BNP achieved success in 2008 indicates that 
in these locations there is a relatively small minority ethnic population. In Barpool 
only 3.1 per cent of the population are considered ‘non-white’, and in Camp Hill only 
1.4 per cent is non-white (Table 24). In fact, the largest minority ethnic populations in 
Nuneaton are in the Abbey and Web Brook wards. Abbey Ward has a minority ethnic 
population of 16 per cent, of which approximately 13 per cent are of South Asian 
origin, and Wem Brook has a non-white population of 12.6 per cent. The size of the 
minority ethnic population in Abbey Ward has changed little between 2001 and 2011, 
and it remains at approximately 16 per cent (Table 24). However, analysis of the data 
shows that the BNP were not able to mobilise enough support in the wards which 
contain the largest number of immigrants or minority ethnic groups. This corroborates 
the findings by John el al, who in their explanation for far right support argued that in 
the wards they sampled the BNP vote was slightly more likely to occur “in white 
wards with higher proportions of white electors” (2006: 16). What we can clearly see 
is that in the wards where the BNP achieved success in Nuneaton it did occur in 
‘white’ wards (Table 24).  
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Table 24: Non-White Population 
Nuneaton and Bedworth 2001   
Wards % of Non-white 
Warwickshire 4.4 
Nuneaton and Bedworth 4.9 
Whitestone 3.1 
Wem Brook 12.6 
Weddington 2.5 
Slough 3.4 
St Nicholas 5.2 
Poplar (Bedworth) 12.7 
Kingswood 2 
Heath 2.7 
Galley Common 1.8 
Exhall 5.3 







  Source: 2001 Census, Office for National Statistics 
 
As well as the size of the minority ethnic population, it is also important to 
examine the location. The analysis of the minority ethnic population does produce 
some correlation with the locations in Burnley where the BNP were successful. 
Rhodes examined the size and location of the South Asian population in Burnley in 
order to explain the success of the BNP, and found that in the wards where the BNP 
were successful, they contained a sizable South Asian population in the neighbouring 
wards (2009: 35-36). The BNP in Burnley achieved success in the wards that were 
predominantly white and border Daneshouse and Stoneyholme, which in 2001 had a 
large population of South Asians equating to 63.85 per cent of the total population 
(Burnley Task Force 2001).  
Although there are some comparisons with the BNP success in Barpool, which 
borders Abbey ward in Nuneaton, there is one important statistical difference which 
relates to the size of the Asian population. Abbey ward has a South Asian community 
which is approximately 13 per cent, whereas in Burnley’s Daneshouse and 
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Stoneyholme wards the population are in the majority, at 63.85 per cent. Although 
this is an evident difference, further analysis of the data supports a correlation 
between Nuneaton and Burnley, in that both experience ‘segregation’ in their 
communities. This was an issue highlighted by participants in this research, who made 
reference to the area around Edward Street in Nuneaton, and the Mosque which is 
located in the area. In fact, it was evident in many responses from BNP voters that the 
‘white’ population in Nuneaton tend to avoid the area, with particular reference paid 
to the large Muslim population in the ward. The importance of this reference to the 
Islamic community in Nuneaton will be analysed further in the following chapter on 
rising Islamophobia, and the effect this had on BNP support.  
Evidence collected by the interviews and focus groups identified a perception 
that communities do not mix, and that particular groups within Nuneaton’s minority 
ethnic populations appear to live ‘separate’ lives to their white counterparts, but in a 
relatively close proximity. This sentiment was prevalent amongst those who voted for 
the BNP in Nuneaton. One BNP voter, who when discussing immigrants in his local 
community stated, “they don’t mix… they tend to keep to themselves” (O2OI8 2013). 
This view was also shared by another BNP voter who argued that “particular groups 
in our society do stay in one group, whether they do that to protect themselves from 
particular attitudes from outside, or whether they do that because they don’t want to 
mix, or they do want just a little corner in our society” (O2OI9 2013). The ‘separate 
communities’ narrative which exists in Nuneaton was highlighted by one interviewee 
who argued that communities do not mix; “I would not say they are completely 
integrated, because they are concentrated in a small area, but as far as I am aware 
there are no major issues between the coloured immigrant community or the white 




). Moreover, another BNP supporter made particular 
reference to the Edward Street area stating that: 
I know people in Nuneaton who use to live in Edward Street, and they now feel 
like outsiders in Edward Street. That hasn’t happened by chance. That has 
happened because a group have decided that’s where they want to live in 
Nuneaton. Gradually they purchased and got the economic means to do that and 
the local community have pushed out. And that’s caused real issues in Nuneaton 
(O2OI9 2013). 
 
This data suggests that the ‘separate communities’ narrative is prevalent amongst 
BNP supporters, and mirrors arguments made by the BNP. The BNP referred to this 
in their manifesto as Social inclusion – One healthy nation, arguing that: 
As nationalists we are committed to caring for and nurturing all sections of our 
national community. We also oppose the tendency of the other, non-nationalist, 
parties to set different sections of the community against each other over 
problems for which they themselves as politicians are largely responsible. The 
creation and maintenance of an undercurrent of national solidarity is one of the 
cornerstones of a true national democracy (BNP manifesto 2005). 
 
Warwick Observatory (2009) found that a large number of residents in Nuneaton gave 
negative responses when asked whether they believed people from different 
backgrounds get on well together in their local area. This study recorded that the 
Borough of Nuneaton and Bedworth has the lowest percentage of residents county 
wide who agreed with this statement, at 74.1 per cent, yet the borough has got a lower 
minority ethnic population than both Rugby and Warwick, (Warwick Observatory 
2009). This suggests that in the borough of Nuneaton and Bedworth there is a section 
                                                          
10
 To view the focus groups participants in more detail please refer to Appendix I 
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of the population who hold negative views towards people who are perceived as 
‘different’ to them.   
The question is what do these population statistics tell us about Nuneaton, and 
why were the BNP able to achieve success in 2008? There is no definitive answer to 
the question why, but the above evidence does help us develop an understanding of 
the similarities and differences between Nuneaton and Burnley’s ethnic 
demographics, and test the environment in which attitudes and views towards 
immigrants have developed. Indeed, this section has offered an insight into the ethnic-
demographics in Nuneaton. This included a brief analysis of the location, the size of 
minority ethnic groups and a comparison with areas which have experienced a similar 
breakthrough. It found that although the data for Nuneaton offers some correlation 
with explanations offered by scholars, the data does not fit the exact model in relation 
to the size of the minority ethnic population. However, analysis has demonstrated that 
BNP voters feel that immigration has not been beneficial, and in fact many referred to 
what they saw as ‘segregation’ within Nuneaton. Indeed, this offered an insight into 
the attitudes of some voters who believe that certain communities do not mix. These 
issues will be picked up again later in the study, when the analysis turns to 
Islamophobia and the role of the media.  
 
The BNP and immigration 
The next section will focus on respondents’ views on immigration and immigration 
policy. It will also examine why some voters believe that the BNP is the only party 
that will act on what they perceive is a ‘problem’ with immigration. It is evident from 
the data collected that immigration was an important election issue. It acted as a 
significant catalyst, aiding the BNP in their rise from obscurity to success in locations 
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like Nuneaton. Therefore, it is important to focus on how the BNP made immigration 
a central tenet of their manifesto, and examine why some voters were drawn to the 
BNP’s anti-immigration policies.  
Immigration was at the heart of the BNP’s manifesto, and is a core issue 
which the party fought on in 2008. For example, in the BNP manifesto for 2005 it 
states that the BNP’s policy is: 
To ensure that we do not become a minority in our own homeland, and that the 
native British peoples of our islands retain their culture and identity, we call for 
an immediate halt to all further immigration, the immediate deportation of all 
bogus asylum seekers, all criminal entrants and illegal immigrants, and the 
introduction of a system of voluntary resettlement whereby those immigrants 
and their descendants who are legally here are afforded the opportunity to return 
to their lands of ethnic origin assisted by a generous financial incentives both 
for individuals and for the countries in question (BNP Manifesto 2005: 14). 
 
It also states that, “Britain’s very existence today is threatened by immigration. As a 
nation we must rebuild trust in the immigration system amongst the British electorate 
whilst simultaneously ensuring that National Security is maintained in this era of 
global terrorism” (BNP Manifesto 2005: 13).  
It is evident from the BNP’s manifesto that immigration was one of their 
flagship policies, and by talking tough they appealed to part of the electorate who 
wanted tighter immigration controls. Indeed, the message that the BNP will be tough 
on immigration resonated with many voters prior to the 2008 election, and it is 
evident that part of the electorate who felt that immigration was becoming a problem, 
would be receptive to the BNP’s anti-immigrant message. For example, one BNP 
voter when asked if immigration was important in who he voted for simply replied, 
“Yes, there are too many immigrants” (O2OI13 2014), while another BNP voter 
attacked what he saw as a lack of action from the government, stating that, “I just 
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don’t think that our government are coming down hard enough on immigrants, 
[They’re] not doing enough for their own people” (O2OI6 2013).  
An analysis of the case study’s data demonstrates the level of anti-immigration 
sentiment. Indeed, immigration was considered an issue right across the political 
spectrum in 2008, and respondents from across all parties registered negative views 
towards immigration. For example, in response to a question asking if participants 
voted for a particular party because it was the toughest on immigration, over 40 per 
cent of all voters who participated strongly agreed or agreed. Analysis also shows that 
59 per cent of Conservative voters and only 28 per cent of Labour voters strongly 
agreed or agreed. However, the results were, as expected, even higher for the BNP 
voters with 91 per cent of respondents either strongly agreeing or agreeing with this 
statement (Table 25).  
Table 25: Why did you vote for a particular party or candidate during the local elections in your town in 
2008? [The party  I voted for is the toughest on immigration]  
  
Strongly 





for in the 
2008 local 
elections? 
Labour % 9% 19% 46% 17% 9% 122 
      100% 
Conservative % 21% 38% 32% 6% 3% 63 
      100% 
Liberal 
Democrats 
% 4% 19% 54% 8% 15% 26 
      100% 
BNP % 63% 28% 9% 0% 0% 32 
      100% 
Green Party % 33% 17% 33% 0% 17% 6 
      100% 
UKIP % 25% 75% 0% 0% 0% 4 
      100% 
Independent % 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 2 
      100% 
Did not vote % 8% 0% 38% 15% 38% 13 
      100% 
Other % 0% 0% 50% 0% 50% 2 
      100% 
Total Count 49 65 103 29 24 270 
% 18% 24% 38% 11% 9% 100.0% 
        Source:  Nuneaton Questionnaire  2012 
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Therefore, the examination of the data produced by the questionnaire demonstrates 
that the issue of immigration was a major factor for part of the electorate who voted 
for the BNP, with the vast majority saying they voted for the party because they 
would be tough on immigration.  
Analysis of the qualitative data also demonstrates that many voters felt that 
there was an immigration problem. The BNP clearly saw an opportunity to capitalise 
on growing public anti-immigration sentiment which had increased since 1999, and 
by 2008 was for many voters top of the political agenda. For example, most BNP 
voters shared this sentiment, with one, when asked why he voted for the BNP 
replying, “I voted for the BNP in 2008 because that’s when I first thought there’s too 
many immigrants in this country… they are taking all of our jobs, from local people, 
English people, I am just sick of it” (O2OI7 2013). This view was shared by another 
BNP voter who argued that “There are lots of Polish in nearby towns and [I] can see 
local services are stretched. [I’ve] Just had enough of it” (O2OI13 2014). Moreover, 
in response to the question whether immigration was the most important factor in why 
they voted for the BNP, a former BNP party activist replied in a forthright manner:  
Yes. That does not mean I am racist. It doesn’t matter if you’re black, Chinese, 
German or French, at the end of the day it don’t matter. And because we are 
members of the EU we are all messed up. People can just come and go freely in 
this country. I would like to see immigration stopped (O2OI2 2012). 
 
Continuing on this theme, another BNP supporter argued against immigration stating 
that: 
I don’t think enough has been done to control immigration, I mean I am no fan 
of big brother, but I do think we do need some certain regulations and controls 
for the good of law… walking around and you feel like an outsider because it is 
full of Polish people drinking lager on the streets, I don’t think that is 
particularly healthy for any country, you know. If that is locally acceptable in 
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Poland, great. But if you say a couple of ladies whatever are walking up the 
road are not going to be threatened by that kind of environment and that kind of 
behaviour when people, race or breed club together and standing talking in a 
foreign language, isolating themselves, it is threatening to certain vulnerable 
groups in society (O2OI9 2013).  
 
However, not all respondents were so ‘diplomatic’ in their responses, as one 
respondent to the questionnaire stated, “The BNP once elected will kick out all non-
English people and give the jobs back to the true white English people... we need to 
take the country back from the hordes of immigrants that have flooded in to this once 
great nation” (Nuneaton Questionnaire 2012).  
It is evident from the data that all BNP voters interviewed offered negative 
responses towards immigrants. Although, it is worth noting that even though 
immigration was important to voters from other parties, it did not drive them to 
parties like the BNP, as one Labour voter stated, “even if I believe immigration 
should be tighter, I still believed Labour had the better policies, and I would not vote 
for the Tories if they were tighter on immigration” (FG2P3 2012).  
What these interviewee responses, and the responses to the questionnaire, 
demonstrate is that BNP voters hold negative views of immigrants and immigration. It 
also shows that the BNP exploited the level of anti-immigrant sentiment, and were 
able to mobilise and attract support in a climate of fear and confusion which 
surrounded immigration, and indeed immigration policy over the last decade. It is also 
evident from the responses that there is a perception amongst many voters that the 
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Immigration: the national not the local 
In helping to explain the impact of immigration and immigration policy on the BNP’s 
success, it is also worth investigating whether the issue relates to the local or to a 
greater extent the national? Research found that, for Nuneaton, voters do not view 
immigration as a local ‘problem’, but rather as a national one. This view was shared 
by Rhodes who stated that the BNP in Burnley were, “aided by a national arena in 
which race had become increasingly politicised, it was the BNP who would advance 
this ‘racial’ politics” (2009: 39). Moreover, respondents in one national study, 
recorded only 18 per cent viewing immigration as a problem in their own area, but 76 
per cent viewing it as a national problem (Searchlight Educational Trust 2011). There 
has been a growing national campaign, often led by the media and some politicians, 
which views large scale immigration into Britain is a problem, and a belief that all the 
mainstream parties have failed to deal with the issue. This was highlighted by 
Goodwin who found that 90 per cent of BNP supporters analysed considered 
nationwide immigration to be the most important issue facing Britain, and “BNP 
voters focused almost exclusively on immigration” (2011: 108).  
This sentiment, that immigration is a national problem, was shared by those 
who voted for the BNP in Nuneaton. Many BNP voters believed that the BNP were 
the only party willing to act in order to deal with the perceived immigration problem 
in the country. This is a view supported by one BNP voter in Nuneaton who also 
linked disaffection, socioeconomics and immigration, stating that:  
the government, I think in the last 15 years have not been strong enough to 
tackle immigration for fear of losing votes, and this is a simple fact… we had 
concerns nationally about immigration, and it is not a black and white thing 
because immigrants nowadays means there are just as many white immigrants 
as there are black. But there is a massive problem with immigration in this 
country and none of our governments, or none of our political parties have had 
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the backbone to stand up and say enough is enough; we may lose a few votes 
but let’s draw the line. Let’s say enough asylum, let’s just cut it. I mean it is 
costing a fortune in taxation, a fortune in social housing and social services 
(FG1P1 2012). 
This particular view that the mainstream parties have failed to deal with the perceived 
immigration problem was also shared by a former Nuneaton BNP party activist: 
The figures they give out I just can’t believe, you could add a million on; the 
figures are just not true. And it is the same as like when they arrest someone 
who ain’t supposed to be here. They have got no identification on them and they 
let them go and make them report to the Police station once a week. And then 
they just disappear. It is like beyond belief. You know what I mean? (O2OI2 
2012). 
 
Moreover, another BNP voter responded by saying that “The BNP seemed like the 
only option, you know, they would stop them coming over, and breeding. I have my 
kids’ future to think about. I was scared what would happen in this country” (O2OI4 
2012). What can be seen from these voters is that there is a perception amongst BNP 
supporters that the mainstream parties have not acted to tighten immigration, and it 
does appear entrenched amongst those who voted for the BNP in Nuneaton, that the 
BNP were the only party who could deal with immigration. This was indicated by one 
BNP voter, who in reply to a question about how they viewed the mainstream parties’ 
position on immigration, and whether they believed the BNP would act on 
immigration stated that, “It was a party that seemed to have some backbone that will 
make laws and not worry about votes if they got power. They would have created the 
changes needed to reduce or stop immigration from non-EU countries” (O2OI1 2012).  
Further analysis also highlighted the loss of trust in the last Labour 
government’s immigration policy. This resonated with part of the electorate who were 
former Labour supporters and Conservative supporters. For example, it has been 
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argued that many former Labour supporters switched to the BNP because for them 
there was simply no alternative. This was highlighted during an interview with a 
Labour councillor who acknowledged that many former Labour Party supporters had 
lost faith in the Labour Party, and their immigration policy by 2008, stating that, “I 
think it was significant for a lot of Labour supporters especially in white working 
class areas like Barpool. Yes I think it was significant... I think it was the national 
trumpet sounding. It was a national issue” (O2OI3 2012).  
By examining the data it is evident that by 2008 there appeared to be a change 
in attitude and a total loss in faith in both the Labour Party and the Conservative Party 
when it came to immigration policy. Moreover, as will be demonstrated in the 
analysis of the data in Chapter six, which looks at the role of the mainstream parties, 
for many Labour voters the idea of voting for the Conservative Party was more 
abhorrent than voting for the BNP. There was evidently a high level of discontent 
aimed at immigration and the immigration policies of the mainstream parties.  
Analysis of the data also highlights the broader national development of the 
immigration issue, such as increasing hostility towards multicultural policies, which 
also benefited the BNP in 2008. For example, Rhodes in his explanation suggests that 
in Burnley the BNP utilised a “sense of white resentment” which created “a feeling 
that it was the material and cultural interests of the whites that were becoming 
marginalised” (2009: 38-39). The ‘sense of white resentment’ was an issue which the 
BNP attached themselves to, and was an important policy in their 2005 Manifesto. 
Indeed, it states that the BNP will “abolish the ‘positive discrimination’ schemes that 
have made white Britons second-class citizens” (BNP Manifesto 2005). This ‘sense of 
unfairness’ resonates with the feelings and attitudes of some of those who voted for 
the BNP in Nuneaton, and evidently benefited the BNP in 2008. For example, one 
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BNP voter stated that, “if I was an Irish traveller or a Pakistani, I don’t know exactly 
what it is mate, but if you are foreign or in a minority and we both committed the 
same crime, I would get done for it and they would get let off… it seems that racism 
only works one way” (O2OI2 2012). This sentiment was also shared by another BNP 
voter who, when discussing how white people are treated by the state, argued that 
“kids can’t even get a house, but the immigrants get one straight away. And most 
have not worked” (O2OI4 2012). What this demonstrates is that a sense of white 
resentment developed, which increased the anti-immigrant sentiment amongst voters, 
to the benefit of the BNP. It is also evident from this section that immigration, in the 
context of BNP support in Nuneaton, appears to relate more to the national, ‘the 
country’, rather than the local. Indeed, most respondents do not refer to immigration 
in the local context, but rather the national. This of course does not mean there were 
not local grievances, as the next section will now demonstrate. 
 The next section will now test the explanation that BNP support was linked to 
racial tension caused by immigration at a local level. Scholars have tested the 
explanation that the BNP have often gained a small foothold where there is evidence 
of racial tension, and indeed race related violence (Rhodes 2009; Copsey 2008; 
Renton 2005; Renton 2003). For example, Rhodes’s (2009) analysis highlighted the 
Burnley race riots of 2001 and how this was reported. He argues that “it is clear that 
the riots played an important part in the emergence of the BNP as a political force in 
the town. The events served to solidify already apparent divisions, ensuring that race 
remained at the forefront of the local political landscape” (Rhodes 2009: 37-38). 
Elsewhere, Renton also highlighted how the BNP benefited from an increase in racial 
tension and violence, stating that, “in Bradford, the BNP was able to trade on the 
legacy of the 2001 race riots” (2005: 40). Therefore, it is evident from previous 
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explanations that the BNP benefited from increased racial tension and violence. Focus 
will now turn to testing to what extent these explanations stand up in Nuneaton. 
Initial analysis of Nuneaton found that there is no compelling evidence of 
racial tension between the minority ethnic community and the white community on a 
scale witnessed in other locations. In fact, Nuneaton, in comparison with many other 
towns, had never previously attracted the attention of the far right as a potential 
source of support, and has not experienced any rioting or racial tension that can be 
compared with Burnley, Oldham or Bradford. However, there is some historical 
evidence of racial tension in Nuneaton, and there have been minor incidences of 
violence. For example, one local resident stated “there has been little flare ups... but it 
is not an ongoing thing. It is the same anywhere. There is always trouble between 
areas in Nuneaton” (FG2P1 2012).  
This view was shared by a local Labour councillor who when asked if he was 
aware of any racial tension in Nuneaton stated; “No. I don’t think there is... There has 
been, some years ago there was some aggression, physical aggression in Edward 
Street, when there was a bail house, and the residents of the bail house and local 
Asians disagreed with each other” (O2OI3 2012). The incident referred to by many 
respondents took place in 2003, and it was reported in the press as racial violence. 
The incident was also referred to as racial violence and a riot by voters of all 
persuasions, and fed into the BNP narrative at the time. However, it appears that in 
Nuneaton it is the perception of racial tension which is greater than the actuality, and 
it is this that was fuelled by rumours and the press rather than any actual major race 
related violence.  
For many respondents it is the fact that the two communities do not mix which 
proved to be more of an issue than any widespread racial violence or tension between 
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the communities. This issue will be analysed further in the next chapter on 
Islamophobia, and in chapter eight which looks at data relating to racial violence and 
tension, as reported in the national and local press. Finally, it is worth noting that the 
fact that they are often referred to by many participants as ‘two communities’ 
indicates the problem that exists for some members of the community.  
What this section has shown is that voters in Nuneaton, who chose to vote for 
the BNP, indicate the importance of national issues relating to immigration, rather 
than local issues. Therefore, it should be argued that the national arena, in which 
immigration became politicised, was more important than the local, although both 
arenas evidently helped galvanise support for the BNP. The politicisation of race in 
the national arena will be analysed further in chapter six, which looks in greater detail 
at the role of the mainstream political parties.  
This section has also touched on the idea that amongst the wider population in 
Nuneaton, not just the BNP voters, there are negative attitudes towards immigrants, 
particularly against immigrants from South Asia who are perceived as being unable to 
live within the white areas of Nuneaton, and choose to live separate lives. The idea 
that specific communities ‘do not mix’ and this benefited the BNP will be analysed 
further in the following chapter.  
 
The BNP and the battle for resources 
Focus within this section will be on the argument that the ‘British should always come 
first’. This argument has often been attached to the battle for scarce resources such as 
jobs, benefits and housing. The idea that the British should always come first was a 
core element of the BNP’s policy in their manifesto:  
We will abolish the ‘positive discrimination’ schemes that have made white 
Britons second-class citizens. We will also clamp down on the flood of asylum 
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seekers’, the vast majority of whom are either bogus or can find refuge much 
nearer their home countries. Britain is full up and the government of Britain has 
as its first responsibility the welfare, security and long-term preservation of the 
native people of Britain (BNP Manifesto 2005). 
 
The idea also became a mainstream political issue in the 2000s with both Labour 
Party and Conservative Party politicians using language normally associated with the 
far right. For example, the then Prime Minister Gordon Brown, during his speech at 
the 2007 Labour Party annual conference, stated that he wanted “British jobs for 
British Workers” (Brown 2007), which mirrors a slogan used by the NF and BNP. In 
order to understand how this statement resonated with the public at the time, and how 
the BNP were able to tap into this argument, it was decided that a question would be 
added to the questionnaire asking if the respondent agreed with the statement that the 
British should come first when it comes to benefits, housing and jobs. The analysis of 
the data produced offers some interesting results with 41 per cent of all the 
respondents either agreeing or strongly agreeing with this statement (Table 26). It is 
also evident that amongst Labour supporters this was an important factor with 45 per 
cent either agreeing or strongly agreeing, and only 36 per cent strongly disagreeing or 
disagreeing. Unsurprisingly, considering previous research into why people voted for 
the BNP (Goodwin 2011), 97 per cent of those who responded said they voted for the 
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Table 26: Why did you vote for a particular party or candidate during the local elections in your town in 
2008? [I voted for the party because they support the idea that British people should be considered first 
when it comes to jobs, housing and benefits]  
  
Strongly 






for in the 
2008 local 
elections? 
Labour % 13% 24% 33% 14% 16% 121 
      100% 
Conservative % 19% 17% 46% 14% 3% 63 
      100% 
Liberal 
Democrats 
% 0% 12% 48% 24% 16% 25 
      100% 
BNP % 67% 30% 3% 0% 0% 33 
      100% 
Green Party % 33% 0% 50% 0% 17% 6 
      100% 
UKIP % 25% 75% 0% 0% 0% 4 
      100% 
Independent % 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 2 
      100% 
Did not vote % 8% 0% 38% 15% 38% 13 
      100% 
Other % 0% 0% 50% 0% 50% 2 
      100% 
Total Count 54 56 93 34 32 269 
% 20% 21% 35% 13% 12% 100% 
        Source: Nuneaton Questionnaire 2012 
 
The sentiment that the British should come first when it comes to benefits, housing 
and jobs, resonated with many of the interviewee respondents. One BNP voter when 
asked the question if they believe British people should come first when it comes to 
jobs, benefits and housing stated, “Most definitely. English people should get priority 
for housing. And there are no jobs” (O2OI13 2014). Another BNP voter when asked 
the question linked immigration with the competition for scarce resources, stating 
that, “you have got to be blind not to realise there’s an immigration problem, and 
rightly or wrongly there is a common perception that immigrants come into this 
country and take jobs and houses” (FG1P1 2012). It was also evident that for many 
BNP voters it was the link with increased immigration, benefits and a sense of 
unfairness that drove them towards the BNP. Indeed, a former BNP activist and voter 
stated that:  
It was important in why I voted. Because if you have been here most of your 
life, regardless of whether your parents come from elsewhere. I mean I know a 
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couple of geezers whose dads came over from Jamaica, Jamaicans, black as the 
ace of spades, I mean I didn’t grow up with them but I have seen them grow up 
in the same area like, and it is the same. Their dads have put money into the 
system, they have worked most of their lives, so they are British I suppose. 
They ain’t just come over and claimed. I mean I can’t go anywhere in the world 
and claim benefits, you know what I mean? So why should they? It don’t work 
both ways if you are a minority you are better off. You know what I mean? You 
live here all your life, but you get nothing, but if you are a minority you get it all 
(O2OI2 2012). 
 
All respondents who voted for the BNP also felt that they were losing out in the 
distribution of resources, be it jobs, housing or benefits. For example, one BNP voter 
in response to the question argued that, “It has become more important in the last few 
years I think. You know issues with lack of jobs” (O2OI9 2013). This sentiment was 
shared by another BNP voter:  
100%... I think as I said it should be the same as Australia, you should only be 
allowed to come into this country if you have got a reasonable profession, and if 
you have got that profession you have a good salary and you can afford your 
own house. You shouldn’t be given a house for people coming over, it’s just 
sickening what is happening to this country, an absolute joke (O2OI7 2013). 
This sense that British citizens were losing out to immigrants was in no way directed 
at one minority ethnic group, rather it was a catch-all view of the immigrant 
population. For example, as one BNP voter argued: 
 
If you look within a mile radius of here, 2 post offices, 2 garages, 6 corner 
shops, and they are all owned by either Polish, Indian, Asian, and I know their 
money is going back into their countries. They may put it into our banks for a 
while but then they either send it back or take it back. So it is not being put back 
into our country. Whereas I have worked most of my life and put my money 
back whereas they don’t and they are entitled to the same benefits as I am. It 
don’t seem fair. It seems that nowadays people who are Asian or whatever, 
people just don’t want to give them any s**t and they don’t put up with 
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anything. Whereas if you are white British it seems like you are s**t on, you 
know what I mean? You ask questions about this, why do they (The Asians) get 
this and that, and then they just play the racist card... I would say yes. I think a 
lot of people are not racist as such. But from what goes on around them, the way 
they are treated and the law and everything, it seems like they lose out, I mean 
look at the Polish, why have they got all the car washes and garages? I was told 
it is because they had concessions off of the government. They seem to have 
hustled and we just don’t, you know what I mean? And everyone I know thinks 
the same, and especially the older people (O2OI2 2012). 
 
Again this is not based on any evidence that the immigration population has benefited 
in Nuneaton but rather a belief, a perception that this is the case. It appears that the 
perceived link between immigrants and benefits has been established in the minds of 
many voters, and particularly amongst those who voted for the BNP in 2008. Indeed, 
one self-declared BNP voter from 2008 supported the link in his response to the 
questionnaire: 
The established major political parties are totally out of touch with genuine 
British non-immigrant people. Hard working families are penalised that benefits 
can be paid to illegals and immigrants who are only here for the benefits they 
get which are totally disproportionate to groups like pensioners (Nuneaton 
Questionnaire 2012).    
 
 Therefore we can see that the statement that the British should come first 
when it comes to benefits, housing and jobs resonated with many voters, especially 
those who voted for the BNP. The examination of the data has also shown how BNP 
voters believe that immigrants have benefited at the expense of British people. 
Although this is not based on factual evidence, rather an illusion of unfairness, it was 
reflected by BNP respondents who believe that the white majority British are 
suffering at the expense of immigrants.  
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Immigration as a single issue 
As indicated above, no one variable, immigration included, can stand alone as an 
explanation for the BNP’s success. An underlying socio-economic environment was 
identified as providing ‘fertile ground’, but it is other variables which combine to 
create the ‘perfect storm’. For example, this chapter has so far shown that 
immigration acts as a catalyst for a range of issues, and appears to provide an 
explanation of the success of the BNP in Nuneaton. This is indicated in the link 
between immigration and the battle for scarce resources, and more importantly the 
link with unemployment.  
There is a strong belief amongst those who supported the BNP that they are 
losing out on jobs, and are seeing their wages collapse due to the influx of new 
immigrants from the European Union. This sentiment was shared by one BNP voter 
who argued that the white working class are suffering due to immigration:  
They are being competed out of the jobs through salaries, and through 
education. I personally believe the standards of education have dropped since 
we have had immigration or since we have had a lot of immigration. Again I 
don’t like to consider immigration as a race issue; I like to consider it purely as 
an immigration issue and it doesn’t matter where people are from it is still 
immigration. And to make that clear I don’t feel that I am racist at all in as 
much as the thought of people coming from other countries and using the 
resources we paid for bothers me (FG1P1 2012). 
 
This argument that immigrants were taking the jobs of the host population was quite 
prevalent amongst BNP voters. Indeed, most were quite explicit and open about this, 
and it is evident that the BNP benefited from the link between unemployment and 
immigration. For example, one BNP voter stated that, “we need to reduce the number 
of immigrants and foreign workers” (Nuneaton Questionnaire 2012), and another 
John Grima  158 
 
BNP voter, who offered a link between immigration and jobs, stating that, “I am 
against immigrants getting our jobs” (Nuneaton Questionnaire 2012). This view was 
also communicated by another BNP voter who during a focus group argued that; 
“who is to say that a lot of the youth today would have jobs without immigration? We 
don’t know, you can’t say that because if it has been a success, why do we still have 
2.8 million people unemployed and that it was right? Would we have had success 
without it?” (FG1P1 2012). Additionally, this sentiment was shared by a BNP 
interviewee who argued that there were already too many immigrants, and in relation 
to jobs and employment, stated that;  
we have got a job market that’s already struggling to support our lot and you are 
naturally letting a lot of other people to come in, it is gonna make the situation 
across the country a lot worse for a lot of people because ultimately there are 
only so many jobs and if there is more people fighting for less jobs there is 
gonna be a bigger burden on the state and it all ties into it (O2OI9 2013).  
 
For these BNP respondents there is a clear link between immigration and 
employment, and indeed the level of unemployment. However, this is a view not just 
shared by BNP supporters. Indeed, this view is also evident amongst those who did 
not vote for the BNP, with both Labour and Conservative voters alike linking the 
issue of immigration with high unemployment and low wages. In fact, one Labour 
voter stated that: 
I think there is always going to be a worry about immigration from people of all 
parties because we are a developed country and people always want to come 
and work here. Better wages and a better life. So people always worry about 
their own jobs going to someone else... A lot of people look at it (immigration) 
and say when we are in the mess, a recession, without any jobs we need to halt 
the number of immigrants until the country is growing again. There is no point 
letting in people if it is not going to benefit us. Because you just get yourself in 
more debt because you get someone who comes over, gets a job which we could 
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do and the new have to go and sign on. So they are paying us not to work. I 
think it is why a lot of people think that immigrants are taking all of our jobs... 
the issue is Polish people come here to work for a good wage, but a British 
person cannot go and work in Poland for a better wage. I think that is why 
people are annoyed with it (FG2P3 2012).  
 
It is also worth noting here that not all voters viewed immigration as a problem. For 
example, during one focus group one Labour supporter argued that immigration had 
been good for the economy, and in fact immigration had in itself created jobs and 
wealth, stating that: 
The Asians have actually benefited the economy. I don’t think anybody would 
say any different, I mean there was a big fuss in 1968 about immigration, but 
no-one would now argue that was a bad thing... It is perfectly plausible for 
governments to make an argument, and governments have, that immigration can 
be an economic benefit (FG1P4 2012).  
 
As briefly highlighted here, and in the previous chapter, socioeconomics, 
unemployment and jobs were an issue, but only in so far as they are linked to 
immigration.  
The previous chapter suggests that unemployment and jobs are important in 
explaining the rise of the BNP in Nuneaton. The above evidence suggests this issue 
becomes all the more pertinent when combined with negative perceptions of 
immigration. Further building this idea of interlocking variables, the chapter will now 
consider the issue of immigration combined with perceptions of limited access to 
public goods. For example, Rhodes demonstrated how the competition for resources 
became an important factor in the rightward political shift in Burnley, arguing that the 
outcome was “a growing sense of resentment visited upon the Asian population by 
many white residents” (2009: 34). Moreover, Eatwell argues that “socioeconomic 
John Grima  160 
 
problems have a particular impact when immigrant groups, especially in a localised 
context, are seen as being in some ways treated more favourably, that ‘they do more 
for them than us’” (2003: 57). Similar, local stories or ‘rumour’ surfaced in Nuneaton 
during the same period, although nothing on a scale witnessed in Burnley. These have 
often related specifically to local housing in the wards of Barpool and Camp Hill, and 
the perception was that this social housing had been allocated to the immigrant 
community in these locations. Rumours were in fact circulating prior to the election in 
2008 in Barpool and Camp Hill, and one Labour councillor made reference to a 
rumour which spread, and was often shared with those who campaigned on the 
doorstep; “Oh you know those flats they are putting up, they are going to be full of 
Ghurkha’s, or they are full of Poles... from what I can actually see about these flats, 
unless the Poles have changed their names to Williams, we know that it is not true” 
(O2OI3 2012). The councillor also noted that some respondents view immigrants as a 
drain on the local and the national resources stating that:  
There were a lot of perceptions to do with, you know where the country’s 
wealth was going, and it was mainly into immigrants you know. Eastern 
Europeans, Poles, of which there is quite a few in Barpool. Um, those sort of 
things would be mentioned by people who you spoke to, and there were things 
to do with Muslims, there were things which to me were totally unreal, because 
even though there are a significant number of Muslim families in Nuneaton, 
they are not in Barpool at all (O2OI3 2012).  
 
Finally, a brief analysis of the link between immigration and crime will be 
offered. As highlighted in the literature, increased crime has often been linked with 
immigration (Goodwin 2011; John et al. 2006). The literature also shows that law and 
order is important for voters, and also how they often link the two. For example, 
Mclaren and Johnson found in their study that there was also an increase in the 
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number of respondents who believed immigrants increased crime rates, with 25 per 
cent agreeing in 1995, increasing to 39 per cent in 2003 (2004: 173). The BNP also 
link immigration and crime, which is evident in their strongly worded Law and Order 
policy;  
It is a hard fact that, according to official figures, 15% of the UK’s male prison 
population is black, despite black people accounting for only 2% of the total 
population. Victim-reported figures concerning the race of criminals give the lie 
to the leftist argument that this is due to discriminatory prosecution. It is an 
inescapable statistical fact that immigration into Britain increases the crime rate. 
Figures for unemployment, welfare dependency, educational failure, and other 
social pathologies tell a similar story for most other foreign ethnic groups. 
There is simply no escaping the fact that choosing to admit such persons into 
the country in significant numbers means choosing to become a poorer, more 
violent, more dependent and worse-educated society... The liberal consensus on 
immigration must be balanced by the interests of National Security. Recent 
arrests of cells of Islamic terrorists living in the country plotting mass murder in 
Britain illustrate the link between illegal immigration and terrorism. The link 
between illegal immigration and crime in our communities – including the 
ruthless exploitation of the immigrants themselves - is also well documented 
(BNP Manifesto 2005). 
  
Crime and the fear of crime are evidently drivers in support for the BNP. For 
example, analysis of the data in Nuneaton demonstrates that BNP supporters voted for 
the party because they were viewed as tough on crime and anti-social behaviour. 
Analysis of the data in Table 26 shows that 66 per cent of BNP voters voted for the 
party because they are tough on crime. This is statistically the highest percentage who 
stated they voted for a party because they were tough on immigration. The data also 
show that BNP voters believed that the party would tackle anti-social behaviour in the 
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area with 72 per cent saying they voted for the party in 2008 because the party would 














Table 27: Why did you vote for a particular party or candidate during the local elections in your town in 2008? 
[I voted for this party because they are tough on crime]  
  
Strongly 




Who did you 
vote for in the 
2008 local 
elections? 
Labour       
17% 30% 47% 6% 1% 100% 
Conservative       
19% 44% 29% 6% 2% 100% 
Liberal Democrats       
0% 38% 50% 4% 8% 100% 
BNP       
41% 25% 28% 6% 0% 100% 
Green Party       
0% 33% 67% 0% 0% 100% 
UKIP       
25% 25% 50% 0% 0% 100% 
Independent       
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 100% 
Did not vote       
8% 0% 62% 8% 23% 100% 
Other       
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 100% 
Total 48 84 115 15 7 269 
18% 31% 43% 6% 3% 100% 
      Source: Nuneaton Questionnaire  2012 
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Table 28: Why did you vote for a particular party or candidate during the local elections in your town in 2008? 
[The party I voted for will tackle anti-social behaviour in my area]  
  
Strongly 




Who did you 
vote for in the 
2008 local 
elections? 
Labour       
16% 35% 46% 2% 2% 100% 
Conservative       
15% 46% 33% 5% 2% 100% 
Liberal Democrats       
0% 38% 46% 8% 8% 100% 
BNP       
41% 31% 22% 3% 3% 100% 
Green Party       
0% 50% 50% 0% 0% 100% 
UKIP       
25% 0% 75% 0% 0% 100% 
Independent       
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 100% 
Did not vote       
8% 0% 62% 8% 23% 100% 
Other       
0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 100% 
Total 43 93 113 9 9 267 
16% 35% 42% 3% 3% 100% 
      Source: Nuneaton Questionnaire 2012 
 
It was evident from interviewees that law and order was important for BNP voters. 
Indeed, one BNP voter when asked if he voted for the BNP because they will be 
tough on law and order replied, “Yes I would say so. For me personally I think there 
is little or no punishment for what people do now. You know what I mean? Especially 
in prison. I mean I know they are locked up but, a telly for £1 a week, and they get let 
out in the sunshine, and 3 square meals, it is like they are not afraid” (O2OI2 2012). 
However, it is the link between immigration and crime which became most evident in 
some interviews. In fact, analysis of the qualitative data demonstrates that some BNP 
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voters linked immigration with crime. For example, one BNP voter argued that 
“crimes are done by immigrants as well, um, and I think any crime that a foreign 
national does, comes over and commits a crime, disrespecting this country should be 
deported straight away” (O2OI7 2013). This voter further shared his experience of 
crime in the area, and related it to a personal experience of a ‘friend’ stating that: 
I knew a friend... who got mugged by two Nigerian men, again not from this 
country, they looked Nigerian, again not from this country, and I just think 
again it’s sickening, if you come over to this country you need to respect this 
country, respect the people, respect the laws and I just don’t think that our 
government are coming down hard enough on immigrants, not doing enough for 
their own people (O2OI7 2013). 
 
This view was shared by another voter who when asked the question, if he voted for 
the BNP because they were strong on law and order stated, “I did, but mainly because 
of what I see. This country is full of illegal immigrants breaking the law, committing 
crimes and getting away with it. Immigrants who commit crime should be deported, 
end of” (O2OI12 2014). However, not all BNP voters when discussing law and order 
linked it to immigration. For some voters it was because they believed the BNP could 
restore law and order, which they believe was non-existent. For example, one BNP 
voter argued that, “the kids can do what they want and the police do nothing. Too 
much political correctness” (O2OI4 2012). The data indicates that issues relating to 
law and order were important to BNP voters. However, the analysis of the data shows 
that like socioeconomics, crime is often linked to immigration, and this remains a 
factor for many respondents when discussing immigration generally.    
The data produced in Nuneaton demonstrates the level of sentiment which 
links immigration with jobs, resources and crime. However, analysis of the data also 
demonstrates that there is no evidence to support the view that immigrants, or 
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immigrant communities, benefited in Nuneaton in the competition for scarce 
resources, or committed more crime, but rather it is the perception that immigrants 
have benefited and are criminals which has had the greatest effect.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has started to tease out the idea that any explanation of the BNP’s 
electoral breakthrough in Nuneaton has to be multivariable in nature. It has 
concentrated on the hypotheses that immigration was an important catalyst, helping 
the BNP exploit the ripe socio-economic environment identified in the previous 
chapter. In terms of directly testing the literature, the evidence above suggests that 
although there was some correlation with explanations offered by scholars, the data 
does not fit the exact model in relation to the size of the minority ethnic population. 
However, the findings related to the BNP exploiting growing negative perceptions on 
immigration were very much supportive of the current literature. 
This chapter has also indicated how immigration became an important 
electoral issue at both a national and local level, and it was also evident that those 
respondents who voted for the BNP have lost trust in the mainstream parties’ ability 
to deal with what they view as an ‘immigration problem’. It also demonstrated that at 
a local level, although there was some limited evidence of racial tension and violence, 
there was no evidence of racial bias based on the allocation of resources in 
comparison with locations like Burnley. It is the perception that this exists which is 
greater than the actuality. However, the analysis of the data demonstrated that it is 
national issues relating to immigration, rather than local issues, which were more 
important. The politicisation of race in the national arena, with particular reference to 
the mainstream parties, will be analysed further in chapter six.  
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Analysis has also shown that the statement that the British should come first 
when it comes to benefits, housing and jobs was important in why voters chose to 
support the BNP. The data indicated that 97 per cent of BNP voters agreed with this 
statement. Therefore it should be argued that this was an important factor driving 
BNP support in the town. These voters in particular, argued that the indigenous white 
majority British are suffering at the expense of immigrants. The message that the BNP 
would act to redress their grievance was one of the major reasons many supported the 
party. 
Finally, although many scholars have analysed immigration as a single issue, 
it alone cannot explain why the BNP were successful in 2008. Indeed, although this 
analysis indicates that immigration was central, rather than being a single issue, 
immigration acted as the catalyst. Immigration was labelled as a problem, and in the 
‘fertile environment’ it was then related to unemployment, allocation of resources and 
crime. The result in Nuneaton was that the BNP, with their brand of anti-immigrant 
politics, benefited to the extent that they had two BNP councillors elected. 
Therefore, from the evidence offered in this chapter it should be argued that 
immigration was a prominent factor. It acted as a catalyst, and when associated with 
other factors, such as unemployment and resources, it was important in galvanising 
voters’ attitudes and sentiments negatively towards immigration and immigrant 
communities. The following chapters will analyse these factors in greater detail, 
specifically the rise of Islamophobia, political opportunity structures and the role of 
the media. 
 
   
 
 




Islamophobia and the BNP in Nuneaton 
 
Chapter four demonstrated that immigration was an important factor which acts as a 
catalyst, and directs voter choice. It is worthwhile taking this theme further, assessing 
the role of Islamophobia amongst those who vote for the BNP. Indeed, most BNP 
voters view Muslim immigrants in a more negative manner in comparison with non-
Muslim immigrants, as indicated by one respondent in Nuneaton, who when asked if 
they view Muslim immigrants differently to other immigrants stated: 
I think so. Yes because they don’t seem to respect our customs, and I 
understand they move to our country and they have their own, but they don’t 
seem to take on any of our culture. I mean if you went to another country you 
have to embrace the culture to a certain point. I mean you have your own 
heritage like where you came from, I am not asking you to forget that, but they 
come over here they build Mosques, speak their own language, wear different 
clothes and they even have their own f***ing schools. I don’t know; I am sure if 
you had an all-white, non-Muslim school it wouldn’t be allowed (O2OI8 2013).  
 
The literature suggests that the rise of Islamophobia since 2001 has been important in 
the success of the BNP (Goodwin 2011a; Biggs and Knauss 2011; Kundnani 2007; 
John et al. 2006). Thus, this chapter tests the explanations in the literature, that the 
BNP’s success was in part driven by increasing Islamophobia. It will demonstrate that 
the rise of the BNP in Nuneaton corresponds with the rising fear of radical Islamism, 
and the ‘perceived’ threat it posed to many voters in 2008. In the course of this 
analysis it has become evident that Islamophobia has become a mainstream political 
and social issue, which the BNP sought to exploit.  
Islamophobia is not a new phenomenon, as the Runnymede Trust noted in 
their report, the dread or dislike has existed in Western countries and their culture for 
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many centuries, and that more recently it “has become more explicit, more extreme 
and more dangerous” (1997: 1). At its extreme, this fear has been linked to Muslim 
conspiracy theories, such as Eurabia, which argues there is an imminent process of 
Islamisation taking place in Europe. Fekete notes that in Britain these were 
established and normalised during the 1980s and 1990s, and points specifically to the 
rise of anti-Arab racism in the press which developed during the oil shocks of the 
1970s, the Iranian Embassy siege (1979-1981), The Rushdie Affair (1989) and the 
first Gulf War in 1991, and argues that “an explicit anti-Arab and anti-Muslim racism 
was being constructed in the UK, particularly by papers like The Sun for some twenty 
years” (2012: 39). This developed alongside the New Right movement, and these 
conspiracies are now “held and circulated in Europe today across a broad political 
spectrum” (Fekete 2012: 30).  
An increase in anti-Muslim sentiment post 9/11, as it will be demonstrated, 
was an important factor for the rise BNP in the first decade of the twenty-first 
Century.  As with any concept there is widespread debate about its definition, and as 
Lorente states, “although the concept is increasingly widespread, it seems hard to 
define in practice just what Islamophobia is, as it is often put on a par with processes 
such as racism” (2010: 116). Therefore, it will be necessary to offer an understanding 
of the various definitions of this concept, before seeking an understanding of its 
relevance to voter choice in Nuneaton.  
The Runnymede Trust (1997) described Islamophobia as a form of racism 
which was rooted in both the intolerance of Islam, that included the belief that Islam 
was monolithic, inferior to the West, it does not have any aims or values in common 
with other cultures, and Islam is a violent religion and is supportive of terrorism 
(1997: 5-12). This view was shared by Lorente who states that, “the term mainly 
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refers to instilled fear and/ or hostility towards Islam” (2010: 116). Moreover, the 
Berkeley Centre for Race and Gender also offer an understanding of the term. They 
state that:  
Islamophobia is a contrived fear or prejudice fomented by the existing 
Eurocentric and Orientalist global power structure.  It is directed at a perceived 
or real Muslim threat through the maintenance and extension of existing 
disparities in economic, political, social and cultural relations, while 
rationalizing the necessity to deploy violence as a tool to achieve "civilizational 
rehab" of the target communities (Muslim or otherwise).  Islamophobia 
reintroduces and reaffirms global racial structures through which resource 
distribution disparities are maintained and extended (Berkeley Centre for Race 
and Gender Nd.).  
 
This of course does not mean that the term is not questioned and viewed as 
ambiguous. For example, scholars such as Zuquette (2008) have referred to the 
‘hysteria’ surrounding the term, about its meaning and what does Islamophobia 
actually refer to. Moreover, authors such as Richardson (2012) and Kundnani (2007) 
highlighted competing terms, which includes ‘anti-Muslim racism’, ‘intolerance 
against Muslims’, ‘anti-Muslim prejudice’, ‘anti-Muslim bigotry’, ‘hatred of 
Muslims’, ‘anti-Islamism’ and ‘anti-Muslimism’. However, it is not the aim of this 
research to dissect the various terms. It will focus on the main understanding of the 
term, Islamophobia, that it is simply a fear of, or hatred of Islam, Muslims or anything 
to do with Islamic culture. As Lorente notes, “when observing the discrepancies 
around any ‘controversial’ concept such as Islamophobia, the only thing which 
remains clear is that no matter what we call it, there are acts and attitudes against the 
Islamic and Muslim communities that reside in our close surroundings... which are 
specifically addressed to the Muslim population or what we consider as such” (2010: 
126).  
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Therefore, this Chapter will examine several important factors relating to 
Islamophobia, developing an understanding of its impact on voters, and concludes 
that this was an important factor in the success of the BNP in Nuneaton. First, it will 
analyse the location thesis, specifically the size of the Muslim population bordering 
wards where the BNP were successful. It then analyses the widely held belief that 
Muslims self-segregate and do not mix with other communities. Focus will then turn 
to how the fear of Islam has resonated with some voters in Nuneaton. Finally, it 
demonstrates how important the shift in focus of the BNP was from a strictly racist 
ideology to anti-religious fanaticism in garnering support in the post-9/11 period. It 
will demonstrate that Islamophobia was important alongside other factors such as 
immigration and socioeconomics. It will show that Islamophobia like immigration 
was one of the most important factors for BNP supporters in Nuneaton, and it was 
important in galvanising BNP support in 2008. In fact, as this chapter will indicate, 
immigration and Islamophobia were often discussed in the same statement, which 
demonstrates how voters conflated the two.   
 
Locational analysis  
This first section will analyse further the demographic data in Nuneaton, and examine 
the locational profile of the Muslim community. This is important because a number 
of scholars have highlighted problems relating to segregation of particular 
communities, and demonstrated that the BNP were typically successful in areas with 
large Muslim communities (Biggs and Knauss 2011; Goodwin 2011; Bowyer 2008; 
John et al. 2006). Goodwin in his research found that there “was a strong and positive 
relationship between higher levels of BNP support and the presence of a large Muslim 
community of Bangladeshi or Pakistani heritage” (2011a: 3). This explanation for 
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higher levels of BNP support was also highlighted by John et al., who in their analysis 
found that the BNP openly seeks to encourage and exploit anti-Muslim feeling, and 
that there is evidence that the BNP gains electoral support in areas with Muslim 
communities (2006: 16). Moreover, Bowyer found in his study that, “in England, it 
has been shown that whites who live in neighbourhoods with a relatively large black 
population tend to display more positive attitudes to immigrants and ethnic minorities, 
while residential proximity to Pakistanis and Bangladeshis is associated with more 
negative attitudes” (2008: 615). What these studies show is that Islamophobia was 
significant for BNP voters, and the BNP gave prominence to negative views of 
Muslims.  
The findings that the BNP are attracting voters who are hostile to Muslims and 
live in areas which border large Muslim communities can be tested using a locational 
analysis of Nuneaton. By analysing the statistical data for the borough of Nuneaton 
and Bedworth it is evident that the Muslim population is not large in comparison with 
other hotbeds of BNP support. Burnley, for instance, has a much larger population 
practising Islam, and at the time of the BNP breakthrough the Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi population stood at approximately 7 per cent (Lancashire County 
Council 2011). In Nuneaton, the percentage of the population who declared their 
religion as Muslim was 2.3 per cent, which represents a significant increase since 
2001, when the population was 1.6 per cent (ONS 2011). Moreover, nationwide the 
Muslim population is around 4.4 per cent, so in comparison with national statistics 
Nuneaton did not have a population any larger than the UK as a whole (ONS 2011). 
Although this is not as large as the population in Burnley, it shows that in Nuneaton 
there is a sizeable, and growing Muslim population, but more specifically a 
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geographically concentrated population. This next section looks at this concentration 
of the Muslim population in more detail. 
It is evident from this analysis that Nuneaton does not have the higher 
population density of other breakthrough areas; however, the significance of the 
location of this Muslim population does have resonance with the literature. Some 
analysts have argued the presence of a concentrated Muslim community has a greater 
effect on levels of BNP support (Rhodes 2009; Bowyer 2008; John et al. 2006). In 
Burnley the Muslim population reside mainly in the Daneshouse with Stoneyholme 
ward, and represents around 60 per cent of the population in that ward (Rhodes 2009: 
35; ONS 2001). By analysing the location of the Muslim population in Nuneaton it is 
evident that it is geographically concentrated in particular wards. The Muslim 
population in Nuneaton is primarily based in two particular locations within Abbey 
ward and Wem Brook ward, which border Barpool, and the only Mosque is based in 
Chilvers Coton, an area in the South-eastern corner of the Wem Brook (Warwick 
Observatory 2013). Abbey ward has seen its Muslim population increase from 11.86 
per cent in 2001 to 14 per cent in 2011, and in Wem Brook the Muslim population has 
risen from 9.11 per cent in 2001 to approximately 12 per cent in 2011 (ONS 2011). 
Thus there are two factors at play identified in the literature: a growing and 
concentrated Muslim population. This was highlighted by one BNP voter who stated 
rather explicitly that the “Muslims are based in just one area, Edward Street. I mean if 
you just walk around Edward Street you can see it is just full of them, or Halal shops 
and f**king everything” (O2OI2 2012). Examination of the argument that the BNP 
benefited from the perception that the Muslim community self-segregate will be the 
focus in the next section. 
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The concentration of the Muslim population in certain areas of Nuneaton 
offers many similarities with the explanations in the literature which analysed the 
impact of segregated communities. For example, Biggs and Knauss found that BNP 
support has been highest in areas which have what appear to be segregated 
communities:  
The BNP thrives where the non-white (particularly South Asian or Muslim) 
population is also highly segregated. Segregation means that people are less 
likely to have contact with non-whites beyond the immediate neighbourhood. It 
also creates a greater sense of cultural or even political threat. Whatever the 
mechanism, segregation aids the BNP (2011: 11).  
 
Rhodes in his study also found that in Burnley the BNP were successful in 
wards bordering those which had a significant number of Muslims living in them 
(2009 35-36). This view was shared by Goodwin who also argued in his analysis that 
“support for the party stemmed from more ethnically homogenous ‘threatened white 
enclaves’, with the suggestion that BNP voters have less social contact with members 
of other ethnic groups” (2011b: 112). Analysis of the data in chapter four also 
demonstrated that the BNP support was more prevalent in wards with higher numbers 
of white voters. Indeed, as Bowyer noted: 
 While the BNP seems to receive the most support in districts with large ethnic 
minority (particularly Pakistani or Bangladeshi) populations, its strength seems 
to be concentrated in wards where white residents are less likely to encounter 
members of ethnic minority groups than other whites in their district; i.e., in 
white enclaves within ethnically diverse cities (Bowyer 2008: 617).  
 
The data collected in Nuneaton suggests that BNP supporters are more hostile 
toward Muslims, but appear less concerned about other minority groups. As one BNP 
voter stated, when asked about immigrants and immigration: “there’s differences... 
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immigrants and then Muslims... Islam, that’s separate” (O2OI7 2013). Moreover, the 
view that in areas where white residents are less likely to encounter members of 
ethnic minority groups the BNP are typically stronger, was highlighted by the leader 
of the local council, Cllr. Dennis Harvey, who noted that in the wards in Nuneaton 
where the largest Muslim communities reside, the BNP have failed to gain success, 
stating that, 
In Camp Hill it is almost entirely white and working class and Barpool isn’t far 
off, and in those areas where there is a Muslim community they are two of 
Labour’s strongest wards I think. The BNP have not done well at all in those 
areas. So there may be the image that there is separateness but it doesn’t come 
directly into those two wards (O2OI5 2012).  
 
In fact, the lack of a Muslim population in one of the wards where the BNP were 
successful, was also noted by another local Labour councillor who stated that, “even 
though there are a significant number of Muslim families in Nuneaton, they are not in 
Barpool at all” (O2OI3 2012).  
The findings in Nuneaton do to a large extent show that the BNP were able to 
exploit segregation. They garnered support in areas which have a majority white 
population, and border locations which have a large Muslim population, rather than 
other religious communities. For example, analysis of the size of the Muslim 
population in Barpool and Camp Hill offers a comparison with that of the 
neighbouring Abbey and Wem Brook wards. The data indicate that the number of 
Muslims living in Camp Hill is significantly lower and has a population of 0.2 per 
cent, while in the ward of Barpool the Muslim population was also significantly lower 
at 0.9 per cent (ONS 2011). Thus, in the areas where the BNP received its greatest 
support, the exposure of whites to Asian, black and other minority ethnic groups is 
limited. However, analysis of the data shows that in Abbey Ward the BNP in 2008 got 
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17.6 per cent of the vote, and in Wem Brook 24.9 per cent of the vote, which 
demonstrates that even in these ethnically ‘diverse wards’ the BNP were able to 
garner support, which does not correlate with the explanations that the BNP is less 
likely to receive support in less ethnically diverse wards (Nuneaton Borough Council 
2008a; Table 2).  
This section has shown that in Nuneaton, although it has a comparatively 
small Muslim population, there is evidence of a community segregated. The Muslim 
and white communities are not mixed across the town, and this has clearly created 
two communities in close proximity. It has also demonstrated that the idea that the 
BNP have garnered support in areas which have locational clusters representing 
particular communities does have some validity. For example, the BNP were 
successful in Barpool which borders those wards having the largest Muslim 
population. It appears that for residents of particular wards, predominantly white 
wards bordering these locational clusters, it is the perception of the size of the Muslim 
population, and the threat from this community which drove some voters towards the 
BNP. This perception was in no doubt utilised by the BNP, rather than the actual size 
of the population being significant in this particular case. Although this section 
provides an insight into the demographics of the population, it does not demonstrate 
why this may be significant in the increasing support for the BNP in 2008. It is only 
through analysis of the qualitative data that one can understand the sentiment and 
attitudes of voters towards the Muslim community. Focus will now turn to how BNP 
voters emphasized the view that the Muslim community is segregated, and choose not 
to mix.  
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Islamophobia: Suspicion and fear   
The idea of divided communities has been fuelled by those who have important 
positions of influence. For example, politicians, the media (See chapter eight) and 
organisations such as, the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), 
facilitated increased coverage of the issues post 9/11. This added to the shared moral 
panic
11
 about Islamist terrorism, which was fuelled further by the media, and will be 
discussed further in chapter eight. Indeed, Tony Blair and the Labour Party were 
instrumental in supporting President Bush in the aftermath of 9/11. The political 
discourse in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, likewise added to the idea of separate 
communities. McGhee refers to this as “institutionalised Islamophobia” (2005: 99) 
which became more prominent in the wake of The Terrorism Act (2000) and the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (2001). Moreover, in the immediate period after 
9/11 the then Home Secretary David Blunkett became embroiled in a race row 
relating to his proposal to introduce culture tests. Indeed, Blunkett wanted to 
introduce British citizenship laws which he believed would tackle the “problems of 
racial segregation” (Travis 2001). Moreover, David Blunkett made a speech in 2002, 
during which he stated that parts of Britain were already “swamped” with immigrants 
(Guardian 2002). Blunket’s speech only served to play into the hands of the BNP, and 
legitimised their argument. The issue of segregation in communities was also raised 
by the former chair of the EHRC, Trevor Philips, who spoke of Britain “sleep 
walking” to segregation and attacked what he saw as the failure of multiculturalism 
(2005).  
                                                          
11 In reference to moral panic Cohen notes that “societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. A 
condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is 
presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, 
politicians and other right thinking people” (2004: 1). For further details on moral panic also refer to Cohen (1972), Altheide 
(2009) and Odartey-Wellington (2009). 
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Evidently, the discourse surrounding segregation placed blame for this 
segregation firmly on the Muslim population, again fuelling anti-Muslim sentiment. 
However, there are scholars, such as Kundnani, who argued that segregation was the 
result of the interaction between industrial decline, ‘white flight’ and institutional 
racism and that, “after 2001, that history had been forgotten and its causality reversed 
so that it was ‘Muslims’ who were held responsible for refusing to mix, while 
‘multiculturalism’ was blamed for allowing their self-segregation” (2007: 27). This 
next section will use the quantitative and qualitative data produced in Nuneaton to test 
whether voters adhere to the narrative that Muslims self-segregate. It will analyse how 
respondents voted for the BNP because of the fear of the other, and the view that the 
Muslim population are not willing to mix, which for some voters derived from their 
experience of these communities.  
In the course of collecting and analysing the data for this research it became 
more evident that in explaining their ‘fear’ of Islam, or the ‘other’, BNP voters’ 
sentiments were often attached to a lack of understanding or interaction. Indeed, most 
BNP respondents pointed the blame directly at the Muslim community. The reasons 
for these claims were more than often attached to the sentiment that the Muslim 
community just ‘do not mix’ with other members of the community, and more 
specifically, the Muslim community did not want to mix with the white local 
community. The analysis also found that amongst the BNP voters interviewed, there 
is a belief that the Muslim community do not mix with them because they viewed 
them as infidels. For example, one BNP voter stated that, “Muslim immigrants don’t 
mix as much” (O2OI13 2014). This sentiment was also highlighted by a BNP voter 
and former activist, who when asked if he felt that there had been a failure to integrate 
with the Muslim community, responded:  
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Yes definitely. They don’t want to do they? It is part of their religion not to mix 
with us. We are f**king infidels ain’t we? And I see it all the time. The way 
they look at us, and I find them very ignorant. The way they can speak English 
but don’t in front of you. But that is just the world we live in… areas have been 
completely taken over by them [Muslims]. They are not like Jamaicans who 
come over, ok they have their own clubs and everything, but they use to mix 
with us (O2OI2 2012).  
 
This view of the Islamic community in Nuneaton was also shared by the selection of 
BNP voters below. For instance, one BNP voter, who when asked about any issues or 
problems relating to the immigrant community in Nuneaton stated that, “there have 
not been problems like, but there will be. We have loads of Muslims and they are 
growing in size. [Nuneaton] will be like Birmingham or Leicester soon... They just 
don’t live like us. They don’t like us, you know? We are infidels. Makes me sick. It is 
us against them” (O2OI4 2012). This response highlighted how some BNP voters 
conflated immigrants with Muslims. This sentiment was also shared by another BNP 
voter who also argued the Muslims do not mix: 
The Asians and Muslims just keep to themselves... they don’t mix mainly, and it 
is the Asians who seem to be the problem. They don’t really mix. You know, 
black people wear the same cloths as us, speak English, but then you get the 
Muslims walking round with Burkas on, and you can only see their eyes and 
stuff. If you walked out in a balaclava you wouldn’t last very long, and if you 
went into a shop you’d be in trouble... Yes that’s how I feel it is like. I don’t 
know whether I want to mix with them, I don’t know. I don’t know any of them 
really. The ones I have known speak their own language and keep themselves to 
themselves. You know they don’t really mingle, they don’t go out, they don’t 
drink, they don’t play football, they don’t socialise, they don’t join clubs, they 
have their own clubs (O2OI8 2013).  
 
There are also examples highlighting that there are some in the white community who 
chose not to mix with the Muslim community, which was a point highlighted by 
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Kundnani (2007). For example, one BNP voter stated when asked if he interacted 
with the Muslim community in Nuneaton: 
I try to stay away from them to be honest with you. I haven’t got time for them, 
and I believe there is too many of them around in Nuneaton, and especially all 
over the country. And after what happened recently with that soldier being 
killed, it proves by example that people like that, I am not saying all Muslims 
are like that, but the majority of them have the same feelings, and they should 
all be out of this f**king country (O2OI7 2013). 
 
Indeed, one BNP voter when asked if he knows any Muslims in his neighbourhood 
replied “No. If they ended up living where I do, and every other house is a Muslim, I 
would probably think about moving out” (O2OI9 2013). In fact, many BNP voters 
shared the sentiment that they do not want to live in neighbourhoods where the 
Muslim community reside. Moreover, one BNP voter was asked if he interacted with 
the local Muslim community and he replied quite bluntly, “[I] Don’t mix with them”, 
and when asked if he thinks the Muslim community mix with the local white 
community, or even want to mix with them replied, “No, only if they have to through 
work, otherwise they don’t want to” (O2OI13 2014). The view that the Muslim 
community are segregated and do not mix was not just restricted to BNP voters in 
Nuneaton. In fact, one Labour voter, when discussing immigration into Britain, 
argued that certain ‘types’ of immigrants are more acceptable than others: 
Certain groups are less willing or able to integrate in society and stuff. It is like 
you get large areas with Asian communities in and people think they are less 
likely to integrate into a community… I think people look at that and say if they 
don’t integrate with everyone else and just live in their own area, and then what 
people hear from groups like the EDL or BNP sounds true, they think yes we 
can’t live together (FG2P3 2012).  
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Analysis of the data in this section demonstrates that some voters in the white 
community do feel isolated and separated from the Muslim community. This has 
played into the hands of organisations like the BNP who have attacked multi-
culturalism, and propagated a narrative on Islamic segregation. Moreover, we can see 
that there is a feeling amongst BNP voters, that in particular it is the Muslim 
community that does not mix. One of the reasons for this is that many voters, and not 
just BNP supporters, view Muslims and Islam with suspicion and fear. There is no 
doubt that the language used by mainstream political actors fed into the growing 
hysteria, which the BNP were able to tap into, and only served to divide communities 
further. This segregation evidently benefited the BNP, who also used fear, particularly 
the fear of the other, to increase their support. 
This study will now focus on the data produced in Nuneaton, in order to 
understand why some voters chose to vote for a party based on their fear of Islam the 
perceived threat people have derived from their experience of radical Islamism. So 
what drives this fear and dislike of Muslims, and how does it manifest itself amongst 
the voters? It has been argued that those who hold closed views of Islam view it as 
inferior, threatening, aggressive, and a religion engaged in a clash of civilisations 
(Runnymede Trust report 1997: 5). Indeed, Goodwin et al. notes that, the world of the 
far right offers a distinct set of narratives which emphasised the perceived threat from 
Islam, which includes the argument “that Britain will soon descend into a race war or 
a civil war as soon as City X or City Y becomes majority Muslim” (2012a: 3). This 
was also highlighted by Goodwin and Evans who found that BNP supporters 
“strongly disagree that Islam is not a threatening religion”, and they “expressed high 
levels of anxiety over Muslims and the ‘threat’ from their religion, Islam” (2012: 18-
19). It appears from previous studies that many BNP supporters are convinced that 
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Islam is posing a danger to the West, and Islamophobia is often expressed in a way 
highlighted by Kundnani, who states that “you say Islam and automatically somebody 
is thinking extremist or terrorist” (2002: 74). Indeed, Goodwin found that 70 per cent 
of BNP voters he sampled believe that, “even in its milder forms Islam poses a serious 
danger to Western civilisation” (2011b: 112). Therefore, it is necessary to test the 
explanations that the BNP supporters in Nuneaton also hold the view that Islam as a 
threat, and that this fear was important in their decision to vote for the BNP. 
The BNP have sought to exploit the fear and the perceived threat from Islam. 
Indeed, BNP leader Nick Griffin was early in realising the potential in exploiting 
growing tensions between the white and Muslim Asian communities in parts of 
Britain. For example, in 1999 when Griffin began his programme of modernisation he 
sought to move away from biological racism. Griffin exploited new issues which 
formed the BNP’s programme, and utilised cultural racism and cultural difference. 
For example, as early as 2000 the BNP leader stated that, “we believe not just that our 
people are different from others, but that such genuine diversity is worth preserving. It 
is not a matter of 'superiority' or 'inferiority'” (Griffin 2000). Moreover, we can see 
clearly in the BNP 2005 election manifesto that culture was becoming a central focus. 
It states that,  
The British National Party believes in genuine ethnic and cultural diversity and 
the right of ALL peoples to self-determination and that must include the 
indigenous peoples of these islands. The British peoples are embroiled in a long 
term cultural war being waged by a ruling regime, which has abandoned the 
concept of "Britain" in pursuit of globalisation. We are determined to win that 
cultural war, and to that end, we must take control of our national borders. We 
must also stop further attempts to enforce multi-culturalism on an increasingly 
sceptical and unwilling populace. The future of our culture is not up for debate - 
it is part of our individual and collective existence on this planet and we are 
under an obligation to pass on to generations yet unborn, the collected 
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knowledge, wisdom and lore, which we ourselves have inherited (BNP General 
Election Manifesto 2005: 3) 
 
There is also evidence that the BNP have utilised the politics of fear, fear of 
Muslims and Islam, in order to garner electoral support. Indeed, Bunglawala argued 
that the BNP have “energetically focused on promoting a new and more voter friendly 
one-line answer to all problems: it’s all the Muslims’ fault” (2006). For example, 
Griffin made a speech to his supporters on 19 January 2004 stating that, Islam was a 
"wicked, vicious faith”, and “Asian Muslims were turning Britain into a multiracial 
hell as they tried to conquer the country” (Anon 2006b). In fact, excerpts from 
Griffin’s speech made all the national newspapers, and were documented in the BBC 
Panorama programme The Secret Agent in 2004. It appears that this message has 
resonated with some BNP voters. For example, one BNP voter spoke of falling birth 
rates amongst the white population, the growing birth rate in the Islamic community, 
and the Balkanisation of the UK, and stated that, “I really think the whole Enoch 
Powell thing, you know the Rivers of Blood, I think that will still happen. I don’t 
know when, but in my lifetime or just after and I think it will happen” (O2OI1 2012). 
These sentiments and attitudes will now be examined in greater detail. 
The examination of the data shows just how much this has resonated with the 
voters in Nuneaton. For example, in Nuneaton, those who chose to vote for the BNP 
did display a fear of Islam, the religion, and view all Muslims as a threat. Indeed, one 
BNP voter, when asked if he believed radical Islam was a threat stated forthrightly, 
“Islam is a threat” (O2OI4 2012), while another BNP voter when asked the same 
question replied, “definitely to me, to English nationals, the whole country. I just 
think they are not safe” (O2OI7 2013). Moreover, another BNP respondent was more 
specific regarding why he viewed Muslims and their religion as a threat, stating that, 
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“Islam spreads and the very nature of Islam forces it to spread and control” (O2OI1 
2012). Clearly, Islam has been portrayed and is viewed by some voters as something 
alien to British culture, which has no doubt contributed to the rise in Islamophobia in 
Britain. This was indicated by BNP voters, with one highlighting his fear and hatred 
of Islam based on his own experiences with Muslims, stating that: 
I have known Muslims... I have had my hair cut by Muslims. And there are a lot 
of Hindu’s around here. And I know for a fact the Muslims do not respect us. 
Because, if a girl has a short skirt on, and because they are non-Muslim, they 
are regarded as Infidel dogs. So it is nothing for them to rape them or shag 
them. That is just the way it seems to me anyway. They look at them differently 
to their own. They don’t really want nothing to do with us. I mean there is one 
down the road, I go in his shop and he just drops his change in your hand, and I 
have been going there for years and he has always been like that with us. I don’t 
go there anymore. I know another Muslim who used to cut my hair and I have 
reason to believe what he said to me. He said to me, I am Muslim and you are 
Christian, I could, you, your wife, your kids, I could rape them, kill all of you. I 
would get done by the law, but as long as I say my prayers to Allah it is not an 
offence. Because you’re a f**king infidel. You know what I mean? And I have 
always believed that, I mean he was talking to me, and as far as I am aware he 
was telling me the truth. So as far as I am concerned they are all the same 
(O2OI2 2012). 
 
This sentiment seemed to materialise in the responses of all BNP voters who took part 
in the interviews. Indeed, as this BNP voter stated when asked if he believed Islam is 
a threat: 
Well I have never had any trouble with them but they are always walking 
around speaking Arabic or whatever in an English country, and they could be 
saying anything about anybody, and the Burka’s or stuff they wear there could 
be anyone underneath that. I know the French have banned them and I think we 
should go the same way. Like I said before, if you walk down the street with a 
balaclava you would get pulled over by the police. Some Muslim walking down 
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the street in a f**king Burka and that is just accepted... I am worried about it to 
be honest with you. If we keep going on the way we are and don’t put our foot 
down, I mean I have watched programmes about Luton and Muslims protesting 
on the street saying they want Sharia Law and then you know you get people 
like the EDL doing demonstrations and they are just branded racist. I mean to a 
certain degree they might be but they are standing up for what they believe in, 
in this country and we don’t want people coming into our country telling us 
what we can and can’t do and what we can and can’t say (O2OI8 2013).  
 
This negative view of Islam was also shared by another BNP voter who stated that:     
 
 
Certain factions of the Muslim community will use their religion as an excuse to 
do things that are unacceptable to British society.  And particularly the area that 
upset me the most was the groups of young Muslim males who see, or aren’t 
allowed to have much sexual contact prior to marriage with another Muslim. 
But they are allowed to take infidels, so in essence they see it as right to sow 
their oats, by hook or by crook with any young white females or whatever, 
whether they be old enough to consent or not (O2OI9 2013). 
 
However, it was not just BNP supporters who expressed fear of Muslims and Islam. 
For example, during one focus group a self-declared Independent voter, when 
discussing people’s perceptions of Muslims in Nuneaton and nationally, stated: 
There is a feeling there that people didn’t know who they could trust or who the 
enemy is, or who the terrorist is or where they are. People developed a fear of 
some people. This clearly did come into play when some people voted, because 
these people, who are immigrants, might be the people we are scared of and 
when you have an organisation like the BNP who are putting Britain and the 
British first, people naturally think this is a good idea. Basically it is naturally 
going to increase any comfort feeling. And so it is not surprising that the BNP, 
whether or not there is any substance there that they pushed their votes up... 
And should we be surprised the BNP got in, not really (FG1P2 2012). 
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It is clear that anti-Muslim sentiment is more evident in the responses of BNP 
respondents. In fact, 100 per cent of BNP respondents who took part in the interviews 
demonstrated a high level of Islamophobia. Indeed, the quotations selected above 
represent the feelings of many voters, but all BNP respondents expressed similar 
views on this topic.  
It was also apparent from the data produced by the questionnaire that anti-
Muslim sentiment was strongest amongst BNP voters. Although less colourful than 
the qualitative data above, the following statistic clearly points to Islamophobia being 
a key variable in the minds of BNP voters. The questionnaire recorded that 84 per 
cent of those who said they voted for the BNP in 2008, did so because of their stand 
against radical Islamism (see table 29). This offers an indication of the level of feeling 
towards Muslims amongst BNP voters, and produces data which correlates with the 
statistical data provided in the literature. For example, Goodwin in his analysis of 
survey data found that BNP voters were more likely to express anti-Muslim 
sentiment, and that 79 per cent stated that “even in its milder forms Islam poses a 
serious danger to Western civilisation” (2011a: 112). This sentiment was also evident 
in the explanation offered by Goodwin and Evans who found that over 88 per cent of 
BNP voters either disagreed or strongly disagreed that Islam does not pose a serious 
danger to Western civilisation, and that less than 1 per cent of their BNP sample 
would welcome a Mosque being built in their area (2012: 19). They also argue that 
BNP supporters were “deeply concerned about the issue of immigration, but also feel 
deeply uncomfortable about the perceived threat from Islam, and by extension the 
presence of its religious institutions at the local level. In short, large majorities in our 
sample appear absolutely convinced that Islam is threatening Western civilisation” 
(Goodwin and Evans 2012: 19). 
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Table 29: Why did you vote for a particular party or candidate during the local elections in your town in 
2008? [I voted for the party because of their stand against radical Islam] 
  









for in the 
2008 local 
elections? 
Labour         
  6% 8% 47% 14% 25% 100% 
Conservative         
  16% 10% 57% 8% 10% 100% 
Liberal 
Democrats 
        
  4% 0% 58% 12% 27% 100% 
BNP         
  71% 13% 16% 0% 0% 100% 
Green Party         
  17% 17% 50% 0% 17% 100% 
UKIP         
  0% 75% 0% 0% 25% 100% 
Independent         
  0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 100% 
Did not vote         
  8% 0% 31% 23% 38% 100% 
Other         
  0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 100% 
Total   42 24 123 28 50 267 
  16% 9% 46% 10% 19% 100% 
        Source: Nuneaton Questionnaire 2012 
 
What this section has shown is that there is overwhelming evidence of intense 
Islamophobia, and it was the prevailing view amongst BNP voters. This demonstrates 
that Islam was, and still is to many a threat, which has developed into a fear of all 
Muslims. It has also shown that this fear, for some, is based not just on the illusion 
created by the media and politicians, but also relates for some to direct experiences. 
Moreover, this section demonstrated that the BNP have tapped into this fear, and they 
were a major beneficiary in terms of gaining electoral support in 2008. Indeed, 
analysis of the data produced in Nuneaton demonstrates that voters do hold negative 
views of Muslims which correlates with the explanations highlighted in the literature. 
Clearly voters hold negative views of Islam, and evidently these sentiments had 
increased post-9/11, as the next section will demonstrate.  
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9/11, Islamism, and the BNP 
This final section will focus on some of the main issues raised in more detail, notably 
whether the effects of 9/11, and its aftermath, fuelled support for the BNP in 
Nuneaton. It will do this by highlighting what is argued in the literature, the role of 
the BNP in attaching itself to perceived ‘war’ against radical Islamism, and finally a 
brief look at media coverage of the 9/11 and the subsequent ‘War on Terror’.  
The analysis of the literature highlights evidence of heightened Islamophobia, 
which included a rise in negative stereotyping of Muslims, with examples of 
intolerance in the media, from politicians and government institutions, which 
evidently filtered into the wider community in the UK (Bowyer 2008; McGhee 2005; 
Richardson 2004). Indeed, Richardson states that, “at times of international conflict 
and fear there is a tendency in the media and in political speeches, and in everyday 
conversations up and down the land to dehumanise and demonise the enemy” 
(Richardson 2004: 15). Richardson also highlighted the enhanced belief that, 
“Islamism is the New Bolshevism” and “the enemy was not an individual human 
being... nor the strands within Islam known as Islamism, but the whole of Islam” 
(Richardson 2004: 17). This view was also shared by Alexander who states that, “in 
the post-9/11 climate, the links being made between Muslim terrorists, British Muslim 
suicide bombers, Muslim ‘hate clerics’ and the ‘rioting’ Muslim communities of 
Bradford, Oldham and Burnley are increasingly becoming ‘seamless and almost 
incontrovertible’” (cited in McGhee 2005: 99). Moreover, the post-9/11 hysteria 
provided an opportunity for the BNP to garner support. For example, Bowyer argues 
that “the BNP also embarked on a propaganda campaign, which intensified after 
September 11” (Bowyer 2008: 612). Furthermore, analysis of the BNP shows how the 
party attached itself to the issue and anxieties surrounding Islam, and offered 
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themselves as the defenders of the British way of life (Goodwin 2011b; Copsey 2008; 
John et al. 2006; McGhee 2005). It is argued that the BNP utilised 9/11 to fuel wider 
Islamophobia in Britain, and actively sought to exploit the growing unpopularity of 
the Muslim community in the post-9/11 period. For example, John et al. state that the 
BNP success in the 2000s can be linked to the fact that the party was “able to 
capitalise upon ‘Islamophobia’ and that the strategy of exploiting the role of Muslims 
in terrorist attacks, such as 7 July London bombings”, and that “the strategy of 
exploiting the role of Muslims in terrorist attacks, may very well have a particularly 
strong effect at the local level” (2006: 16-17). Moreover, Rhodes in his analysis of 
multiculturalism and the subcultural politics of the BNP states that, in the “aftermath 
of the 2001 riots, 9/11, and the onset of the ‘War on Terror’ saw Muslims, both here 
and abroad, become a target of fear, suspicion, and hostility, portrayed as a potentially 
threatening and disloyal group”, and the 7/7 bombings “marked an intensification in 
political, media, and public suspicion of the broader Muslim community” (2011: 67).  
It is suggested that in the immediate years following 9/11 the BNP’s embrace 
of Islamophobia had an effect on their level of electoral support. For example, 
electorally the BNP gained in elections year-on-year following 9/11, and from 2001 to 
2008 the BNP vote in local elections increased from no seats in 2001, to three in 
2002, then increasing to 55 by 2008 (Table 30). In fact, the BNP had since 2000 seen 
their votes in the local elections increase dramatically from 3,022 votes to 292,911 in 
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              Source: Tetteh 2009 
 
Although there were no seats in 2005 it is worth noting that only 18 councils were 
contested, and the BNP did still achieve 11 per cent of the total vote (Tetteh 2009: 5). 
The BNP also experienced a dramatic increase in their support at the general 
elections, rising from 0.2 per cent (47,129) of the total vote in 2001, to 0.7 per cent in 
2005 (192,746), and rising again in 2010 to 1.9 per cent (563,743) of the total vote 
(See Table 5).  
There are no explanations which link rising BNP electoral support directly 
with increased Islamophobia and terrorist attacks, although the data above does offer 
some correlation. BNP support rose dramatically in the period between 2001 and 
2009, which is in line with heightened Islamophobia. If we analyse the rise in local 
councillors against specific terrorist attacks by radical Islamists it does indicate that 
from 9/11 onwards the BNP vote increased as did the number of local councillors (see 
Table 31). Although there is no direct correlation between voting within this period 
and individual BNP victories, these attacks did contribute, but not as a precise 
identification of ‘terrorism for votes’.  
 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed at 
the Lanchester library, Coventry University. 
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As indicated earlier in the chapter, there was a shift from the racial threat 
espoused by the National Front in the 1970s and the BNP in the 1980s and 1990s, to a 
cultural threat from 2001 onwards, which led the BNP to direct its attacks on the 
Islamic community. It was also evident through the analysis of location, that the BNP 
in the post 9/11 environment have exploited anxiety over settled Muslim 
communities. For example, the BNP focused its election resources on areas with large 
Muslim populations in parts of the North of England, London, and in the Midlands 
(see Appendix IV – Election leaflets; The truth About Islam/The Londoner). Indeed, 
Goodwin notes that, “within hours of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the 
party launched a ‘campaign against Islam’ and quickly developed leaflets which 
Table 31: Local election seats won/Major Terror attacks 2000 to 2008 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed at 
the Lanchester library, Coventry University. 
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featured quotations from the Koran and warned voters that Britain was being turned 
into an Islamic republic” (2011b: 68). The strategy of the BNP was to exploit the 
growth in anti-Muslim sentiment in the wake of 9/11, and in particular target locations 
in Britain which have concentrated Muslim communities. Goodwin’s explanation that 
the BNP changed direction, and focused their attacks on Islam and Muslims, will now 
be tested by analysing the data in Nuneaton. It will also briefly look at what the BNP 
did to exploit the anxiety post 9/11.  
It is evident that the former BNP leader Nick Griffin realised that the increase 
in Islamophobia, post 9/11 and 7/7, could be utilised. In fact, from the early 2000s 
Griffin sought to make political capital out of the increasing climate of Islamophobia, 
and attacking Islam, multiculturalism, and the segregation of the Islamic community 
was at the forefront of BNP campaigns. This also included the BNP joining forces 
with extreme elements from the Sikh and Hindu communities in an anti-Islamic 
campaign. The campaign claimed that Islam was a threat to all non-Muslims and 
involved the distribution of CDs and leaflets and included a joint statement from the 
BNP, Sikhs and Hindus, with Griffin arguing that “Islam is the biggest threat Britain 
has ever faced” (cited in Harris 2001). Griffin also argued that the multiracial dream 
had ‘died’, and argued this related specifically to the Muslim communities:  
In white working-class estates on the edges of Muslim areas all over the country 
the liberal fantasy of multi-racial harmony is dead and gone forever… the only 
question is how long its putrid corpse will bring hatred, violence and death to 
innocent people of all colours before we are in a position to give it a decent 
burial (cited in Rhodes 2011).  
 
As demonstrated earlier, electoral support for the BNP increased dramatically in the 
post-9/11 period. But just how much did 9/11 resonate with voters in Nuneaton? The 
analysis of the data produced by this research shows there was a rise in anti-Muslim, 
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and anti-Islam sentiment, especially amongst BNP voters, and in the post-9/11 period 
all Muslims were viewed with suspicion by part of the electorate. Indeed, this was 
noted by Kundnani in the literature, who argued that, “all Muslims in Britain have 
come to be perceived as potential terrorists and have had to explain themselves to the 
rest of the country, as if what happened on 9/11 was somehow their doing” (2007: 
31).  
Analysis of the data also shows that 9/11 and subsequent terror attacks by 
radical Islamists increased negativity of all Muslims, especially amongst BNP voters. 
For example, when asked whether the terrorist attacks of 9/11, 7/7, and the general 
war on terror were influential in their decision to vote for a party or candidate, one 
BNP voter seemed very assured of their position replying; “I would say so. I started 
following the BNP after 9/11… I was scared what would happen in this country” 
(O2OI4 2012). Another BNP voter who was asked the same question replied, “I think 
a lot of people think about it, but in 20 years there will be double or quadruple the 
amount of them because that is just the way it is” (O2OI2 2012). Moreover, one BNP 
voter highlighted a familiar story which has plagued the press for years, and stated 
that “you have Islamic guys who have been linked to terrorism and you can’t get rid 
of them” (O2OI1 2012).  Furthermore, one BNP supporter was asked how the events 
of 9/11 and terrorism impacted on why they supported the BNP and they replied: 
Definitely, yes definitely. I have got two kids and you hear about all these 
terrorist plots being foiled and stuff, in this country and America. You know at 
the end of the day my priority is my family and their well-being. And you hear 
all the time about people in Mosques in London preaching hate. And then you 
have the soldiers coming back from Afghanistan and you get Islamic groups 
protesting about British Soldiers killing Muslims and it just makes me sick 
mate. But coming back to that swaying my vote a lot of these people walking 
around [Muslims] you don’t know who they are, most of them have got the 
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same name, they are all called Mohammed. When I use to work in a phone shop 
you got people come in and one of them would bring their ID and it is has got 
his name on it, Mohammed Ali or whatever, and then his brother comes in and 
he has got the same f**king name. How can you keep tabs on them? (O2OI8 
2013).  
 
It is worth noting that for some in Nuneaton it was what followed the attacks of 9/11 
rather than the terrorist act itself. For example, one Muslim leader in Nuneaton stated 
that “the increase of Islamophobia related issues started, I do feel, ever since the Iraq 
War, where Labour enforced the War on Terror” (O2OI6 2013).  
It appears from this brief analysis that when asked, BNP voters agree fear of 
Islam and Muslims was important, but it is linked to other views, often relating to size 
of the immigrant population, segregation or the War on Terror which followed 9/11 
which was more important. The question which remains is where and how were these 
views shaped and developed? As this analysis has shown the BNP were important in 
getting their anti-Muslim message across, but it was also the case that the media, 
(mainly the tabloid press), were instrumental in legitimising the message of the BNP.  
 As indicated above, it has been argued that the rise of Islamophobia was in 
part fuelled by the media (Eatwell 2011; Copsey and Macklin 2011; Kundnani 2007). 
Indeed, Copsey and Macklin state that “there is no doubt that some mass circulation 
papers have set agendas which have made not just terrorism but Islam a major issue” 
(2011: 238). This view was also shared by McGhee, who notes that: 
The reporting of the 9/11 attacks is crucial for understanding the context in 
which anti-Islamic feelings have been stirred up in non-Muslim countries. On 
the day of the attacks on New York and Washington, the culprits were very 
soon identified as being Muslims; thus a connection between Islam and 
terrorism was fused as reporters and politicians across the world began to report 
and comment on the attacks as being Islamic in origin (McGhee 2005: 103).  
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Evidently politicians, former and current, helped fuel Islamophobia in the media. For 
example, in 2001 Baroness Thatcher, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, was accused of 
racism after an article she wrote was published widely in the press stating that, “the 
people who brought down those towers were Muslims and Muslims must stand up 
and say that is not the way of Islam” and that she “had not heard enough 
condemnation from Muslim priests” (Thatcher cited in BBC News 2001). Moreover, 
Thatcher in an article, Advice to a Superpower in the New York Times (2002), which 
was widely published in the British press at the time, stated that “Islamic extremism 
today, like Bolshevism in the past, is an armed doctrine. It is an aggressive ideology 
promoted by fanatical, well-armed devotees. And, like Communism, it requires an all-
embracing long-term strategy to defeat it”. As these few examples demonstrate, the 
media has been complicit in fuelling Islamophobia, and it helped legitimise the anti-
Islamic message being utilised by the BNP in the post-9/11 period. This will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter eight, which looks specifically at the role the 
media played in increasing Islamophobia.  
What this section has demonstrated is that the BNP have made political 
progress by utilising the rising fear and hysteria which followed the attacks of 9/11 
and the subsequent War on Terror. This did resonate with BNP voters in Nuneaton. 
The analysis has also demonstrated briefly how the media have been important in 
legitimising the same message which the BNP attached itself to. Moreover, through 
the analysis of the data produced, it is shown that there is a correlation between BNP 
support and increasing Islamophobia in the post-9/11 period. The attacks of 9/11 and 
the subsequent War on Terror, when combined with the language of fear espoused by 
politicians and the media, clearly proved beneficial in legitimising the ideas and 
discourse of the BNP. Indeed, BNP voters demonstrated an increased level of anxiety 
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towards Muslims, and many stated that their support was linked to 9/11, 7/7, and the 




This chapter has shown that the BNP’s success cannot really be understood or 
analysed without examining the effects of Islamophobia. It found that the BNP were 
able to attract voters by highlighting the segregation which exists in the town, and 
amplified the division specifically between the ‘Muslim’ and ‘white’ community. The 
analysis found that voters of all persuasions held the belief that the Muslim 
community do not, and are not willing to mix with their ‘white’ neighbours. This has 
also clearly played into the hands of those who have utilised fear and difference to 
garner support. The analysis also highlighted the impact of fear, a fear which was no 
doubt amplified by the media in the wake of the 9/11 attacks to the benefit of the 
BNP.  
This chapter also found that, as with immigration, national issues were more 
important than local. For example, national issues such as 9/11, 7/7 and the War on 
Terror evidently played out at a local level, and this proved pivotal for the BNP in 
garnering support. Further evidence of this will be provided in chapter eight. This 
research also demonstrates that it should be analysed as an important factor alongside 
variables, such as immigration and socioeconomics. Indeed, as this analysis has 
shown, the anti-Muslim campaigns clearly resonated with voters, and fed into the fear 
of Islam and Muslims. Islamophobia was an important part of the jigsaw which 
galvanised support for the BNP, and conflates with a number of variables tested in 
this research. 
This chapter has shown that in Nuneaton, although it has a comparatively 
small Muslim population, there is a geographical concentration of the Muslim 
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population in certain parts of the borough, and there is evidence of divided 
communities. It has also demonstrates that in comparison with other locations where 
the BNP were successful, such as Burnley, the geographical concentration of the 
Muslim population can help explain why the BNP were successful in Nuneaton, 
typically that it was in predominantly white wards bordering these locational clusters. 
This chapter also highlights that some voters in the white community feel isolated and 
separated from the Muslim community, which in the climate of fear, which existed in 
2008, played into the hands of the BNP who propagated a narrative on Islamic 
segregation.  
The chapter also examined the view that BNP supporters view Muslims and 
Islam with suspicion and fear. This was evidently fuelled by moral panic in the wake 
of terrorist attacks. It demonstrated that the language being used by mainstream 
political actors fed into the growing hysteria and the BNP made political headway out 
of this. Indeed, it should be argued that Islam and Muslims are viewed in an 
extremely negative manner by BNP voters, and is the prevailing. Islam was seen as a 
threat and this developed in the first decade of the twenty-first Century into a fear of 
all Muslims and their religion. The BNP tapped into this fear early on, and was the 
main beneficiary in terms of gaining electoral support in 2008 as the data 
demonstrate.  
Finally, this chapter has shown that the BNP made political progress by 
utilising the rising fear and hysteria following the terror attacks and threats in the first 
decade of the twenty-first century, and it does show a correlation between BNP 
support and increasing Islamophobia in the post-9/11 period. The attack of 9/11, the 
War on Terror, and the language of fear espoused by politicians and the media, were 
beneficial to the BNP, and legitimised their ideas and discourse. This case study 
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suggests that Islamophobia and the discourse generated by the subsequent War on 
Terror should be regarded as a key variable. It should be analysed as a key 
independent factor, and not like the majority of the literature which often analysed 
Islamophobia within the context of the immigration variable, even if the two are 


























A competition for votes 
 
The emphasis of this chapter is on the role of political opportunity structures (POS), 
and how important disaffection and disillusionment were, on the success of the BNP 
in Nuneaton. As highlighted in the literature review, the role of POS has been 
analysed by researchers as an explanation for far right breakthrough (Startin 2014; 
Hainsworth 2008; Mudde 2007; Rydgren 2007; Eatwell 2003). POS theory focuses on 
factors external to the far right party, which, according to Eatwell, stress the “extent to 
which the actions and programmes of mainstream parties help or hinder insurgents” 
and whether “there is the question of the degree of ‘openness’ of political institutions 
to insurgent parties” (2003: 58). POS factors were also identified by Rydgren, who in 
his analysis focused on the decreased trust in the mainstream parties, the increased 
salience of an alternative party, the politicisation of new issues, the convergence of 
the mainstream parties, the relative openness of a political system, and the presence of 
coalitions between the mainstream parties (2007: 476-477).  
Examination of the literature has also demonstrated that BNP voters are 
exceptionally distrustful of political institutions in general, and are extremely hostile 
towards mainstream politicians. Indeed, many voters shared the sentiment that ‘all 
parties are the same’, and academics have sought to understand the importance of 
disaffection and disillusionment on voting behaviour, and whether this materialises in 
support for the far right (Harrison and Bruter 2011; Goodwin 2011a; Rydgren 2005). 
For example, Harrison and Bruter found in their analysis that, “citizens who may not 
usually vote for the extreme right might consider the choice if they are disillusioned 
with the state of politics and effectively feel disenfranchised from the existing 
political system” (2011:15). Moreover, Goodwin argues that BNP voters are 
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“extremely dissatisfied with the government and main parties”, and further states that 
“they are extremely negative about the performance of the government and the three 
main parties” (2011a: 113). This chapter investigates the explanation that decreased 
trust is important through the analysis of disaffection and disillusionment.   
In terms of the structure of this chapter, first it analyses whether political 
convergence opened up a political space for the BNP in Nuneaton in 2008. It will 
demonstrate that although convergence was important, it was only when it was 
conflated with disaffection and disillusionment that this became more important in 
opening a political space for the BNP. Second, examination of how disaffection and 
disillusionment impacted on voting behaviour was made, which shows how the BNP 
benefited as some voters switched allegiance. Focus will then turn to the role of the 
mainstream parties, notably their lack of local campaigning and the decline in local 
politics. It will provide evidence which highlights that the mainstream parties did 
become complacent, and for some voters in 2008 they failed to offer a credible 
choice. Finally, this chapter analyses the electoral system and voter turnout and argue 
that this had a limited impact on the BNP’s success in 2008. Analysis in this chapter 
will show that although POS factors were significant, and contributed to the BNP 
success in Nuneaton, some factors can better help explain far right breakthrough, 
while others are of little importance. As the analysis of the data will show, the effects 
of convergence, disaffection, distrust and disillusionment were of greater significance 
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The politics of convergence  
This first section will now offer an analysis of convergence. Convergence occurs 
when parties reposition themselves in the centre ground of the political spectrum, and 
act as catch-all parties. This has been significant in explaining declining support for 
the mainstream parties to the benefit of minor parties like the BNP. Many authors 
have analysed the role of convergence in providing an ideological space for the far 
right (Hainsworth 2008; Kitschelt 1995; Rydgren 2005). For example, Hainsworth 
states that “political opportunities can arise when mainstream parties are seen to 
converge politically, ideologically, programmatically and via policy sharing, thereby 
opening up a political space for other parties” (2008: 130). In addition, Rydgren 
highlights one outcome of this convergence, stating that, “the real or perceived 
convergence between the mainstream parties in the political space has caused a 
feeling that there is no real difference between the mainstream right and left political 
parties” (2005: 422). Indeed, several accounts have suggested that there was no 
ideological divide, similar to that which existed in Britain during the 1970s, the 1980s 
and early 1990s (Goodwin 2011a; Ford 2010; Cruddas et al. 2005; Green 2007). 
Moreover, some scholars have argued that voters find it difficult to differentiate 
between the mainstream parties’ policies. Indeed, Green states that, “fewer and fewer 
people recognise a difference between the Conservatives and Labour” (2007: 631). 
This view is corroborated by Ford who notes that half of the respondents who took 
part in his analysis believe the mainstream parties offer no real choice, and their 
policies “are all the same” (2010: 159). Therefore, this analysis tests the argument and 
explanations in the literature that the mainstream parties in Britain have converged, 
and this has helped facilitate the breakthrough of the far right in Nuneaton. 
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First, it is important to focus on the argument that the parties have converged 
on policy. The argument is that the Labour Party and the Conservatives have both 
moved closer to the centre ground, with both parties seeking to attract voters with 
similar economic and social policies. This included policies relating to benefits, 
immigration, the economy and Europe. Lee points to New Labour’s positioning on the 
idea of the citizen being the “bearer of responsibilities” which was evident in their 
policies when in government which included, the Welfare to Work programme and 
benefit sanctions for those who refused to take up work or training (2013: 255). This 
view was also shared by Bevir who argued that “New Labour seems to be as keen as 
the Conservatives to deal with this dilemma by modifying the range and conditions of 
welfare payments” (2000: 292). In fact, the Labour Party under Tony Blair shifted 
considerably to the right especially on issues of the economy, and Lee argues that, 
“embracement of the market economy is the most definitive feature of New Labour’s 
move to the centre” (2013: 255). There is also evidence that there was a shift on 
immigration and asylum. Indeed, Wring notes that the Labour Party adopted many 
policies on asylum, which were similar to the Conservative Party, and espoused an 
“authoritarian rhetoric” on asylum (2001: 920). For example, former Conservative 
leader Michael Howard put immigration and asylum at the heart of his general 
election campaign in 2005, and the Labour Party, who were traditionally seen as more 
tolerant of immigration and asylum, began to sound like Conservative politicians 
when discussing the issue. Indeed, as previously mentioned, former Prime Minster 
Gordon Brown argued for “British jobs for British workers” (Brown 2007), and 
politicians, such as Labour MP Margaret Hodge, argued that traditional Labour voters 
are angry because, "They can't get a home for their children, they see black and ethnic 
minority communities moving in and they are angry" (cited in The Telegraph 2006). 
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This was in part aimed at appeasing those leading the ‘white backlash’ who felt that 
the Labour government at the time had failed to tackle immigration, and was 
important because the Labour Party were losing support, in areas where they had 
traditionally attracted white working class support. This of course is not the first time 
mainstream parties have attempted to appease those who bought into the politics of 
white backlash. For example, Rhodes points to early mainstream attempts to garner 
support using white backlash, highlighting the speech from Enoch Powell, and 
Thatcherism in the 1980s, and states that in more recent times “mainstream politicians 
have also become increasingly willing to articulate the sentiments of backlash 
politics” (Rhodes 2010a: 82). There is evidence that the mainstream parties were 
indeed converging on policy, and were to a large extent using and legitimising the 
language of the BNP. The outcome of this convergence was not that it closed the 
space for the BNP, but rather it fed into the narrative that the parties are all the same, 
and opened a political space in the first decade of the twenty-first Century. This will 
now be examined in greater detail. 
Evidently the BNP gained success in Nuneaton when the Labour Party and 
Conservative Party were both offering policies nationally which had a ‘catch all’ 
ideological appeal. Indeed, Wilks-Heeg argued that because of convergence the BNP 
has “benefited from the tendency for British politics to have become dominated by a 
‘crowded centre’, particularly since the construction of ‘New Labour’ from the mid-
1990s” (2008: 9). In the analysis of convergence and its effect on the elections in 
Nuneaton, it became evident that voters no longer saw a difference between the 
mainstream parties. Analysis of the data produced in Nuneaton demonstrates that 
BNP voters stated they could not differentiate between the mainstream parties’, which 
correlates with the explanation in the literature. For example, examination of the 
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interview responses demonstrates that BNP voters have a negative view of the 
mainstream parties, and the view that they are ‘all the same’ resonates with these 
voters.  
We can also see that this sentiment was shared by all the BNP respondents 
who participated in this study, as the below responses demonstrate:  
There was no choice. I would rather vote for the Raving Looney Party rather 
than any of them like. Anything rather than the Conservatives or Labour. How 
many people don’t vote now mate? And it is not just because they can’t be 
bothered, it’s because what they get to vote for. They are all the same (O2OI2 
2012).  
 
They are just the same, all out for what they can get (O2OI4 2012).  
 
You get sick of people, the same faces, same policies (FG1P1 2012).  
 
There is no f**king difference between them. They all say they will sort out 
stuff but they never do anything when they get in power (O2OI8 2013).  
 
No there is not much difference between the parties (O2OI9 2013). 
 
Twenty years ago Labour were working class, Conservative were for posh 
people, and you didn’t really hear from the Lib Dems, the BNP, I not even sure 
how long they have been around. But definitely Labour and Conservatives there 
was two sides to that, you had your working class and your well off people, now 
I would say there isn’t much difference between the parties (O2OI7 2013). 
   
It is evident from the sample of responses above that mainstream party convergence 
has opened up a political space for organisations like the BNP because some voters, 
who are receptive to the message of the BNP, clearly view all parties as the same.   
This section has examined the evidence and demonstrated how the mainstream 
parties converged on specific policies, and how BNP voters who participated in this 
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study felt alienated. It has shown that a negative view arises from the perception that 
the mainstream parties are identical. This contributed to the sentiment that parties are 
‘all the same’, and fuelled political dissatisfaction and disillusionment. In 2008 this 
sentiment benefited the BNP, who portrayed themselves as a new party, and the only 
option if you want to vote against the mainstream parties. This will be analysed 
further in the next chapter which looks in detail at the role of the BNP.  
Convergence has undoubtedly left some voters feeling disillusioned with the 
mainstream parties. However, it does not show why they chose to vote for the BNP. 
Indeed, all parties campaigned hard on policies, such as immigration, which is the 
BNP’s principle policy, so why did some voters choose the BNP? Indeed, as Rydgren 
argues, “the convergence of mainstream parties in political space is of minor direct 
importance for explaining the emergence of RRP [Radical right parties] parties” 
(2007: 498). Analysis in the next section will show how convergence, when combined 
with other factors, such as disaffection and disillusionment with politics in general, 
fuelled support for the BNP. Indeed, it is only when this convergence is occurring 
alongside other factors that the far right are able to exploit the space provided. 
 
Disaffected and disillusioned – Decreased trust in mainstream parties 
This next section looks at the growth in disaffection and disillusionment, and 
demonstrates how this resonates with the voters in Nuneaton. It will do this by 
focusing on several factors, including the effects of disillusionment and mistrust 
regarding the integrity of the mainstream politicians, highlighting how voters have 
lost faith in the mainstream parties’ ability to deal with the perceived immigration 
problem, the rise in protest politics, and the mainstream parties’ failure to challenge 
the status quo.  
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First, this section will look at the impact of mistrust and disaffection felt by 
large swathes of the electorate in Nuneaton. By analysing responses of voters in 
Nuneaton there is evidence of a disillusioned electorate who feel unrepresented by the 
mainstream parties, and as one BNP supporter stated, “They are all useless” (O2OI13 
2014). Indeed, analysis of the responses below from BNP voters demonstrates the 
level of disillusionment and disaffection felt. For example, one BNP voter stated that 
“the working class have been let down by all governments. They pretend to help us 
but then just help the rich... I think they have all lost touch” (O2OI4 2012). Another 
voter also highlighted the level of disillusionment with politics and stated; “I have not 
got a massive amount of faith with what goes on in politics” (O2OI9 2013). This view 
was shared by another BNP voter who stated that the mainstream politicians, 
Are all just going to get up there and lie to us… never trust anyone because 
everything they said, at previous elections when they try and gather up votes 
and everything they do, it never happens. So I would never trust a politician... 
all politicians are f***ing liars anyway, you know what I mean... Never trust a 
politician, whatever they say they are going to do, it never happens and I am 
hoping that what the BNP say they can do. But you need more people to vote 
for the BNP, because this country is going to s**t (O2OI7 2013). 
 
Moreover, we can also see from the participant’s response below how this 
sentiment resonates with those who voted for the BNP: 
 
I have voted for the BNP. Obviously, I felt disillusioned with the Conservative 
Party, the Labour Party, and the Liberal Party. I also think that at a local as well 
as a national level government is corrupt. In fact I think the local Labour 
government in Nuneaton is corrupt and politically self-serving. In the 20 years I 
have lived in Nuneaton I have never seen anything change in my mind, things 
just get worse... Councils just don’t take responsibility for anything. Rates have 
gone up, Warwick blames Nuneaton and Nuneaton blames Warwick. All I ever 
hear from Nuneaton borough Council is that it is the County Council’s fault and 
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all we hear from the County Council is it’s up to the local council... I grew up in 
a time, when during my late teens councillors were elected to serve the people. 
Now my attitudes have changed. We are now just a group of people here to 
serve the council (FG1P1 2012). 
 
It was also evident from the qualitative responses to the questionnaire that BNP voters 
were disillusioned with the mainstream political parties, as these responses below 
illustrate:   
 
They are all the same. I am sick of the mainstream parties and what they say 
liars (Qualitative responses Questionnaire 2012). 
 
Seems like the white working class men are not represented. All parties are 
virtually the same and not to be trusted… every politician simply lies to us. I 
feel pretty sad having to vote for a liar (Qualitative responses Questionnaire 
2012). 
 
Waste of time to vote, they all lie to you tell you one thing and do another. 
I vote for a vote of no confidence (Qualitative responses Questionnaire 2012). 
 
What these responses demonstrate is that disillusionment with politics is not 
directed at one particular party but rather all the mainstream parties, and that it 
appears to be a recurring theme for BNP voters when discussing the mainstream 
parties. It was also evident when speaking to local politicians that there was a rise 
in anti-political sentiment. Indeed, elements of the electorate had completely lost 
their trust in politicians and were disillusioned, and one local Labour councillor 
noted that this was evident on the doorsteps in Nuneaton during the election 
campaign in 2008, and stated that:   
Having spoken to people on the doorsteps in Barpool... people we considered 
our core vote, certainly on the left of it frayed away, and of course some of 
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those people have gone to the BNP. And those people often say things like, ‘oh 
there is no difference between the mainstream parties’, and they feel let down 
by the Labour Party and that they have forgotten their interests and doesn’t 
really have anything to offer them... they definitely, and the feelings persist I 
think to a greater extent, think that the Labour Party doesn’t stand for them or 
represent them anymore (O2OI3 2012). 
 
This response from the local Labour Party councillor shows that on the ground, during 
the 2008 election campaign, there was an increased level of disillusionment amongst 
voters, and many former Labour voters.  
We can see from the above responses that voters clearly feel disillusioned with 
the mainstream parties. Besides the sense of alienation caused by convergence, there 
are additional factors which appear to have fuelled the growth of this disaffection. 
There are many examples of mainstream corruption which fuelled the growth in 
disaffection and disillusionment including the Cash for Honours scandal which broke 
in 2006 (Jones and Steele 2006), and in May 2008 the High Court finally agreed to 
release details of MPs’ expenses claims (BBC News 2008). Indeed, it could be safely 
assumed that this fed into the belief that the mainstream parties are just out to line 
their own pockets. This is corroborated by the fact that the BNP used many of these 
scandals to their own advantage, and this is highlighted in their ‘Punish the Pigs’ 
leafleting campaign (Appendix IV; Leaflet c.). In fact, it has been argued that the 
BNP made political gain out of corruption and distrust in politicians. For example, a 
Sunday Express poll found that “minor parties, including the far-right BNP, are the 
main beneficiaries of public disgust with the political establishment” (2009). The 
effects these scandals had on some voters in Nuneaton will be shown below.  
 The evidence that these scandals, alongside BNP campaigns against 
corruption, were important in increasing disillusionment and can be seen in the data 
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produced in Nuneaton. For example, there was an increased level of anger and 
dissatisfaction felt by part of the electorate aimed specifically at the corruption, which 
became synonymous with some mainstream politicians, as one BNP voter stated, 
“Politicians are all on the take” (O2OI13 2014). As the responses below demonstrate, 
BNP voters expressed anger, and high levels of mistrust when asked about the impact 
of corruption in national politics:   
 
It is frustrating, they are in a position of power and what it shows is that 
basically, and I am not saying all of them, they are corrupt. They use the 
taxpayer’s money to get their f**king swimming pool cleaned out or some new 
bushes in their garden or porn channels on their TV (O2OI8 2013). 
 
I don’t trust any of them. They are all on the take... to be honest I haven’t liked 
them for years, and the corruption just summed it all up for me (O2OI4 2013). 
 
Examination of the data also shows that for some respondents all these corruption 
scandals served to do was entrench the idea that all the mainstream parties are corrupt 
and self-serving. For example, one BNP voter was asked whether corruption affected 
their voting choice, replied angrily, “It is all bulls**t mate. They got away with it. It 
didn’t affect my choice of vote as I already knew they were a waste of time. In my 
eyes they committed a crime and got let off with it” (O2OI2 2012). The level of 
mistrust and anger with the mainstream politicians were not just restricted to BNP 
voters, especially in the wake of the expenses scandal. Many participants also shared 
similar views with BNP voters, even if at no point they considered voting BNP. For 
example, we can see some of the responses below to questions relating to the 
expenses scandal: 
It did make me think about who I was voting for. But to be honest there was no 
one else I would vote for. They were all guilty, from all parties (FG2P3 2012). 
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The whole country was appalled. All MPs from all parties were guilty. They 
were corrupt... To be honest I don’t really listen much to politicians. Most of the 
stuff I see is what I read in the newspaper or on the internet. And it tends to be 
just scandals that make the papers. You only really hear about stuff that is going 
wrong (FG2P1 2012). 
 
The expenses scandal did not help. It did politicians at whatever level no good 
at all (FG1P4 2012).  
 
Given, these views across voters for all parties, this limits the issues that pushed 
voters into the arms of the BNP; however, it did increase the level of distrust which 
left some voters feeling they had no other option. The data show that BNP voters were 
particularly scathing of corruption, and it tended to be with politicians at a national 
level, rather than the local level which indicates that corruption was not detected at a 
local level. As highlighted by the leader of Nuneaton council, Dennis Harvey, who 
was asked if there was ever any evidence of corruption in local government which 
may have affected the 2008 election and replied; “I am council leader so I would say 
no... But no there wasn’t, no. And there have never been any cases” (O2OI5 2013). 
However, disillusionment with political corruption was especially important to BNP 
voters, and even though there is no evidence of corruption at a local level, similar to 
that which was experienced in Burnley during the BNP’s breakthrough (See Rhodes 
2009: 33-34), BNP voters still punished the local candidates because of the national 
instance of corruption. Indeed, as the analysis of the local press indicates in chapter 
eight, there was no evidence of any local scandals or corruption in the period leading 
up to 2008.  
One further factor which has arguably fuelled disaffection and disillusionment 
with the mainstream parties, and enabled parties like the BNP to breakthrough, is 
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immigration. This relates specifically to the perceived failure to deal with immigration 
competently, an issue which has increased disaffection, and led to decreased trust in 
politicians, and increased salience of alternative parties. Analysis of the literature does 
indicate that the issue of immigration is linked to disillusion and disaffection. For 
example, Goodwin found that there has been a considerable increase in “the number 
of citizens who do not associate any of the main parties with the best policies on 
immigration” (2011a: 66). Moreover, Ignazi states that the “post-industrial extreme 
right are the by-product of a dissatisfaction for government policies on issues such as 
immigration” (2003: 217). This view is shared by Hainsworth who states that “the 
extreme right’s success reflects a popular disillusionment with mainstream and 
traditional elites, institutions and practices and their capacity to ‘deliver the goods’” 
(2008: 129). The goods in this case are the government’s failure to deal with the 
perceived immigration problem.  
As detailed in chapter four, immigration remains a core issue which acts as a 
catalyst. Indeed, evidence shows that it is related directly to rising disillusionment and 
disaffection. The analysis of the qualitative data demonstrates that BNP voters did 
demonstrate a high level of mistrust and disillusionment with government policy on 
immigration. For example, examination of the responses from BNP voters in 
Nuneaton highlights this, with one voter stating that, “no one else listens and no-one 
else wants to sort out immigration. They all talk about it but do f**k all” (O2OI4 
2012). This sentiment was also shared by another BNP voter, who when asked about 
the policies of the mainstream parties on immigration, replied, “for years politicians 
have stood there and blatantly lied, and I don’t even f**king follow politics. They 
blatantly lie and then stand there and ask you to vote for them” (O2OI2 2012). One 
voter also argued that the mainstream parties have lost touch with the ordinary voters 
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when it comes to immigration policy, stating that; “the Labour party, when they 
removed control over EU immigration, predicted 10000 immigrants coming into the 
UK, and it ended up with a million Polish workers. It puts a burden on affordable 
housing and whatever, and there are all sorts of problems with that” (O2OI9 2013). It 
is worth noting here that this particular respondent blames the Labour party for the 
increase in Polish workers, not Britain’s membership of the European Union. Another 
voter also took a similar view, but placed blame on the Conservatives, and when 
asked who he voted for before the BNP replied: 
[I] voted Conservative sometimes when I thought they might do something 
about immigration…I don’t think the mainstream parties have done anything 
really. I think the Conservatives were saying they were going to cut down on 
immigration when they came into the government before the last election but 
since they have got in they have not done a lot (O2OI8 2013).  
 
Therefore, the perceived incompetence of the mainstream parties on immigration has 
had the effect of increasing voter dissatisfaction with mainstream parties, as shown in 
the chapter on immigration and asylum, with both the Labour Party, and to some 
extent the Conservatives Party, being viewed as unable to deal with the ‘problem’. 
Evidently immigration and the politicisation of race were factors when analysed 
within the context of growing disillusionment and disaffection, and issue salience has 
materialised in increasing BNP support leading up-to the 2008 elections. However, it 
appears that it is the mainstream parties’ failure to deliver on their policy promises 
that has a negative effect on voters, rather than the BNP having ownership of 
immigration. 
This suggests that the mainstream parties’ attempts did not have the desired 
effect of strangling the BNP, and only served to politicise the issue of race and 
immigration further. It is in response to this that the BNP attempted to gain issue 
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ownership of immigration, on the basis that they are the only party who will do 
something about it. Issue ownership is important because immigration attracts votes in 
an environment where immigration tops many lists of voter concerns. Historically, it 
was the Conservative Party who sought to gain ownership of immigration. However, 
it appears that the Conservative Party were no longer seen as the party who would 
control immigration. This is reflected in the data provided by Ipsos-Mori, which 
shows that rather than having issue ownership, the Conservative Party has seen a 
sharp drop in support relating to immigration, with a drop from 50 per cent in 1978 to 
19 per cent in 2001 in the number of voters who believed they had the best policies on 
immigration, although this had risen to 28 per cent by 2010 (Goodwin 2011a: 65-66). 
In fact, many argue that the Tories, when in power, did not actually control 
immigration in the way promised, but rather as Karapin states, “as soon as the Tories 
got into power, they immediately softened on the immigration issue” (cited in Ignazi 
2003: 211). Analysis of the statistics highlights why immigration became an 
important election issue, for all parties. Immigration increased by 95% between 1991 
and 2014, a period when both the Conservatives and the Labour Party were in power, 
rising from 329,000 in 1991 to 641,000 in 2014 (Hawkins 2015: 6). It is also worth 
highlighting the total net migration for the period 2001 to 2011 which according to the ONS 
is now estimated to have been 2.53 million (Hawkins 2015: 7). This again feeds into the 
sentiment that although the mainstream parties talk tough on immigration no party has 
really acted upon it, further raising voter valence of the issue.  
When there is consensus on immigration, amongst the mainstream parties, 
then the focus of attention for voters is directed on whether these parties can actually 
deliver. Analysis of the data collected in Nuneaton and highlighted in chapter four, 
demonstrates that for BNP voters the mainstream parties did not deliver. Indeed, this 
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corroborates the explanation offered by Ford that “over 8 in 10 respondents agree that 
there is a big difference between what parties promise and what they deliver, and 
more than 7 in 10 agree that parties are more interested in winning votes than in 
representing their constituents or governing effectively” (2010: 159). The issue of 
immigration specifically combined with disillusionment can therefore be regarded as 
an important factor in explaining the 2008 breakthrough.   
Moving on to the third theme in this section, as indicated in the literature, 
some scholars have focused on how disaffection and disillusionment acts as a spark 
for a wider protest vote (Harrison and Bruter 2011; Goodwin 2011b; Rydgren 2005). 
For example, Harrison and Bruter argued that “voters may express discontentment 
with the existing system by casting a protest vote to send a warning to the incumbent 
government” (2011:15). Moreover, as Rydgren notes, convergence can lead to a 
feeling that the parties are the same, and fuelled widening distrust in politics, and 
created, “an audience receptive to parties ready to mobilise protest votes” (2005: 423). 
It is therefore well worth exploring the notion that the vote for the BNP in 2008 was a 
protest vote.  
When analysing the data produced in Nuneaton there is overwhelming 
evidence that BNP supporters voted for the party as a protest against all the 
mainstream parties. In fact, over 90 per cent of BNP voters stated their vote was a 
protest against the mainstream parties (Nuneaton Questionnaire 2012). This is to some 
extent corroborated by the leader of the council, Dennis Harvey, who when asked if 
he thought it was a protest vote in Nuneaton stated, “I think it was a growing protest 
vote amongst working class people” (O2OI5 2013).  
However, Goodwin argues that the support for the BNP is not “simply a by-
product of protest politics” (2011a: 101). Indeed, it could be argued that voters must 
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be receptive to the policies, or some of them, which the BNP were championing. 
There is some evidence to support this. For example, one BNP voter when asked if he 
was protesting replied simply that “I have been protesting for years. The BNP was not 
just a protest for me [in 2008], I voted because they were standing” (O2OI4 2012). 
Evidently this voter had some ideological affiliation with the BNP, and the evidence 
from the qualitative data tends to corroborate the view that these voters were receptive 
to the ideas of the far right, especially in relation to immigration. However, this does 
not mean that there was not an element of protest in the vote. This view is shared by 
Harrison and Bruter who note that, “casting a protest vote in favour of a mainstream 
opposition party in order to send the incumbent government a message of 
dissatisfaction is undoubtedly different from voting for an extreme right party because 
of an ideological association with that party” (Harrison and Bruter 2011:16). 
Therefore, consideration will now be given to the element within these specific social 
groups who were offering a protest vote, and returned to their historical party of 
choice. For example, in the analysis of the questionnaire data collected we can see 
that of the 33 respondents who voted for the BNP in 2008, 10 voted for the Labour 
Party in 2012, and 5 did not vote at all in the election of 2012 (Table 32). Further 
research into these voters helps to develop an understanding as to whether this was a 
protest vote for some voters, or whether there was an evident ideological association 
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Table 32: Who did you vote for in 2012?           
(BNP Voters 2008)   
  
Who did you vote for in the 
2012 local elections? 
BNP 10 
Labour 10 
Did not vote 5 
Independent 6 
Green Party 1 
Conservative 0 
Liberal Democrats 0 
Other 1 
  Source: Nuneaton Questionnaire 2012 
 
The more likely explanation is that the form of protest which took place in Nuneaton 
related specifically to the rising disillusionment with politics and politicians of all 
mainstream parties, and the vote for the BNP was for some a protest against those 
residing within the ‘Westminster bubble’. One of the reasons the BNP became a party 
of protest for some in Nuneaton was the lack of choice, as will be highlighted in the 
next section. 
In conclusion, this section has demonstrated that there was widespread 
dissatisfaction and distrust with the mainstream parties, offering some understanding 
of the causes of disillusionment, and an understanding of why some voters may use 
the elections as the opportunity to make a protest vote. Evidently, the idea that the 
parties are all the same, the effects of scandal after scandal, and the level of distrust 
there is in politicians, have all fed into an already disillusioned electorate. It was the 
BNP who benefited from this disillusion and disaffection in 2008.  
 
 Mainstream Party Complacency  
This section will focus on what will be referred to as ‘mainstream party 
complacency’. It will use the evidence produced in this study to show that this was 
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central in enabling the BNP to breakthrough in Nuneaton, and also test the argument 
that they did not offer alternative or credible opposition. It will also examine whether 
there was reluctance amongst an element of the electorate to vote for the ‘other’ 
mainstream parties, such as the Liberal Democrats. This analysis will also highlight 
the fact that it was not that the Labour Party believed they could not win the seats, but 
rather that they had become complacent and somewhat aloof in the belief that these 
were ‘safe’ Labour seats. Therefore, the focus will be on the Labour Party campaign 
in 2008, or lack of campaigning, at a time when the BNP appeared to be everywhere 
in the town. 
First it is worth noting that at a national level in Britain all the mainstream 
political parties have suffered due to a decline in membership (Keen 2015: Ware 
1996). In fact Ware states that “Britain provides a spectacular case of collapse of 
party membership” (1996: 87). Recent analysis shows that membership of the three 
main political parties now stands at an historic low of 1 per cent, down from 
approximately 4.8 per cent in 1953 (Keen 2015: 1). However, in contrast to the 
declining support for the mainstream parties it is worth noting that support in the form 
of membership has risen for minor parties such as the Scottish National Party, the 
United Kingdom Independence Party and the Green Party. Of course the reasons for 
declining support for the mainstream parties are complex, but evidently there is a 
belief that the mainstream parties no longer attract the levels of support they once had, 
and this has filtered through to the parties at a local level who struggle to attract 




                                                          
12
 For further analysis of supporters, members and activists refer to Ware (1996: 63-92). 
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The failure of the mainstream parties, especially at a local level, has been 
highlighted as an important factor by academics analysing the state of local parties, 
and the decline in local politics. For example, Wilks-Heeg notes, “the weakness of the 
main parties locally is a major factor in the growth of the far-right” and that “the most 
significant BNP gains have been made in areas where the third largest party has 
effectively collapsed and, in several cases, the decay of the second largest party is also 
far advanced” (2008: 16-17). This view was also shared by Rhodes, who argued that 
the mainstream opposition, the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats, were 
traditionally weak and did not make any inroads in parts of Burnley during the 2002 
local elections, with the Conservatives only contesting 9 out of 45 seats and the 
Liberal Democrats only putting up 16 candidates, and it is this weakness which 
contributed to the rise in the BNP in Burnley (2009: 30). 
These local studies offer an important comparison with Nuneaton. For 
instance, the areas where the BNP gained success the Labour campaign was, it could 
be argued, not credible, and there was a lack of an alternative and minimal 
campaigning by the mainstream opposition parties including the Conservative and the 
Liberal Democrat parties. This is important because, in order to secure votes and 
achieve success in elections the BNP has to compete with other parties. However, 
what is evident in Nuneaton is that in some wards the mainstream parties in 
opposition failed to offer any real competition to the BNP. This was apparent in the 
level of campaigning, the selection of candidates, and the level of ignorance of the 
BNP threat held by the incumbents.  
For some of the incumbents it related more to a lack of resources and 
impending defeat, which spread throughout the Labour Party in Nuneaton from 2008 
onwards, and a failure to accept or understand the threat from the BNP. Indeed, the 
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leader of the council Cllr. Dennis Harvey offered his view of the defeat in 2008, 
arguing that during the election the Labour Party was,  
A diminishing number of people and to some extent we still are. But during the 
active Labour government the numbers fell. And we have always worked 
together across the borough. We have tried to work not just ward specific. But 
by 2008 our number of active members had fallen or they got older and were 
not replaced by younger people. So the number of active troops on the ground 
was limited. So what we could do was quite limited. And I don’t think we 
necessarily saw a big threat coming from the BNP because of the long history of 
good race relations in the borough. We have never had bad race relations, but 
we didn’t see it coming here (O2OI5 2013). 
 
The argument, that the local parties did not run credible campaigns in some wards, 
was highlighted by the local Conservative Nuneaton MP Marcus Jones who stated 
that; “by 2008 things had got worse... they were entrenched in those wards holding on 
to what they had got, but there was very little Labour action on the ground” (O2OI10 
2013). This is a view also shared by voters with one BNP voter stating: 
The only person I saw in town was the BNP, so if you haven’t got Labour, 
Conservative or Liberal Democrat coming into the town it shows they don’t 
care... if I have only seen the BNP it shows that they are trying harder to change 
something in my view (O2OI7 2013). 
 
This was also corroborated by one local Labour councillor who stated that the demise 
of the Labour Party prior to 2008 was important. He argued that it was “a reflection of 
the fact that the Labour Party is not active, or as active as it should be locally. I mean 
my philosophy is that if you are active it attracts young members and you have an 
active party who can be self-sustaining with its own local candidates and so on” 
(O2OI3 2013). The problem for the mainstream political parties is that as Keen notes, 
“disaffiliation is particularly prevalent among the young” (2015: 11). In fact young 
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voters are now less likely to identify with a political party, with only 66 per cent of 
people aged 23-32 identifying with a political party in 2012 compared to 85 per cent 
of 24-33 year olds in 1983 (Keen 2015: 11-12). 
It is argued that in some locations where the BNP were successful, they were 
viewed as the only credible opposition, and it has also been argued that the 
mainstream parties failed to act as competent opposition parties in some areas. For 
example, Rhodes in his study of the BNP in Burnley highlighted the problem of 
disaffection and noted that “disaffection with Labour has been compounded by the 
failure of both the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats to challenge the status 
quo” (2009: 30). Indeed, as many analyses have shown, the BNP in its early 
breakthrough stage attracted a large number of voters from the Conservative Party, 
not just the Labour Party (John et al. 2006; Copsey 2005). Moreover, like Burnley, 
many former Labour voters in Nuneaton, who voted for the BNP, were reluctant to 
vote for the Conservatives. Similarly, like voters in Burnley, many Nuneaton voters 
had memories of the Thatcher era, or they were from families who resented 
Thatcher’s governments, and they were reluctant to vote Conservative (See Rhodes 
2009: 31). Therefore, some voters voted for the BNP because they felt there was a 
lack of choice, credible opposition and an evident reluctance to vote for the 
Conservative Party.  
The evidence produced in Nuneaton shows that some BNP voters did point to 
the lack of any credible candidate, candidates who were not local, or candidates 
standing from other mainstream parties they would never consider voting for. Indeed, 
when analysing the data it is clear that some Labour supporters could understand why 
certain voters, who previously backed Labour, would vote for BNP rather than for the 
Conservative Party. For example, one Labour voter in response to the question, ‘why 
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did voters switch in large numbers to the BNP and not another party’, replied; “the 
way I have been bought up. I suppose if I was rich maybe I would vote Tory because 
then they would represent me... the Tories just look after themselves; they don’t really 
care about the poor... a lot of people were just fed up with Labour and just didn’t want 
to vote Tory, so they voted BNP as a protest vote” (FG2P1 2012). This view was 
shared by another Labour voting participant who stated that; “Labour were in power 
and the Tories were blaming Labour, attacking immigration too, and a lot of people 
believed this, and Tories were hoping they would get the vote. But rather than voting 
Tory people just voted for the BNP” (FG2P3 2012). This sentiment was indicated by 
one Labour councillor who highlighted the presence of the BNP during the 2008 
campaign, and the fact that people would rather vote for the BNP than the Tories in 
some areas: 
My observations are that in 2008 the BNP seemed to be all over the place… 
2008 was a watershed where we were losing the votes, and to some extent 
people in Camp Hill and Barpool realised that voting Conservative was no good 
and some Conservatives voted for the BNP as well in order to be able to get rid 
of the Labour candidate (O2OI5 2013).  
This view that former Labour voters would not choose to vote for the Conservative 
Party, and vice versa was also highlighted by another Labour voter, who sought to 
explain why they believed some voters who they knew were voting BNP stated: 
“There was a great disillusionment with the Labour Party... there always is with the 
government in power. And I think a lot of white working class voters thought they 
were not going to vote Tory” (FG1P3 2012). Indeed, the idea that some voters would 
never vote for the Conservative Party is not a new one, and in fact Skelton argues that 
in some locations “voting Tory has become countercultural” (2013: 2). The idea that 
voting Tory is ‘countercultural’ was also highlighted in a recent study, which 
indicated that 39 per cent of Northern voters who took part would never vote 
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Conservative (YouGov 2013). Moreover, in a similar study 42 per cent of voters 
nationwide stated they would never vote for the Conservative Party (IPPR/YouGov 
2011). What the above analysis demonstrates is that some voters did not and would 
not vote for particular parties, so Labour voters would never vote Conservative and 
vice versa.  
 Table 33: Nuneaton Local Election 
Candidates/Turnout (2008-2012) 
   
Ward 
2008 Local election 
No. of Candidates Party standing 2008 
Turnout 2008 
(BNP % of vote) 
2012 Local election 
























Labour Party 34.85% (16.70%) 3 
BNP 
Conservative Party 









Labour Party 25.73% (27.70%) 








Labour Party 22.02% (8.40%) 
Galley Common 3 
BNP  
Conservative Party 




Labour Party 38.69% (25.20%) BNP Did not stand N/A 23.84% (0%) 
Wem Brook 3 
BNP  
Conservative Party 
Labour Party 43.43% (24.90%) BNP Did not stand N/A 26.67% (0%) 
  
  Source: Nuneaton and Bedworth Borough Council 2008-2012 
 
This ‘countercultural’ outlook puts the emphasis on third parties. The Liberal 
Democrats proved not to be a popular choice. Indeed, the leader of the council, Cllr. 
Dennis Harvey, when asked whether there was any other option or any other 
candidates, replied, “No. I mean I don’t remember if there was a Liberal candidate, 
but the Liberals were never a big issue here in the 30 years since I have been a 
councillor” (O2OI5 2013). For instance, the Liberal Democrats only put forward one 
candidate out of a possible eight wards in Nuneaton (Nuneaton and Bedworth 
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Borough Council 2008). This somewhat corroborates the argument that the BNP 
“does better in elections where fewer parties stand” (John et al. 2006: 24). For 
example, if we look at the parties who stood in the wards in 2008 the evidence to 
suggest that the options were limited (Table 33, p.222). 
In Barpool the BNP stood against just two candidates, the Labour Party and 
the Conservative Party candidates, and in Camp Hill there were four candidates from 
the Labour Party, the Conservative Party, and a Socialist Alternative candidate (Table 
33). In both these cases no Liberal candidate stood in these elections, and it could be 
argued the Conservatives only ever put forward candidates in these wards as a token 
opposition, but never with the intention of actually campaigning to win. In fact, 
during an interview with the local MP Marcus Jones, he was asked if the campaign in 
Barpool was only a limited one and replied; “Well it was, but it is because of the fact 
that all political parties put their resources where they will be most effective” 
(O2OI10 2013).  
Complacency and electoral arrogance were also at the heart of the Labour 
Party’s 2008 campaign. After years of success at a local level in most wards, Labour 
believed they could rely on their supporters to turn out and vote for them whether they 
campaigned or not. Indeed, this was a point argued by one voter who stated that the 
Labour Party “treated Labour Party voters with contempt. I would say it was more 
than losing touch. I think they just put a big tick against Nuneaton and put no money 
or resources into it, and ignored the fact that Bill Olner [MP for Nuneaton 1992-2010] 
was a joke” (O2OI11 2013). There was also a sense in Nuneaton that the Labour Party 
hold on certain council seats, particularly those seats which had always been Labour 
strongholds, were not under threat, and this was reflected in the very low contact rates 
in 2008. This is indicated by one local Labour councillor, who stated that: 
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It was obviously a bad day for Labour in Nuneaton in 2008, and across the 
country. But I think it depends on the individual whether they saw it coming or 
not. I mean the voter contact rates for Barpool were around, well less than 5%, 
which you cannot contemplate winning an election with, I wouldn’t anyway. 
You know I would expect 40% and I would be thinking that is not really 
enough, but I mean at the time that was the level, and it is much better than that 
now. So that was a problem. I think that, you know, the issue persists. We don’t 
talk to our supporters enough, you know people who would consider voting for 
us and I think that is one of the major differences the Labour Party has changed 
between 2008 and 2012 (O2OI3 2012). 
The view that the Labour Party forgot about street campaigning was not just 
evident in Nuneaton. For example, in 2006 in Barking, Labour MP Margaret Hodge 
claimed that residents in her area were voting for the BNP because, "the Labour Party 
hasn't talked to these people. This is a traditional Labour area but they are not use to 
engaging with us because all we do is put leaflets through doors. Part of the reason 
they switch to the BNP is they feel no one else is listening to them" (The Telegraph 
2006). Similarly, the lack of campaigning was highlighted by one former Labour 
Party voter in Nuneaton who argued that the Labour Party “didn’t flyer, they expected 
to win, didn’t bother to talk to us. The Conservatives did, and I remember Marcus 
coming round and knocking on my door. And the BNP made the most of 
campaigning... they targeted Nuneaton” (O2OI11 2014). 
The Labour Party had become complacent in Nuneaton, and Labour 
strongholds, such as Barpool and Camp Hill, were viewed as ‘safe’ seats. Indeed, the 
Labour Party had been in control of the council from 1973 to 2008. This sentiment 
was evident during an interview with the leader of the council, Cllr Harvey, who 
stated that, “when I was first elected in 1973 I got 75 per cent of the vote. You didn’t 
really need to campaign, the idea that anybody other than Labour could win in Camp 
Hill was just unthinkable” (O2OI5 2013). It was also clear from the interviews with 
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the local Labour councillors that they believed the local Labour Party election 
campaign had failed, and they did not mobilise in such a way as to counter the threat 
coming from the BNP in 2008. One local councillor indicated what he believed were 
the reasons for the Labour Party’s defeat in 2008, arguing that the campaign was quite 
limited in 2008, and the Labour party lost direction. He stated that:  
One of the first things we did, or we tried to do, was support the local 
councillors in the 2008 election. The first thing I did was to run a leaflet 
distribution campaign in Barpool to support the local candidate. Basically from 
where I stand that was the only campaigning that took place, was the leaflet 
distribution I organised from scratch because there were no road walks 
organised... as far as I know that was the only campaigning which the Labour 
Party did in Barpool... there was no real knockout on the day. No other 
campaigns involving door knocking or leaflet drops of that sort. For all sorts of 
reason you know. I mean the candidate was very grateful that we had come in 
and helped because that was the only thing that actually occurred in Labour 
Party terms in 2008... I think it was the case, we lost it yes. I mean subsequent 
events like by-elections, where there has been BNP candidates standing 
demonstrate this. I mean it has been a case of getting out there and talking to 
people and winning these people back (O2OI3 2012). 
 
Interviews with BNP voters also substantiate the view that the Labour Party 
forgot about street campaigning in 2008. When voters were asked if they remembered 
the local mainstream party campaigns in 2008 all shared similar experiences, and 
gave similar responses. One BNP voter when asked if he remembered the local 
Labour campaign replied; “No I think they were very complacent at the time and were 
not particularly driven. As I said they have an opportunity to deal with things at a 
local level but they just didn’t” (O2OI9 2013). This view was shared by another BNP 
supporter who highlighted the lack of campaigning by the Labour Party and the 
BNP’s effort, stating that; “I got a BNP leaflet through the door, and everything what 
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I feel needed to be done they were saying, which is probably what swayed me towards 
them. We did see them [the BNP] going around the town centre”, and when asked 
about the Labour Party campaign in the town replied, “I didn’t see them [the Labour 
Party] in the town centre or nothing like that, so it was just the BNP one I saw in 
town” (O2OI7 2013). Moreover, another BNP voter when asked the same question 
also spoke of a similar experience; “I never saw my Labour councillor. I never got 
any leaflets. I saw the BNP bloke though, he use to come round and spoke to me, he 
was from round here, not like the others” (O2OI4 2012). The lack of Labour 
interaction, and BNP action in 2008 was also highlighted by another BNP voter, who 
when asked whether he had any contact or literature from the mainstream parties 
simply replied, “No not really, nothing” (O2OI8 2013), and when asked if he had ever 
met his local Labour councillor stated bluntly, “No never” (O2OI8 2013). This view 
was also supported by another voter who recalled the BNP campaign in 2008, and 
remembered the BNP campaign well, and when asked about how he heard about the 
BNP replied; “leaflets come through door, and posters, and stuff like that” (O2OI8 
2013). However, what is interesting is that when asked if he knew or met the local 
BNP candidate in 2008 he replied, “Yes he lives local” (O2OI8 2013), with another 
BNP voter providing a similar response to the same question, stating “I met the local 
councillor Findley” (O2OI13 2014). This was important because getting local 
candidates standing was an important tactic for the BNP in many areas, and was part 
of their campaign to become a legitimate force in British politics.  
What this section has demonstrated is that the Labour Party’s lacklustre 
campaign in 2008 and the lack of choice were important factors. Indeed, the two 
wards where the BNP won have traditionally been Labour strongholds, with little 
support historically for the Conservative Party, and it did not necessarily appear to be 
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a location in which the BNP would breakthrough. However, as this section has shown, 
there was evidence that the mainstream parties did not fight a credible campaign and 
there was a lack of choice. This when coupled with the idea that voting for the 
Conservative Party was ‘countercultural’ enabled the BNP to get their message across 
without any real opposition in 2008. Evidently, this fed into the growing 
disillusionment of the mainstream parties. The mainstream parties failed to take the 
BNP threat seriously, and as Wilks-Heeg notes, the BNP, like other smaller parties, 
were “filling the vacuum created by the decline of the main parties locally” (2008: 
18).  
 
The role of the electoral system 
This final section of this chapter will focus on whether the electoral system benefited 
the BNP in 2008. Although some voters have turned to the BNP and other minor 
parties, the system in Britain has often been seen as a major stumbling block. The 
arguments in the literature relating to how open political institutions are to a far right 
party have focused on the role of majoritarian and proportional representation (PR) 
electoral systems. Some scholars have argued that in comparison to plurality systems, 
the PR systems have been important in the recent breakthrough of the far right across 
Western Europe (Shields 2007; Givens 2006; Ignazi 2003; Marcus 1995; Vaughn 
1995). According to one school of thought, the system is irrelevant. For example, 
Eatwell notes, “it is possible to find countries where there has been ‘space’ for 
extremist parties, where there has been a proportional electoral system etc., but where 
there has been minimal extremist voting” (2003: 59). There is clearly some debate in 
the literature relating to how important the electoral systems are. Focus will now turn 
to its importance in British elections.  
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Previous explanations in the literature that have analysed the far right in 
Britain, have viewed the FPTP system in Britain as a major factor hindering any 
chance of a far right mainstream breakthrough, because normally it penalises minor 
parties and favours larger parties such as the Labour Party and Conservative Party, but 
is blind towards the ideological position of parties (Mudde 2007; Norris 2005; Ignazi 
2003; Eatwell 2000; Griffin 1996; Copsey 1996). Indeed, Ignazi, in his explanation 
for the British Far Right’s historical failure, stated that in Britain “an institutional 
feature such as the majoritarian first-past-the-post electoral system, penalising the 
growth of new and extreme parties, plays a crucial role” (2003: 186). The position is 
supported by the fact that successful BNP candidates have been largely elected in UK 
elections based on non-traditional ballots (John and Margetts 2009; Renton 2005). For 
example, Renton argues that in Britain, elections run on the basis of proportional 
systems, like the London and European elections, favour minor parties (2005: 25). 
There is some evidence to support this with the BNP’s electoral success in the 2008 
London Assembly Elections which employs the additional member PR system, and 
two MEP’s elected in the 2009 European elections which uses the d’Hondt PR 
system. However, under the system of FPTP, even though the BNP received half a 
million votes during the 2010 general election, they failed to gain any representation 
in the British Parliament. Although it is evident the electoral system has been 
important in restricting the far right in British general elections, in many cases it has 
been helpful in opening political space up for the far right at a local and national 
electoral level.  
The local elections in Nuneaton were conducted using the system of FPTP, 
and the BNP were able to get two councillors elected. As a result, it could be argued 
that at a local level the system of FPTP did not hinder breakthrough. It could also be 
John Grima  228 
 
argued that the system did in fact hinder the BNP to some extent in 2008 by limiting 
representation and forming a stronger representation on the council. For example, if 
PR system was used in 2008, the BNP would have had even more councillors elected 
when they achieved an average of around 25 per cent of the vote across the town 
(Table 2). The analysis of the system and its effects on election results in Nuneaton, 
demonstrates the system cannot really help explain why the BNP had two councillors 
elected.  The analysis of the electoral system does not offer any conclusive findings, 
and it should therefore be considered that in this case study the electoral system was 
not important, even if it played a role in enabling the BNP to gain local 
representation. 
As well as the political system itself many analysts have studied the 
mainstream parties’ willingness to go into coalition with far right parties which can 
directly legitimise the far right through coalitions. This was evident across Europe 
with the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the Italian Social Movement (MSI) both 
joining coalition governments, and was important in the breakthrough of the Front 
National in Dreux in the early 1980s (Shields 2007: Eatwell 2000; Marcus 1995: 
Vaughn 1995). However, in Britain there has been no process of legitimisation of the 
BNP through coalitions, although according to some reports the BNP did make an 
offer of an electoral pact with UKIP in the 2009 European elections, which was 
rejected by UKIP leader Nigel Farage (BBC News 2008). Moreover, at a local level 
there was no evidence of the BNP councillors working in any sort of Labour or 
Conservative coalition on the local council when it came to voting on any policy, 
which meant that the BNP candidates were starved of any further legitimacy. 
In relation to the electoral system and the coalition effect, there is little 
evidence to demonstrate that it affected the electoral success of the BNP in Nuneaton. 
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However, the analysis of the system does not offer any understanding of electoral 
turnout, and its effect of far right party success. A brief analysis of electoral turnout as 
a factor in understanding the electoral success of the BNP will now be offered. There 
is some limited evidence that low turnout benefits small parties like the BNP, because 
if they can mobilise sufficient support in particular areas which have low turnout, they 
have a greater chance of success. For example, the BNP in Nuneaton achieved 
success at ward level when turnout was below or around 40 per cent. However, the 
issue with turnout is that it does not always guarantee success, therefore cannot really 
offer a model which can be replicated. For example, in 2012 the turnout for the local 
elections was significantly lower, in fact turnout in the borough was 28.19 per cent, 
and in Barpool it was 25.73 per cent and Camp Hill 20.02 per cent, and the BNP did 
not return any councillors in Nuneaton (Table 32). These findings correlate with those 
highlighted by John et al., who found that in the wards analysed in their study “there 
was no relationship between a low level of turnout and the BNP in elections across all 
wards” (2006: 24). Therefore, even though the BNP benefited in 2008 when turnout 
was low, the view that turnout cannot explain successes in Nuneaton is somewhat 
corroborated and turnout is not relevant in this case study.  
This brief analysis of the electoral system demonstrates that it can and does 
play a limited role, especially at the breakthrough stage, for any new party. Indeed, 
this can be seen in the success of the BNP at the 2009 European elections and the 
elections to the London Assembly. However, at a local level the electoral system 
played little or no part in the success in 2008, or failure of 2012, of the BNP. As 
demonstrated, the BNP had two councillors elected in Nuneaton under the FPTP 
system, which typically hinders the far right in Britain. In fact, if PR was used in 2008 
the BNP would have increased their representation locally. Finally, turnout was 
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analysed which indicated that although turnout was low it cannot really provide an 
explanation for the success of the BNP in 2008. However, it was beneficial in 2008 
because it enabled the BNP to gain representation by mobilising enough support in 
the case study wards when turnout was low. For the record, there are three 
explanations offered at a national level, but these do not have any relevance at a local 
level. Evidently, as this analysis has highlighted, it is other factors which were 
important in driving BNP support in 2008.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that, as with the other factors analysed in previous 
chapters, political opportunity structures, disaffection and disillusion can and do 
impact on the level of support for the far right. For example, convergence fuelled the 
sense that the parties are ‘all the same’ and this fed into the rising disaffection felt by 
part of the electorate. Convergence fed into the growing disillusionment and mistrust 
in the mainstream political parties to the benefit of the BNP in Nuneaton. This was 
seen in the growing belief that the mainstream parties are not competent when it 
comes to dealing with issues relating to immigration, and the anger which developed 
in the aftermath of the expenses scandal. The analysis of the mainstream political 
parties role in Nuneaton also demonstrated that the Labour Party was complacent in 
2008. This was very important for the BNP in winning the competition for votes in 
2008. This chapter has also shown that the mainstream parties did not do enough 
during their campaign to counter the message coming from the BNP. Clearly what the 
BNP had to say resonated with some voters who were disaffected and disillusioned 
with the mainstream parties.  
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Finally, what the Nuneaton case study also demonstrates is the limited impact 
of turnout as an explanation for the BNP’s breakthrough. Likewise, the nature of the 
electoral system is not to be of high significance. The BNP won two seats in 
Nuneaton despite, not because of, the first-past-the-post system. Rather it was the 
widespread disaffection and disillusionment with the mainstream parties which 
opened up a political space, and when combined with the low turnout in Nuneaton it 
benefited the BNP in 2008. It is worth noting that POS alone cannot explain 
themselves why the BNP were successful in 2008, but as Rydgren notes, “they 
contribute a great deal to such an explanation” (2005: 418). The next chapter will 
focus on another important explanation in the literature which highlights the role of 
the BNP. It will examine how the BNP took an active role in increasing their 
credibility in order to fill the political space which opened up in the first decade of the 
twenty-first Century. The following chapter will examine the role of the BNP in 






























The Role of the BNP in Nuneaton 
 
Successes for far-right political parties have often been associated with astute party 
organisation and leadership. The BNP’s 2008 breakthrough proves to be no exception. 
The subject of this chapter is role of the BNP at a national and local level. It will 
analyse how the BNP sought to successfully manage its image in order to exploit the 
political space that opened up. This will include an analysis of the period when Nick 
Griffin became leader of the BNP in 1999 and sought to sanitise the party, putting 
distance between the BNP and memories of the NF.  
In order to show how the BNP took advantage of the political space that 
opened up, this chapter will examine the BNP modernisation programme which 
increased the party’s appeal to some voters, and the role of the leader in transforming 
the party into some semblance of an electable party. First, this chapter will 
demonstrate how the BNP modernised in the early 2000s by adopting the French 
Front National (FN) master frame, directing its appeal towards a more mainstream 
electorate, focusing specifically on the white working class. It will also analyse the 
role of leadership on the success of the BNP in 2008 and show that the then BNP 
leader Nick Griffin was important for the party through his implementation of his 
modernisation programme. It will then show how the BNP focused on local 
campaigning by attaching itself to local issues, and how important this was for the 
BNP in Nuneaton. Finally, it will demonstrate how the party was able to take 
advantage of a range of conditions through modernising, such as attaching itself to 
immigration and Islamophobia, when combined with a particular set of circumstances 
and events led to increased (but limited) legitimacy and voter appeal. This will be 
important because although a space opened up in the first decade of the twenty-first 
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Century, the BNP had to make the party respectable in the eyes of the electorate in 
order to exploit these conditions.  
 It is worth noting that the transformation of the BNP’s electoral fortunes 
coincided with the election of a new leader, Nick Griffin. Griffin, who had been a 
prominent figure in the far right since the 1970s, was elected leader of the BNP in 
September 1999. He replaced John Tyndall, when growing levels of discontent left 
Tyndall’s position as leader untenable (Wheen 1999). One reason for this was that 
Tyndall was a man who did not believe the party should change its core values and 
ideology for electoral success. For example, Tyndall, five years after losing his 
leadership position, was still arguing that, “the BNP should, so long as it is legally 
permissible, exclude Jews from membership, and in any event should not appoint 
Jews to positions in the party nor select them as candidates for elections” (Spearhead 
2004). This shows how Tyndall remained true to his anti-Semitic beliefs which had 
hindered the electoral success of the party while he remained leader.  
Griffin, unlike Tyndall, believed that his own leadership style and vision could 
propel the party into the dizzy heights of election success, which had not been 
witnessed since the party’s only victory in Tower Hamlets in 1993. Indeed, Copsey 
notes that, “Griffin’s objective was to transform the internal culture of the British 
National Party – to ‘modernise’ it and ‘normalise’ it as a legitimate political party” 
(2008: 100). Griffin on becoming leader set the party on a course of modernisation, 
aimed at making the party more electable and respectable. In 2001 Griffin stated that 
the party has changed, and “if you’re interested in confrontation and violence, don’t 
bother us” (Anon. 2001). Moreover, writing in the BNP magazine Identity in 2002, 
Griffin stated that through modernisation, “the BNP has genuinely changed 
enormously over the last few years, and our victories... are partly the reward for those 
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changes”. Griffin was central in moderating the BNP’s more extreme policies, while 
at the same time focusing on community politics and increasing the legitimacy of the 
party. How important the BNP modernisation programme was for their success in 
Nuneaton is the question this chapter will seek to answer.  
 
The ‘transformation’ of the BNP 
The relative success of the BNP between 2001 and 2008 suggests that the BNP were 
successful as a consequence of copying modernisation programmes that had proved 
beneficial for far right parties electorally elsewhere in Europe. Indeed, the BNP’s 
modernisation closely followed the tactical changes employed by the French Front 
National (FN) in the 1970s and 1980s. For example, Rydgren notes that, “emerging 
parties and social movements try to make use of master frames and strategies already 
out there, which they try to modify in ways to fit the specific political and cultural 
context in which the adopter is embedded” (2007: 476). This master framework 
adopted by the FN combined ethno-nationalism, cultural racism and anti-
establishment populism. Similar approaches were adopted by the Austrian Freedom 
Party (FPÖ) and Vlams Blok in Belgium. As part of the master frame, far right parties 
who adopted it move away from overt anti-Semitism and biological racism, whilst the 
call for the revolutionary overthrow of democracy was abandoned. This master frame 
was very successful for the likes of the FN and FPÖ, and it is evident that the FN 
master frame has become central for far right parties who wish to become electable 
and more mainstream. Parties who adopt this strategy have managed in the main to 
become more respectable and electable, and this was the case for the BNP after 1999, 
as the next section will demonstrate.  
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There is evidence that the BNP adopted the FN strategy and this can be seen in 
their modernisation programme. The party adopted the ideological and strategic 
formula used by the French FN, developing it into a uniquely British version of a 
‘nationalist-populist’ party. Copsey argues that “Griffin’s ideas took their immediate 
inspiration not from domestic fore-runners but from the recent examples set by more 
successful ‘national-populist’ parties in continental Europe – in particular, the French 
National Front”, and in order to further the quest for legitimacy “Griffin simply lifted 
elements from both the political style and organisational features of the Front 
National” (2008: 123). For example, as highlighted in the earlier immigration chapter, 
the BNP transformed its policy on immigration. It no longer advocates forced 
repatriation and directs its attacks towards cultures it views as posing a threat to 
British identity, a tactic that bares many similarities to the FN.  
Similarly, Griffin also changed the language used by the BNP as part of this 
modernisation programme. Griffin used discourse that had proved successful for other 
far right leaders, most notably Le Pen in France. The key message, in this respect, was 
portraying an ongoing ‘assault’ on British culture that needed to be repelled, and was 
evident in the 2005 manifesto (refer to the exert from the BNP manifesto, pp.181-
182). The analysis has shown so far that the BNP utilised elements of the FN template 
to raise their profile in British politics. They toned down their language, modernised 
their political agenda, and aimed to recruit more ‘respectable’ members as candidates 
for the party. The BNP through modernisation also wanted to appeal to more 
mainstream voters. They hoped that by professionalising their campaign and acting 
more responsibly this could be achieved, and to an extent it was. Ford and Goodwin’s 
study noted that; “The party has professionalised its campaigns, urging activists to 
become better dressed and jettison extremist rhetoric” (2010: 5).  
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The plan for the modernising process was set out by Nick Griffin in the 
Patriot magazine in the spring of 1999. Here Griffin sought to create the image of a 
responsible party. In this article Griffin (1999) stated that modernisation can “be 
summed up in two words: responsibility and professionalism”. The BNP also sought 
to tone down its overtly racist and fascist language. From 1999 onwards Griffin 
moderated the party’s ideology, transforming the public discourse on race and 
immigration. The party under Griffin ‘avoided’ anti-Semitism, racism and no longer 
openly puts forward the policy calls for forced repatriation. As shown in the chapters 
on immigration and Islamophobia, the BNP placed increasing importance on cultural 
difference, and this was viewed as a more acceptable target. The aim of the BNP was 
to normalise the party, demonstrated in the manifesto of 2005, which included a raft 
of policy proposals on identity, freedom, democracy and the economy. In fact, the 
BNP in their manifesto were attempting to show they were not a single issue party, as 
it states in their manifesto: 
This is the largest and most comprehensive election manifesto the British 
National Party has compiled. It clearly illustrates that we are neither a single 
issue party, nor an ephemeral protest group. The BNP is serious about winning 
our nation back and this manifesto sets out our plan to achieve this goal (BNP 
Manifesto 2005: 4). 
 
The BNP went in search of the winning formula that would allow it to gain 
electoral success similar to that experienced by the FN in the 1980s. One of Griffin’s 
first tasks was to make the party more appealing by removing some of the old Neo-
Nazi baggage which affected the party’s legitimacy. This included an attempt to 
differentiate the party from the old, tired established mainstream parties who were 
viewed by BNP voters as ‘all the same’. The BNP sought to position themselves 
between the mainstream parties, and those groups who were traditionally opposed to 
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democracy, and retracted their call for revolutionary overthrow. As Goodwin notes, 
“The earlier revolutionary critique of liberal democracy has similarly been toned 
down in favour of anti-establishment (but not overtly anti-democratic) populism” 
(2010: 39). Indeed, the BNP 2005 Manifesto was entitled Rebuilding Britain’s 
Democracy (2005), and it states that the party will keep to their “commitment to 
parliamentary democracy” (BNP Manifesto 2005: 38). Griffin also sought within the 
manifesto to make the party more appealing to the electorate by emphasizing its 
defence of democracy, alongside its desire to protect the identity, freedom and culture 
of British voters. In fact, Griffin stated on the BNP website’s opening message that, 
“the BNP is a patriotic, democratic alternative to the old parties that have wrecked our 
great country” (Griffin n.d.). This demonstrates how the BNP offered themselves as 
the defenders of democracy, arguing that they were the only party “to rebuild the 
basis of democracy in Britain” (BNP Manifesto 2005: 17). It was also noted in the 
manifesto that the BNP were the only party “defending democracy against creeping 
totalitarianism”, and they alone could “strengthen and extend genuine democracy” 
(2005: 9). The objective was to appear anti-establishment rather than anti-democratic, 
with some success.  
The BNP transformed its policies and offered a more populist appeal. It also 
sought to specifically appeal directly to disaffected voters, with policies aimed at 
taking advantage of growing disillusionment. Following the example of other 
European far right modernising parties, the BNP policies address anti-party sentiment, 
socio-economic policy, law and order and the defence of culture (BNP Manifesto 
2005). This was beneficial to the BNP as they sought to gain legitimacy. Indeed, Ford 
and Goodwin state that, “the BNP’s efforts to ‘modernise’ and offer a more moderate 
and democratic ideology are winning over a small but fast growing band of new 
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recruits” (2010: 19). There is some evidence showing that this was successful. For 
example, the electoral success of the BNP in the 2000s is testament to this. Moreover, 
as demonstrated in the chapters discussing Islamophobia and immigration, the BNP’s 
new image appealed to an electorate who were receptive to their message.  
Evidence of the BNP’s new popular appeal can be seen in how they attempted 
to attract disaffected voters, or those who were disillusioned with the mainstream 
parties. For example, alongside the ‘Punish the Pigs’ campaign (See chapter six), the 
BNP also attacked what they labelled as the ‘old gang parties’, mirroring the 
successful campaign led by the FN with reference to Le Pen’s attack on ‘the Gang of 
Four’ in France (Shields 2007). The aim was to appeal to disaffected voters who 
would not normally associate with any far right party. There are examples of the BNP 
seeking to widen its appeal, such as the targeting of lorry drivers who were protesting 
against rising fuel prices, and supporting those who were fighting for rural interests 
(Eatwell 2004: 70). Another example can be seen in the production of election leaflets 
tailored for specific communities. For example, in a leaflet produced for the BNP in 
Broxbourne, the candidates stood on the basis that they would prevent 5600 homes 
being built in Hertfordshire’s green belt (Appendix IV; Leaflet f.)          
Showing the effects of modernisation on voting, beyond pointing to the 
electoral victories themselves is problematic. Most voters were not aware of this 
‘modernisation’ programme, rather it was a process which enabled the BNP to 
sanitise their message, and legitimised the party in the eyes of some voters. Yet, the 
evidence from Nuneaton does show that this new message permeated the electoral 
outlook of voters. For example, one BNP voter was asked if he was aware of the 
BNP’s history and its fascist roots replied that he, “did not care about the past”, and 
that he was “not aware of the BNP’s history and only began following the party 
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recently... I didn’t know anything about them really” (O2OI4 2012). When asked if he 
was aware of the BNP’s history and links amongst its leadership to the National Front 
he stated; “Well I know that they had links, but that was in the past wasn’t it. And 
they don’t want to kick everyone out now do they” (O2OI4 2012). A similar response 
was also provided by another BNP voter who when asked the same question replied, 
“Yes, but that was in the past” (O2OI12 2014). What this demonstrates is that 
amongst some BNP voters there is a disconnect between the past radical views of the 
BNP, and the party of the 2000s. One community leader underpins this view of 
disconnection by stating that, “they’ voted for the BNP without realising what it stood 
for” (O2OI6 2013).  
Another important aspect of the modernisation programme was the BNP’s 
attempt to transform its image, which included making the party more appealing in 
the media, seeking that the party be portrayed in a less negative manner. However, the 
mainstream media remained hostile towards the BNP due to their historical links with 
fascism and neo-Nazism, therefore not giving them a platform on which to stand. For 
example, tabloid newspapers like The Sun newspaper were openly hostile to the BNP. 
In 2004 The Sun printed a front page headline “Bloody Nasty People”, attacking the 
BNP, and referring to the party as “a collection of evil, hate-filled moronic thugs ... 
wicked men ... criminals who should be locked up” (Smith 2004: 1). However, it 
should be noted that The Sun newspaper was also complicit, publishing material 
which legitimised the discourse of the BNP, and encouraged the prejudices of those 
who chose to vote for the party. Further evidence of this will be provided in the final 
chapter which focuses on the written media. 
Although the press did not give positive coverage to the BNP this did not stop 
the party from finding other channels to get their message across. For example, the 
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BNP utilised new media, such as the internet, using their website, Facebook and 
twitter to enhance their message and appeal to a wider audience. The BNP website 
became a central tool for the party as they sought to improve their image, and 
communicate to voters who may not otherwise have access to their message. For 
example, in 2007 the BNP website was the most visited of any political party in the 
UK (Telegraph 2007). Indeed, one Nuneaton BNP voter who was asked if they used 
the website prior to voting in 2008 replied; “I only started in 2008 because that’s 
when I was at working age, so it has only become important to myself because I am 
working, and I can see more now what the country is like” (O2OI7 2013). However, 
one BNP voter stated that although they use the site, it is not often; “they [BNP] are in 
the news a bit when there is any election going on, but ain’t been on their website for 
a while really” (O2OI8 2013). Therefore, it proves difficult to understand just how 
important the new media resources were for the BNP voters in Nuneaton in 2008, 
mostly due to the lack of evidence linking support for the party with the rise in use 
amongst voters of new media sources.   
 Finally, this section will offer an analysis of leadership. The literature suggests 
that the role of the leader is important in the recent success of the far right, especially 
at the breakthrough stage (Startin 2014; Eatwell 2006; Overy 2004; Billig 1978). An 
analysis of the survey data collected in Nuneaton does show that amongst of those 
BNP voters there was support for former BNP leader Nick Griffin, with over 60 
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Table 34: Why did you vote for a particular party or candidate during the local elections in your town in 
2008? [The party I voted for had the best leader]  
  
Strongly 





you vote for 
in the 2008 
local 
elections? 
Labour 31 24 52 11 2 120 
25.8% 20.0% 43.3% 9.2% 1.7% 100.0% 
Conservative 18 25 16 2 2 63 
28.6% 39.7% 25.4% 3.2% 3.2% 100.0% 
Liberal 
Democrats 
5 5 10 3 2 25 
20.0% 20.0% 40.0% 12.0% 8.0% 100.0% 
BNP 16 2 12 1 1 32 
50.0% 6.3% 37.5% 3.1% 3.1% 100.0% 
Green Party 0 2 3 0 1 6 
.0% 33.3% 50.0% .0% 16.7% 100.0% 
UKIP 1 0 3 0 0 4 
25.0% .0% 75.0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Independent 0 0 1 1 0 2 
.0% .0% 50.0% 50.0% .0% 100.0% 
Did not vote 2 2 5 2 2 13 
15.4% 15.4% 38.5% 15.4% 15.4% 100.0% 
Other 0 0 2 0 0 2 
.0% .0% 100.0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
Total 73 60 104 20 10 267 
27.3% 22.5% 39.0% 7.5% 3.7% 100.0% 
      Source: Nuneaton Questionnaire 2012 
 
However, many of these voters were already disaffected with the mainstream parties 
and their leaders; therefore they evidently believed the BNP leader was better in 
comparison. This does not mean the BNP leader was unimportant, as suggested in 
some of the literature, he was central in the modernisation of the party.  
This view is to a large extent corroborated through an analysis of the 
Nuneaton interview data. The interviews conducted amongst BNP supporters suggest 
that these individuals concentrated more on the leadership qualities of the local 
candidate, rather than Griffin’s abilities. Indeed, analysis demonstrates that some 
voters in Nuneaton were not convinced by Griffin’s leadership and saw him as a 
hindrance to further progression. One voter when asked if Griffin was important in 
their decision to vote for the BNP replied: 
If it had of been somebody else without the history in the National Front it may 
have been done better... I think someone else may have had a better chance 
without Nick Griffin’s background... I think Griffin was to blame. He never 
clearly defined the role of the party or got away from the stigma of I am a racist. 
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He should of been more clear in his statement that the BNP manifesto is not a 
racist manifesto, this is a manifesto about Britain (O2OI1 2012). 
 
Another BNP voter who was asked the same question was adamant that it was more 
to do with what the party stood for rather than the leader; “It was what the party stood 
for... Nick Griffin is just the face of BNP... it is the whole party” (O2OI7 2013).  
Although there is little evidence to support the view that Griffin was important 
in attracting voters to the BNP, there is little doubt that his role in modernising the 
BNP was central in its relative electoral success. It can be argued that his internal 
leadership, organisation, direction, and attempts at sanitising the BNP brand 
demonstrated his leadership role. As shown in the review of the literature Griffin did 
not have the charismatic appeal, however he does fit the mould of a ‘successful’ 
leader because he did manage to hold a far right party together, changed the image of 
the party and increased its appeal amongst sections of the British electorate. Griffin 
was able to do this by ensuring stability, and offering a programme which some voters 
supported (Mudde 2007). Griffin was clearly more appealing to those who voted for 
the BNP than the other mainstream party leaders; therefore, they were more inclined 
to refer to him as a good leader in comparison with the mainstream party leaders, who 
were all espousing the same message. Therefore, analysis of the leader is not 
conclusive, and to some extent corroborates the work conducted by van der Pas, de 
Vries and Van der Brug who in their study of Dutch far right leader Geert Wilders, 
argued that there is “little support for the leadership effects hypothesis” (2011: 470). 
Adopting the master frame and modernising the BNP was beneficial to the 
BNP candidates in Nuneaton. It enabled the BNP to take advantage of an opening in 
the political space in 2008, and they benefited from their modernisation programme 
during a period when the mainstream parties were seeing their support decline. They 
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achieved relative success in places like Nuneaton because they were able to conceal 
parts of their ideology, transform the party’s image, and to a large extent transform 
the party from its fascist past. The aim of modernisation was therefore part of a wider 
plan to make the BNP more acceptable to the voting public, enabling them to take 
advantage once the opportunity arose.  
 
Local candidates fighting for local issues 
The importance of local campaigning for the BNP is evident when analysing the data. 
The party attached itself to local issues, putting greater emphasis on community-based 
activism and recruitment of local people to the party. This is not the first time the 
BNP have utilised community politics as was highlighted in the review of the 
literature (Copsey 2008; Eatwell 2004; Sivanandan 1994). For example, the BNP’s 
only success in the 1990s in Tower Hamlets was an early indication for many in the 
party hierarchy of what could be achieved electorally if the party changed their 
tactics. This included the likes of Tony Lecomber, Michael Newland and Eddy Butler 
who became prominent figures in the modernisation programme. In fact, Butler had 
masterminded the BNP’s only success prior to Griffin becoming leader in 1993 using 
the tactics of ‘community based politics’. Eatwell notes that the BNP found local 
elections “provided a cheaper and democratic route forward” (2004: 70). How this 
tactic developed can be seen in the way the BNP focused on local issues since 2000 
when fighting election campaigns.  
In the breakthrough locations of Burnley, Stoke and Barking and Dagenham, the party 
focused on local issues. For example, in Burnley the BNP campaigned publicly on 
various local issues, such as halting the closure of swimming pools, calling for a 20 
mph speed limit on housing estates and focusing on attacks on the white population in 
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parts of Oldham (see Rhodes 2009; Wilks-Heeg 2008; Renton 2003). Whereas in 
Barking and Dagenham, as well as utilising local community politics, they also 
claimed that locally Labour councils were giving Africans grants of up to £50,000 to 
buy houses under a scheme known as 'Africans for Essex' (Trilling 2010). There was 
evidence of community based politics in Nuneaton and the next section will focus on 
the BNP’s community based politics in more detail. 
The BNP made use of community politics, which Eatwell refers to as “BNP 
community politics in action” (2004: 72). Eatwell also noted that in locations like 
Burnley we can see an example of “how local hard work, combined with ‘community 
politics’, which sought especially to exploit a sense of white resentment about alleged 
preferential treatment of ethnic minorities, could bring results” (2004: 72). Rhodes 
also highlighted the tactics of the BNP, noting that in Burnley the BNP copied the 
campaign led by Harry Brooks and the Independents that “provided a blueprint on 
which the BNP could base its campaign” (2009: 11). The tactics used in Burnley bore 
many similarities with the tactics used during the BNP’s success in Tower Hamlets in 
1993. Essentially, the BNP copied the model used by the Liberal Democrats, which 
included a ‘bottom up’ policy of local electioneering, giving local activists much 
autonomy to fight on local issues rather than national issues like the other two 
mainstream parties. The Liberal Democrats introduced a local policy which was 
called the ‘sons and daughters’ scheme. The scheme gave priority in housing to the 
sons and daughters of local residents who were predominantly white which gave the 
impression that the Liberal Democrats favoured white residents. According to 
Copsey, the actions of the Liberal Democrats made “racism politically respectable” 
(2008: 55). This was because the party had, at a local level, manipulated race as a 
political issue for their own electoral success. The BNP were able to utilise this form 
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of electioneering, and put themselves forward as the party fighting for local people. In 
legitimising the race issue, the Liberal Democrats indirectly helped legitimised the 
BNP’s campaign of ‘rights for Whites’ in 1993. The BNP successfully integrated the 
Liberal Democratic form of political campaigning during 1993, and applied it on a 
national scale after Griffin became leader in 1999. At a local level it was important 
that the BNP sanitised its image and message. As indicated by Copsey, two principles 
defined the BNP process of modernisation which was vital for the local breakthrough, 
respectability and professionalism; respectability gained through vetting candidates 
and moderating the language of the BNP, and was aimed at ending “the culture of 
careless extremism” and secondly the principle of professionalism, directed at 
attracting more respectable candidates (2007: 68). This view was shared by Goodwin 
who argued that the leadership of the BNP has, “sought to improve the respectability 
of the party’s rank and file activist base, criticizing the tendency to recruit only ‘closet 
Nazis’ and instead stressing the need to recruit ‘sensible and good quality types’” 
(Goodwin 2010: 39).  
Evidence of a BNP attempt to recruit more responsible and respectable 
candidates was highlighted by Rhodes who stated that, as well as the BNP attaching 
itself to local issues, “the party also chose candidates that were rooted in the local 
community in an attempt to gain a greater degree of legitimacy” (2009: 41). This 
related specifically to tactics and organisation at a local level and included sustainable 
community support, local electioneering and doorstep canvassing. Indeed, these tried 
and trusted methods had by 2008 been successful for the BNP at a local level and did 
have a positive effect on the BNP in the first decade of the twenty-first century. For 
example, there was a dramatic increase in representation at a local level, with 
thousands of voters electing BNP councillors and the party normalising its affairs in 
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the eyes of part of the electorate. The programme of respectability and 
professionalism worked for the BNP in many locations. They had over fifty local 
councillors elected, and the party’s membership rose from the hundreds in 1999 to 
approximately 12,600 at its peak in 2009 (Keen 2015: 6). Its effect in Nuneaton will 
now be examined on the basis of the data collected. 
A major aspect of these localised campaigns was the BNP’s attempt to attract 
local, respectable candidates, without the ‘extremist baggage’. It was also important to 
recruit candidates who were rooted in the local community. This was highlighted in 
the literature, with Rhodes in his study of Burnley stating, “a quarter of the BNP 
voters interviewed professed to know personally the BNP councillors they had 
supported” (2009: 42). Nuneaton bares many similarities to Burnley in that the BNP 
was “adept at attracting supporters as a result of the ingenuity and commitment of its 
local activists”, and that by focusing on local issues it “has been able to portray itself 
as representing the interests of the white community” (Rhodes 2009: 40). This 
suggests that the BNP planned to improve and expand its activist base by appealing to 
a more moderate, local recruit. It also evidently benefited the BNP in places like 
Nuneaton, and mirrors the BNP policy in other locations. For example, the candidates 
in Nuneaton were not associated with the far right, or linked to any extremist party of 
the past, which had often been the case. All of the BNP candidates who stood in the 
2008 local elections were local people, who had grown up, lived and worked in the 
local areas. As one local Labour councillor stated: 
I think Alwyn Deacon [prospective BNP councillor and local party leader in 
2008], I am sure you have heard of him... he is a Nuneaton guy and he use to be 
a member of the Labour Party and his dad was a Labour Mayor. So they do 
have a network of acquaintances and so on, spread throughout the town from 
being active in politics over generations. They have made use of these contacts 
and they have been used effectively (O2OI3 2013). 
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Therefore, one important element in the process of normalisation relates to the use of 
local activism, and employing local candidates who have no known history or links 
with fascists.  
The use of local activism and local candidates was important in the success of 
Martyn Findley and Darren John Haywood who were elected in Barpool Ward and 
Camp Hill. Findley was elected in an area where he is well known, and for many 
voters he was a ‘respectable’ member of that community and this was clearly 
beneficial. For example, nearly all the interviewees knew Findley personally, saw him 
as a respectable person, have met him or have heard about him locally, and this is why 
they supported the BNP. Findley works locally and is a well-known local driving 
instructor with many links to that local community. Therefore, the fact that where 
Findley stood and won as a councillor he has local roots in the community, and was 
‘respectable’, were evidently important in his success. The work of Findley in the 
local community, and the respect he had locally, was highlighted by the local 
Conservative MP Marcus Jones, who stated that, “in terms of a ward councillor 
dealing with the bread and butter stuff, broken street lights and anti-social behaviour 
or dog fouling I think he was quite good at that” (O2OI10 2013). This was also noted 
by Cllr Dennis Harvey who stated that “Martyn Findley was the most active when he 
got elected, but never really pushed his BNP views” (O2OI5 2013). In fact, one way 
Findley focused on local issues was through his online blog. Findley made use of the 
internet to get his message across, using the blog to offer his support for local people 
and local issues, which included saving a local park, promoting a neighbourhood 
watch scheme and issues relating to wheelie bin collections. Prime examples of this 
localised politics in action were evident in his “Save Tommy Rec Playground” (2009) 
campaign, and in his blog entitled “Streetlight switch off is a recipe for fear” (2010) 
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Findley attacked the County Council on their plans to switch off street lights in the 
borough in order to save money. In addition, the BNP employed new techniques in 
places like Nuneaton, which included leaflets designed for a more working class 
electorate targeting issues which are relevant to particular local areas and social 
classes (See Appendix IV: Leaflet a.). For example, the leaflet focused on the 
changing demographic in London and was aimed particularly at those areas in London 
which border the large Muslim communities in parts of East London, such as Barking.      
So we can see that as part of the modernisation process the BNP targeted local 
elections and campaigned hard using local candidates fighting for local issues, 
utilising community based activism. This proved to be beneficial to BNP candidates 
in 2008, particularly in Barpool and Camp Hill due in part to the failure of the 
mainstream parties to take this BNP campaign sufficiently seriously. Modernisation 
of the BNP also benefited the party because candidates were vetted and trained as part 
of the programme of introducing respectability and professionalism in the party. The 
last section in this chapter will now offer an analysis of how the BNP modernisation 
also benefited from limited legitimisation.  
 
Legitimising the BNP 
This final section will demonstrate how the BNP were able to take advantage of a 
range of issues, such as immigration and Islamophobia, which offered increased 
legitimacy and voter appeal. This was significant as widening support is not just 
linked to factors such as immigration, Islamophobia and the actions of other parties, 
but also the ability of the BNP to take advantage of these conditions to increase their 
legitimacy. Indeed, they were able to use their limited legitimacy to increase votes 
and support in Nuneaton as will now be demonstrated.   
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Nick Griffin’s decision to modernise the BNP coincided with a series of 
social, economic and political challenges, which offered the party a degree of 
legitimacy. For instance, there were challenges to British identity, an influx of 
political and economic asylum seekers, the mass immigration of new EU citizens, 
notably of Polish descent, the rise of Islamophobia in response to growing Islamism, 
and the economic recession. It was through these dynamics that, according to 
Goodwin, the BNP “began stressing the ‘threats’ which immigrants and minority 
ethnic groups pose to British culture, values and ways of life” (2011: 67). This 
marked a dramatic change in the party’s discourse, which previously espoused crude 
racial nationalist language and enabled the party to gain legitimacy and limited 
ownership of the issue of immigration. For example, as demonstrated in the previous 
chapters on immigration and Islamophobia, the BNP were able to tap into growing 
disillusionment with increasing immigration, and fear associated with Islamophobia. 
Indeed, Copsey states that both the Labour Party and the Conservative Party “took on 
and pandered to the electorate’s fears over asylum and immigration”, and the BNP 
“associated itself with themes that were increasingly considered ‘legitimate’ and 
‘normal” (2008: 147). In fact, Burnett argues that the Labour government was 
important “in fostering hostilities and legitimising the far right’s agenda” (2011: 11).  
Examination of the immigration variable in chapter four also demonstrated 
that voters do not trust the mainstream parties when it comes to immigration and 
asylum policy, and the politicisation of race has clearly been a strong determinant in 
support for the far right. For example, it indicated that the BNP were able to capitalise 
on niches in the electoral arena, and the mainstream parties’ position on crucial issues, 
notably immigration or rising Islamophobia. It was also evident that Islamophobia and 
the language of race were apparent across all mainstream parties, and in the decade 
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following 2001 this benefited the BNP. Indeed, Zuquete argued that the far right 
benefited because it has “co-opted issues that a large number of mainstream 
politicians, both on the mainstream Right and Left, find it hard to disagree with, if not 
fully support” (2008: 332). This included women’s rights, attacks on the 
encroachment of Sharia Law and Sharia Courts, as well as attaching itself to animal 
rights issues with regards to the serving of Halal meat in schools. By attaching itself 
to these issues, alongside modernisation, the BNP were able to further legitimise their 
discourse.   
What this final section has shown is that the acquisition of legitimacy, both 
through the actions of the mainstream parties and the sanitising of their message, was 
important for the BNP in their success at a local level. The modernisation of the 
BNP’s discourse, and the introduction of ‘normal’ policies, did provide the party with 
an element of legitimacy for some voters. This element of legitimacy was a factor in 
2008, and people did view the BNP as a legitimate party of protest.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that the BNP managed to secure an air of respectability 
for some voters, and this granted them the opportunity to garner support at a local 
level. The BNP were able to conceal parts of their ideology, transform the party’s 
image, and to distance the party from its fascist past. The analysis has also shown that 
the BNP reached the dizzy heights of electoral success by copying the French FN 
strategy (Master frame) and creating a very British version of a nationalist populist 
party. Moreover, the analysis of local election campaigns demonstrates that the BNP 
adopted similar tactics used in Millwall in 1993, and those used by the Independents 
in Burnley in 2002. It has also shown that many BNP supporters in 2008 no longer 
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associate the BNP with fascism or neo-Nazism and this was indicated in their 
responses.   
The local BNP candidates in Nuneaton were able to take advantage of an 
opening in the political space, and achieved success by concealing and transforming 
parts of their ideology, as well as the party’s image. The party became more 
‘acceptable’ to part of the electorate and they took advantage of this limited 
legitimacy, appealing to an electorate concerned with issues such as immigration and 
Islamophobia. It is also evident that Griffin, during the mid-2000s, succeeded in his 
attempt to ‘normalise’ the party. It has shown how the BNP targeted local elections, 
and campaigned hard using local ‘respectable’ candidates who fought on local issues, 
and utilised community based activism. This proved to be beneficial to BNP 
candidates in 2008, particularly in Barpool and Camp Hill due in part to the failure of 
the mainstream parties to take this BNP campaign sufficiently seriously. 
Modernisation alone cannot explain support for the BNP in Nuneaton. 
However, it can help understand how the BNP took advantage of crises and 
conditions because of modernisation and how the party acquired, for some, limited 
legitimacy. The final chapter will focus on the role of the media in the success of the 
BNP in Nuneaton. This chapter will be important in showing how in particular the 













Two key questions arise when scrutinising the role of the British media in any far 
right electoral breakthrough. How important were the local and national media in the 
far right’s electoral success, and how do you measure the influence of the media? This 
chapter sheds light on these questions and adds to the literature which examines the 
role of the media in the success of the far right. The role of the media has often been 
analysed in the context of other variables, including immigration and asylum. 
However, the aim of this chapter is to analyse the media as an independent variable, 
in order to demonstrate how important it was in the success of the BNP in Nuneaton 
in 2008.  
First, in terms of chapter structure, focus will be on an analysis of the local 
press, specifically concentrating on a story and newspaper content analysis of the 
Heartland Evening News (which became the Nuneaton News in 2009) and the 
Coventry Telegraph. Second, it will examine specific stories in the national tabloids, 
which include tabloids such as The Sun, the Daily Mail and the Daily Express, and 
analyses the content of these stories and responses from interviewees. Analysis of the 
local and national press will show that the media reporting, specifically relating to 
Muslims and immigration, was situated in a moral panic over Islamist terrorist 
attacks, particularly in the wake of the 9/11 and 7/7 terror attack. Throughout, this 
chapter will show how important the media were in constructing legitimacy for the 
BNP in the years leading up-to their success in Nuneaton in 2008. It will show this by 
demonstrating the media’s legitimisation of the BNP’s language and policies in the 
press, and the relationship between the party and the media. It also investigates the 
press and highlights the media’s role in agenda setting, with particular reference 
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attached to the analysis of five themes, immigration, Islamophobia, asylum, Islam and 
Muslims. These five themes were chosen following analysis of the qualitative data, 
which highlighted their frequency as the five most important issues for BNP voters. 
This chapter will demonstrate how salience of issues in the news media, such as the 
visibility and prominence of issues relating to the five themes, has contributed to 
support for BNP.  
 
The Role of the Media 
The literature review for this thesis revealed that historically in the analysis of the far 
right, compared to other variables offered as explanations for their electoral 
breakthrough, the media has received little attention (Refer to chapter one, pp.52-54). 
Boomgaarden and Vliegenhart state, “the literature largely ignored an important 
factor that accounts for dynamics in public opinion towards and electoral support for 
anti-immigrant populist parties, which is the mass media” (2007: 405). This chapter 
will therefore add to the explanations which have scrutinised the role of the media in 
the success of far right parties and argue that the role of the media should always be 
analysed as an important factor. 
First, it is worth noting that analysis of the role of the media is fraught with 
difficulties, with one of the main problems being how to measure its influence. As 
Mudde notes, it is very hard to test empirically the exact influence of the media on the 
success of the far right (2007: 252). This view is also shared by Eatwell who notes 
that “there are major methodological problems involved in assessing the media 
effects” (2003: 62). However, what is clear is that the media can and does play an 
important role in legitimising groups like the BNP through salience of issues and 
policies. For example, Schain in his analysis of the FN in France during the 1980s 
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argued that, the media was important in the breakthrough stage through legitimisation, 
and that “legitimacy has not simply emerged. It has been constructed” (1987: 230). 
This related to how the press courted Le Pen and gave him access to various media 
channels. This view is to a large extent supported by Mudde who argues that “the 
media can encourage (or obstruct) electoral breakthrough by influencing which issues 
gain salience, and providing positive (including neutral) reporting on populist radical 
right actors can help them gain electoral breakthrough” (2007: 254). This, indeed, is 
what happened to a limited extent in Nuneaton prior to the 2008 electoral success.  
There is literature on the media and its influence on voting patterns. For 
example, DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) in their analysis looked at whether media 
bias affects political beliefs and changes voting behaviour. They found that Fox News 
convinced 3 to 8 percent of its viewers to vote Republican (DellaVigna and Kaplan 
2007: 32). Looking at the media bias and its influence on voting behaviour, they 
concluded that “the media can have a sizeable political impact” (DellaVigna and 
Kaplan 2007: 32). Boomgaarden and Vliegenhart (2007) also found that the media 
can have a positive impact on the level of support for the far right. They argued that 
“the prominence of immigration issues in national newspapers has a significant and 
positive impact: The more news media reported about immigration-related topics, the 
higher the aggregate share of vote intention for anti-immigrant parties” (Boomgaarden 
and Vliegenhart 2007: 404). They tested the salience of general news on immigration 
and economic news in relation to immigration, and found a “significant positive 
influence of news on vote intention for anti-immigrant parties” (Boomgaarden and 
Vliegenhart 2007: 413).   
The BNP’s relationship with the media will now be discussed. Historically, 
the media had been seen as the enemy of the far right, and hostile to any ‘new’ far 
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right party. Indeed, the far right have viewed the media as the enemy, and extremists 
have always viewed the media as part of a Jewish conspiracy. In fact, Griffin (1997) 
wrote a pamphlet called Who are the Mind Benders, during which he outlined the 
myth that Jews control the media, and that there was a Jewish conspiracy to 
brainwash the British public. In the pamphlet Griffin states that: “The mass media in 
Britain today have managed to implant into many people’s minds the idea that it is 
‘anti-Semitic’ even to acknowledge that members of the Jewish community play a 
large part in controlling our news” (Anon. n.d.). This shows how the far right have 
traditionally viewed the media, as unsympathetic and the enemy of nationalism.  
Although the media has been unsympathetic to the far right it is clear that parts 
of the media have legitimised the discourse, issues and policies associated with them. 
Moreover, there is evidence that the far right have benefited from the common 
political wisdom that says any publicity is good publicity. It could be argued that the 
BNP did in fact benefit from bad publicity. For example, the racial hatred trial in 2006 
of BNP leader Griffin and his former youth organiser Mark Collett served as an 
“unprecedented recruiting sergeant” (Wainwright 2006). In fact, Griffin stated after 
his acquittal that, "this case has brought us more donations than ever before, including 
one of £20,000, the biggest in our history. We've never had such good publicity 
before" (cited in Wainwright 2006). The trial, which Griffin argued was in defence of 
free speech, related to addresses made by both Collett and Griffin in the run-up to the 
local and European elections of 2004, and was aired in the BBC programme The 
Secret Agent (BBC Panorama 2004). Griffin used this case and the media frenzy 
surrounding it to air his own views, stating: 
Millions of people in this country will be able to hold their heads higher and 
walk a little taller tonight. I was speaking the truth to an audience of decent 
working people in West Yorkshire who in some cases are facing terrible 
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problems; including the grooming of their children by racist paedophiles from 
part of the Muslim community…We don't hate anyone from the ethnic minority, 
or blame asylum seekers for seeking a better future for their kids. We blame the 
government for putting their people above our people - for turning our once 
decent, stable country into a multicultural mess which looks increasingly like a 
future Bosnia (Griffin 2006).  
 
Alongside the trial coverage, the BNP also attempted to use wider media attention to 
their advantage. Griffin appeared on respectable news programmes such as Newsnight 
(Jeremy Paxman interview 2002), and BBC Radio Four’s Today programme in 2005, 
during which Griffin explained why the BNP was using an image from the London 
bombings for their election campaign. As indicated earlier, historically the media had 
followed a ‘no platform’ policy which had denied the far right in Britain oxygen 
which could fuel the flames of legitimacy. However, the media had by allowing the 
BNP limited access, provided the party and Griffin the opportunity to ‘normalise’ the 
party in the eyes of some voters.  
The BNP also benefited further by what Copsey argues was, “a series of 
sensationalist media campaigns directed against asylum-seekers, and heightened by 
post ‘9/11’ anti-Islamic insecurities” (2008: 146). This view is shared by Mudde who 
notes that the media can “provide them [far right] with a highly favourable forum” 
(2007: 251). This point will be returned to later in this chapter.   
The local press also offered the BNP an element of legitimacy. For example, 
in an interview given to the media in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 election 
success for the BNP in Nuneaton, the then West Midland organiser Alwyn Deacon 
used the media to thank voters who voted for the party, stating, “the BNP is the fastest 
growing political party in Britain because we are the only party to stand up for the 
British people” (cited in Birch 2008). Therefore, in the aftermath of the BNP’s 
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election success the press gave the BNP a platform to celebrate their victory. This 
demonstrates that the media can and does provide a ‘favourable forum’ for the far 
right, and will therefore be important in this analysis of Nuneaton.  
It is important for this analysis to note that constant media coverage also 
creates issue salience which has also been beneficial to the BNP. This was 
fundamental for the BNP because at a time when the press was reporting widely and 
negatively on immigration, the BNP offered themselves as the only party who would 
act on immigration (see above chapters four and five for more detail on immigration 
and the BNP). Of course using the media to your advantage is not a new concept, and 
was one important aspect of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s success in France during the 1980s. 
Indeed, Grayson argues that Le Pen’s use of the media in the 1980s “gave him the 
opportunity to introduce into political discourse far-right ideas which were previously 
kept out of the media” (2014). This is a view shared by Wolfreys who argued that, 
“access to the media played a crucial role in the FN strategy” (2009). However, the 
BNP unlike the Front National (FN) did not benefit by having direct access to the 
media because the media remained hostile to the BNP. Rather it is the salience of 
issues which includes immigration and asylum that have benefited the BNP (Copsey 
and Macklin 2011: 84-85). It is evident that sections of the media, particularly tabloid 
newspapers, discuss issues and use discourse which resembles that used by parties 
like the BNP. It is this which clearly can encourage electoral breakthrough by 
influencing the issues which gain salience and benefits far right parties. 
 
Researching the Press in Nuneaton 
For this analysis particular attention has been paid to those newspapers which 
respondents to the questionnaire stated they read on a regular basis, with particular 
John Grima  258 
 
reference paid to the newspapers read by BNP voters. In regards to the local press it 
was decided that for this analysis the period between 1999 and 2012 would be 
analysed. This period was chosen as it represents the period when Nick Griffin 
became leader of the BNP in 1999, through to the defeat of the BNP in the Nuneaton 
local elections of 2012. The aim was to demonstrate whether there was an increase in 
negative reporting and salience of particular issues in the press, which coincided with 
rising support for the BNP. The decision to analyse these specific newspapers was 
also based on the data produced by the questionnaire data (Table 35), and through 
interviews with respondents.  
Table 35: Readership of Newspapers based on who the 
respondent voted for in 2008 (Respondents could choose 
more than one national or local newspaper) 
     Which National or local 
newspaper do you read on 







The Sun 36 16 3 20 0 5 2 82 
The Mirror 19 2 2 4 0 1 0 28 
The Daily Mail 24 25 7 4 0 5 4 69 
The Daily Star 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
The Times 7 9 1 1 1 0 1 20 
The Guardian 12 1 3 0 0 0 1 17 
Independent 12 1 3 1 2 1 2 22 
Heartland Evening News 
/Nuneaton news 37 20 13 8 1 2 3 81 
Nuneaton Tribune 43 23 8 5 1 1 5 89 
Coventry Evening Standard 3 3 2 2 0 0 0 10 
Coventry Telegraph 13 8 2 6 1 1 1 29 
                                                              Source: Nuneaton Questionnaire 2012 
 
For example, Table 35 shows that overwhelmingly BNP supporters stated they read at 
a national level The Sun newspaper, while locally around 50 percent also read a local 
newspaper which includes the Heartland Evening News (Nuneaton News) and the 
Coventry Telegraph. The press was selected as part of this analysis because it offered 
an opportunity to add to the current literature relating to the media variable, and test 
whether there is a link between the success of far right parties through legitimisation 
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of their policies and discourse. Therefore, understanding the link between the far right 
success and the media will be central in this analysis.  
The media played a role, and understanding that role will be measured in this 
chapter. It is worth stating that the aim here is not to show who framed the argument, 
or whether it is the readers buying particular newspapers because they represent their 
views, or the newspapers are influencing the views of their readers. However, with 
that in mind, an analysis of these newspapers will offer an insight into the influences 
of the printed press, through their reporting of issues which mirrored those 
championed by the far right BNP.  
 
The Local Press  
The role of the media in legitimising the BNP’s messages was very apparent in 
evidence mined from archival work on the Heartland Evening News (Nuneaton News) 
and Coventry Telegraph. This section will focus on a story and newspaper content 
analysis, focusing on the local press between 1999 and 2012. This relates to stories 
and content that includes key words and themes relating to immigration, asylum, 
Islam, Muslims and terrorism. First it will offer a story analysis, looking specifically 
at the reporting of the five themes in the local press. These were selected in order to 
demonstrate the discourse relating to these five themes, and how this developed in the 
years leading up-to to the success of the BNP in 2008. It will then analyse the 
newspaper content in greater detail, focusing on a sample of the stories. Then it will 
show that the reporting transformed in the period between 2008 and 2012, with 
greater focus on local issues, and less focus on national headlines. Analysis of the 
story and content of these local papers will show that the local media did, to a large 
extent, legitimise and sanitise the argument and discourse put forward by the BNP 
prior to the 2008 local election.  
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 The first element of this local newspaper analysis shows clearly how the 
media reported immigration, asylum, Islam, Muslims and terrorism. For example, 
there is a dramatic rise in coverage of these issues in the period between 1999 and 
2006 (Table 36). As highlighted in the methodology chapter, the analysis of the local 
press included an in depth search of every daily newspaper on microfilm in the 
archives of Nuneaton Central Library. It also included an online analysis of the local 
media using a digital key word search. It is evident from the sources that the local 
papers reported stories which reflected those that were prominent at a national level. 
For example, the Heartland Evening News (Nuneaton News) carried many stories 
concerning uncontrolled immigration and asylum, as well as terrorism in the 
immediate post-9/11 and 7/7 period. In fact, there is a rise in immigration stories from 
just seven in 1999 to nineteen stories by 2006. More evident is the increase in featured 
stories relating to terrorism, which rise dramatically between 1999 and 2006 (Table 
36). Even taking into account the attacks of 7/7 and 9/11, the reporting on terrorism in 
a local newspaper represents a high proportion of stories reported.    
Table 36:  Heartland Evening News/Nuneaton News (16th Jan 2009) 
   Key Word/Theme (Total Number of stories)     
Year Immigration Asylum Islam Muslim Terrorist 
1999 7 0 0 1 6 
2000 7 14 5 1 5 
2001 8 13 1 8 75 (72 Post 9/11) 
2002 9 23 5 6 56 
2003 11 20 2 7 66 
2004 13 16 10 22 90 
2005 
16 15 15 27 
108 (7/7 Terror 
attack) 
2006 19 7 10 32 79 
2007 5 2 0 1 8 
2008 8 1 1 4 2 
2009 0 0 0 1 2 
2010 3 1 0 2 0 
2011 5 1 0 0 0 
2012 3 (Only 1 prior to 
2012 local election) 0 0 0 0 
   
Source: Heartland Evening News/Nuneaton News 1999-2012 
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Table 36 indicates that stories relating to terrorism increased from just six in 
1999 to 75 in 2001, and following the terrorist attack of 7/7 in 2005 it increased to 
108 reports. The rise in stories relating to the five themes is evident between 1999 and 
2006. For example, asylum rose from zero stories in 1999 to fifteen by 2005, and 
stories relating to Muslims rose even more dramatically from one in 1999 to 32 by 
2006 (Table 36). Moreover, the increase in the levels of reporting on these issues 
reflects the increase in support for the BNP in the town and the demise of the Labour 
Party. In fact, reporting increases dramatically prior to the success of the BNP in 
Nuneaton, although it does begin to decrease from 2007 after the Heartland Evening 
News (Nuneaton News) completely transformed the papers format, giving greater 
priority to local stories, and appeared to be less aggressive in its discourse in relation 
to the five themes. Indeed, analysis of reporting in 2012 shows that there was only 1 
story relating to the theme immigration in the period January to May 2012 (Table 36). 
What this demonstrates is that reporting of the five themes increased dramatically up-
to 2007, and this to large extent laid down foundations for the BNP to build support in 
the first decade of the twenty-first century. The fact that the paper changed the level 
of reporting on the five themes did not influence the increase in support in 2008. The 
outcome of this was that through the presses agenda-setting function, notably their 
discourse and salience of issues, the BNP’s message became sanitised and accepted as 
legitimate for an ever increasing number of voters. 
 So far this section has focused its attention on the Heartland Evening News 
(Nuneaton News). Additionally the Coventry Telegraph was analysed using the online 
version of the paper. This decision was made in order to analyse another medium 
from which people are informed of the news. What this examination found was that 
the Coventry Telegraph followed a very similar pattern when comparing story 
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analysis. For example, the number of stories relating to immigration increased from 
just 6 in 2001 to 47 in 2008 (See Table 37). Moreover the number of stories relating 
to terrorism remained high between 2001 and 2012. This shows that like the 
Heartland Evening News (Nuneaton News), the Coventry Telegraph was sharing a 
discourse similar to that espoused by the BNP, which could only contribute to the 
party’s increased legitimacy.   
Table 37:  Story analysis Coventry Telegraph 2001-2012 (Online) 
   Key Word/Theme (Total Number of stories)    
Year Immigration Asylum Islam Muslim Terrorist 
2001 6 11 7 18 86 
2002 9 11 1 13 34 
2003 21 34 9 41 27 
2004 27 29 9 41 44 
2005 12 21 8 36 43 
2006 52 41 15 45 33 
2007 54 34 15 43 25 
2008 47 25 18 24 30 
2009 61 34 23 34 39 
2010 88 39 26 33 33 
2011 81 45 15 34 28 
2012 56 18 8 18 28 
   
         Source: Coventry Telegraph Online 2014 
 
However, the Coventry Telegraph differs from the story analysis of the Heartland 
Evening News (Nuneaton News), in that it continued to publish stories relating to the 
five themes in greater number. Moreover, in the case of immigration the number of 
reports continued to rise in number up until 2010 (Table 37). Nonetheless, this data 
also shows that there was a correlation between the number of stories locally relating 
to the five themes, and the rise of the BNP in Nuneaton. 
It is also worth highlighting that the negative portrayal of immigrants and 
asylum seekers in the local press, and the national Labour Party’s failure to deal with 
these perceived problems, also coincided with the demise of the Labour Party in the 
town as seen in chapter six. Also evident from this analysis is that members of the 
local Labour Party in Nuneaton appeared oblivious to the increase in negative 
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reporting of the themes. Indeed, the rise in negative reporting contradicts what was 
stated by one local Labour councillor, who when asked about reporting in the local 
press on these issues stated that “there was nothing in the local press” (O2OI3 2012). 
This view was also shared by the local Labour leader, Dennis Harvey, who when 
asked if any local media stories impacted on voter choice stated:  
Not what I can think of. To be fair to the media here they are quite fair. And I 
have for many years written a column in the newspaper, which I know many 
council leaders I worked for did not get that opportunity. So I have always had 
direct contact with people. And it was offered to me by one newspaper and then 
another. But I have always found them quite fair (O2OI5 2013). 
 
Therefore, there appears to be a disparity between what was being printed in the local 
press at the time, and what the local politicians believe was being printed. As shown 
in table 36 and 37, stories relating to the 5 themes increased dramatically between 
1999 and 2007. Of course this does not offer a detailed analysis of the content of these 
stories, and this will be looked at in the next section. 
 
Local Newspaper Stories 
This next section will now offer an analysis of the newspaper content specifically 
relating to the five themes. It is not unknown for the local press to influence and fuel 
issues at a local level. For example, Eatwell highlighted the role of the local media, 
which he argues is more apolitical and tends to report in a neutral way. He draws 
attention to how the local press in Oldham reported race related events in 2001 which 
“fitted the BNP’s agenda” (Eatwell 2003: 61) by giving considerable coverage to 
racially motivated attacks on whites, no-go areas for whites in Oldham, and the attack 
on a 76 year old war veteran. There is some evidence that this was also the case in the 
local Nuneaton press. For example, the Heartland Evening News (Nuneaton News) 
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reported on the BNP in both a neutral and positive manner, with headlines such as 
‘BNP man will fight for seat’ (Birch 2007b: 3) and ‘Son aiming for father’s old seat’ 
(Birch 2007: 1), which led with the story that the son of a former Labour Mayor of 
Nuneaton, Bill Deacon, was now running for local office, for the BNP. This story 
conceals the sharp discontinuity between the father’s politics and those of his son. 
Moreover, the Heartland Evening News (Nuneaton News) in the month before the 
local elections of 2008 led with the front page headline ‘Deacon’s Dozen’, which 
publicised all of the local BNP candidates standing in Nuneaton (Birch 2008: 1). The 
story was great publicity for the BNP. It offered the BNP organiser for Nuneaton 
Alwyn Deacon, the opportunity to put the party’s electoral message in a positive 
manner. Deacon in reference to the BNP candidates stated, “they are from all walks of 
life; a cross section which ranges from the self-employed to professional people and 
housewives” (Birch 2008:1). Stories like those above create an air of respectability 
and legitimacy for the BNP.  
Copsey (2008) highlighted how important the local press can be in increasing 
legitimacy and credibility, with particular reference to the reporting of 2001 
disturbances in Oldham as reported in the Oldham Chronicle, which he argued fuelled 
racial tension. Copsey argued that “by accentuating Asian-on-white attacks, the 
Chronicle’s reporters had helped set the agenda that was singularly edifying for the 
extreme right” (2008: 128). Moreover, Renton argues that a series of actions taken by 
the police were central in this process. This included the claim by Chief 
Superintendent Hewitt that there was an increase in attacks on whites by Asians, a 
story which was publicised by the Oldham Chronicle, highlighting that of the 572 
racial incidents reported in Oldham sixty per cent of the victims were white (Renton 
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2003: 78-79). It is evident when analysing the local Nuneaton press that particular 
stories, similarly to the Oldham Chronicle, did play into the hands of the local BNP.  
 There are several key stories which benefited the BNP in Nuneaton. For 
instance, in July 2004 trouble flared at a hostel in Nuneaton, in the Edward Street area 
which is home to a large Muslim population. This story was reported in the Heartland 
Evening News (Nuneaton News), who led with the front page headline ‘Violence 
erupts’ (Cooke 2004: 1). The article stated that the violence was race related, and that 
“violence erupted in a Nuneaton street as gangs of white and Asian youths clashed” 
(Cooke 2004: 1). There is some evidence that this story did exactly what the BNP 
hoped it would, because it was reported in a way that suggested the motive for the 
violence was racial, and it was mentioned and referred to as racial violence by voters 
of all persuasion which fed into the BNP’s agenda. For example, one BNP voter in 
response to the question do they remember any racial tension in the town replied; 
“Well I read the local papers. I do remember there was some trouble around Edward 
Street, whites and Asian gangs fighting. Does not surprise me really been building up 
for years. They don’t like us and we don’t like them” (O2OI4 2012). It was not just 
BNP voters who recalled this story. Indeed one former Labour voter stated when 
asked the same question replied: 
I do remember they had some problems at the Hostel [Edward Street] which 
was pretty nasty; it was racially motivated, but also a lot to do with young men 
who didn’t have a lot to do. A lot of things were not reported in the media, they 
didn’t want to escalate it, and it probably would have. But there is a Mosque in 
that area and I don’t know who started what (O2OI11 2013). 
 
The fact that the story proved to be factually incorrect and not racially motivated, and 
was reported so in a later edition of the Heartland Evening News, appears to be a 
detail lost on some voters. In fact, the violence erupted in relation to the placing of a 
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bail hostel in Edward Street, and trouble between residents of the hostel and members 
of the local community. It is evident that stories like these did have a lasting impact 
on some voters. 
 There were also key stories in the local press which highlighted the fear of 
terrorism and can be linked to the moral panic that had existed in the press and that 
espoused by politicians in the wake of terror attacks. These had developed in the post-
9/11 period, and increased the fear of attack for residents in Nuneaton. For example, 
the Heartland Evening News (Nuneaton News) in September 2004 led with the 
headlines ‘fighting terrorists’ (Harrison 2004a: 1) and ‘Mock terror on streets’ 
(Harrison 2004: 1). The story ‘Mock terror on streets’ related to a mock terrorist 
attack exercise which included a mock biological and nuclear attack. The aim of the 
exercise in Nuneaton, according to one local reporter, was to “ensure communities are 
protected” (Harrison 2004: 1). This of course only added to the growing fear and 
paranoia that had developed in the post-9/11 period. Also adding to this fear was the 
local Labour MP Bill Olner, who published a piece in the Heartland Evening News 
(Nuneaton News), titled ‘Terrorists won’t change our way of life’ (Olner 2007). As 
indicated in the chapter on Islamophobia, the BNP were also highlighting terrorism 
and the threat to the British way of life.     
In addition to extensive reporting on terrorism issues, the local press also 
highlighted a link between race, asylum and crime when reporting criminal acts in the 
town. For example, in April 2002 the Heartland Evening News (Nuneaton News) led 
with a front-page headline ‘Turk faces rape charges’ (Anon. 2002: 1). It also followed 
up this story with the front page headline ‘Asylum seeker on rape charge’ (Anon. 
2002a: 1). The story focused on the Turkish man’s asylum status, and the crime he 
was charged with. What is interesting is that there was nothing else reported on the 
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trial in the press and it appears the case never went to trial. There were also many 
other stories which linked immigration and asylum with particular criminal activities. 
For example, in 2004 the paper ran with the headlines ‘Immigrant jailed’ (Anon. 
2004: 2), ‘Albanians remanded’ in 2006 (Anon. 2005: 1-3), and in 2008 ‘Immigrant 
stole trainers’ (Anon. 2008a: 5). Negative stories linked to immigration, asylum and 
crime were not just highlighted in the Heartland Evening News (Nuneaton News), the 
Coventry Telegraph also carried negative stories which linked crime to immigrants 
and asylum seekers. One headline read, ‘Illegal immigrants jailed for 500K credit card 
scam’ (Anon. 2008) and another story linking crime and immigration led with the 
headline, ‘Police swoop on criminal underworld - A huge swoop involving police and 
immigration officers was launched in Coventry yesterday’ (Anon. 2006a). From the 
analysis of these reports in the Heartland Evening News (Nuneaton News) and the 
Coventry Telegraph, it is evident that asylum and immigration were more than often 
linked to crime. The obvious point needs to be made here. The fact that the accused 
was an immigrant was rarely pertinent to the case or story. Most crime in the town 
was committed by white males, yet these were not referred to as, white, British 
citizens. The outcome of this reporting was that it added to the BNP’s propaganda 
message which linked immigration and crime. Indeed, BNP leader Nick Griffin linked 
crime and immigration, attacking Pakistani immigrants and blaming them for certain 
crimes, stating, "you can't possibly separate the hard drugs trade from the question of 
Islam and particularly Pakistani immigration. Any working class area of Britain - in a 
multiracial area - the hard drugs problem is related to Islam and Pakistan" (Newsnight 
2008). The growing fashion for journalists to highlight their subject’s immigration 
status helped make the BNP’s propaganda more legitimate.  
John Grima  268 
 
Analysis of the local press also demonstrates that as well as linking asylum, 
immigration and crime, there were also many negative stories relating to immigration 
in general, in the Coventry Telegraph and the Heartland Evening News (Nuneaton 
News). For example, the Coventry Telegraph in 2002 reported on immigration with 
the headline, ‘Illegal immigrants keep rolling in’ reporting that, “more illegal 
immigrants arrived in Nuneaton and Bedworth in May than in the two previous 
months” (Anon. 2002). These reports were common in this period. In 2006 the 
Heartland Evening News reported on the influx of migrants from Eastern Europe with 
the headlines ‘UK facing east Europe crime wave’ (Anon. 2006: 2). In fact the 
Heartland Evening News printed many negative stories relating to immigration, such 
as ‘Immigration purge’, a story which highlighted the then MP for North 
Warwickshire Bill Olner’s support for the government’s tougher stance on 
immigration (Merriman 2008: 3), ‘Illegal immigrants caught’ (Anon. 2000: 3), and a 
front page headline which stated, ‘Three men arrested – Suspected illegal immigrants 
held after town centre chase’ (Harrison 2003: 1). What these stories demonstrate is 
that at a local level the press were using discourse which the BNP propaganda 
machine had been campaigning on, further sanitising the discourse of the far right 
party in Nuneaton.  
 This section has shown that the number of stories in the local press relating to 
the five key words, immigration, asylum, terrorism, Islam and Muslim, increased in 
the period between 2001 and 2007. Although they decreased in the year prior to the 
BNP’s success in 2008, the local media did have a tendency in the years leading up to 
2008 to report on the five key words in a negative manner. Moreover, this section has 
highlighted some of the newspaper reports published in the local press and the impact 
these have had on some voters in the town. As demonstrated, some voters referred 
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specifically to stories printed in the local newspapers, notably the violence at the 
Hostel in Edward Street. The survey of the local newspapers found that although it is 
impossible to measure the influence directly, the analysis does go some way in 
explaining how the local press sanitised and legitimised the BNP in the town. 
Basically the BNP’s message for some was no longer ‘unacceptable’ or seen as 
extremist. 
  
The National Hysteria  
This section will now focus on the role of national newspapers in validating the BNP 
and their discourse, and examine the impact of the national printed press on voters in 
Nuneaton. Specific reference will be made to the main tabloids read by respondents 
who completed the questionnaire, and responses from interviewees. Archival research 
revealed a large number of relevant stories in these target papers, The Sun, Daily Mail 
and Daily Express, which relate specifically to the key words. It will demonstrate that 
the reporting was positioned in a moral panic constructed around the fear of 
immigrants, Muslims and terrorism. It was this moral panic which benefited the BNP 
in 2008.    
When analysing the data produced by the questionnaire it showed that over 
half of BNP voters who responded said they read The Sun or Daily Mail (Table 35). 
Analysis of the qualitative data shows that BNP interviewee respondents stated they 
read the tabloid newspapers, and also shows that there were many stories mentioned 
by respondents. When asked whether the press or media influenced their vote, some 
respondents highlighted particular stories relating to anti-white racism, immigration, 
asylum and terrorism, with BNP voters, referring to particular press stories. These 
more than often highlighted the impact of fear and hysteria, led by parts of the 
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national tabloid press. For example, one BNP voter when asked if he could think of 
specific examples referred to the story in Leicester about China Pigs:  
It was all in the papers and everything. It was about some woman who had a pig 
in her window. She basically collected China pigs. And she put it in the 
window; maybe on purpose I don’t know that. But she was told by the police to 
remove the pot pig that had been in the window for years and years, she had 
collected them but because it had been offensive to the Islamic community, 
which had built up around her, which was a lot of Ugandan Muslims, and she 
refused to remove them she was taken to court. She was charged with some 
aggravated charge or something or other and she was fined. She was forced to 
remove the pigs. I mean she had lived there for years, she wasn’t a young 
woman and the Islamic community had actually come after her. But instead of 
saying hey it was not a problem and accepting her for what she was, they 
ignored that and she was prosecuted. But they won’t prosecute Islamic 
extremists for burning poppies and spitting on soldiers or dead soldiers coffins 
(O2OI1 2012). 
 
The story of the China Pigs first appeared in The Independent (Garner 1998) and 
appears to have been a media story, like many others, which have become engrained 
in the minds of some BNP voters (for example the Three Little Pigs Story deemed 
offensive to Muslims, Register 2008). Stories like these appeared alongside BNP 
headlines highlighting attacks on British culture and way of life, and reappeared and 
regurgitated in the growing anti-Muslim atmosphere, post 9/11. Indeed, evidence that 
elements of the press fuelled the fear of Islam was highlighted by the BNP voter 
above, who recalled a scare story in The Sun newspaper. He stated that: 
Islam spreads, and the very nature of Islam forces it to spread and control. I 
always remember about that time I came home on leave and I was thinking, no, 
no it won’t happen in this country and, um, the headlines in The Sun newspaper 
were, the local Islamic Community had burnt down some Sikh or non-Islamic 
picture houses in Bradford. This was because they were showing films which 
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were showing women’s legs and things like that, you know Indian dancing and 
Bollywood movies, that type of thing, and they burnt it down (O2OI1 2012) 
 
Not all respondents agreed with this view, but many highlighted what they believed 
was the media’s role in legitimising these views. For example, one local councillor 
responded by saying that “it was all to do with Muslims, you know the sort of media 
‘scaremongering’. It was very prevalent in the press at that time” (O2OI3 2012). This 
view was shared by one local Muslim community leader who stated that:  
The media, no matter what party it is, the media’s perception is we have to 
sell... part of the media perception is about going out and selling the best stories 
they can, what people are going to buy into. And people love the fights, the 
disagreements, the arguments, and that’s what’s quite interesting and quite sexy 
isn’t it. And people will buy it and hear that and the media have always played a 
part, always. So when it comes to voting, if it’s the BNP, they will put 
something in there, like Muslim men oppress their women and the media jumps 
at it, and the next thing you know votes go to the BNP (O2OI6 2013). 
 
It is important to understand how this fear has been fuelled by the media. It is 
the alleged, or for some actual, cultural difference between Islam and the West which 
has grown in the last few decades. This has been evident in the mainstream press 
since the late 1980s. For example, the former Daily Telegraph editor Charles Moore 
stated in an article in The Spectator (1991) that “Britain is basically English speaking, 
Christian and white, and if one starts to think it might become basically Urdu 
speaking and Muslim and Brown one gets frightened”, while authors Bernard Lewis 
(1990) and Samuel Huntington (1993) sought to place the gulf between the Western 
World and Islam world, which has often been referred to as the ‘clash of 
civilisations’.  
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The ‘clash of civilisations’ took on even more reverence in the immediate 
aftermath of 9/11 as many politicians, authors and the media, sort to justify their 
Islamophobia, and Kundnani states that “the ‘clash of civilisations’ takes the Islamic 
tradition to be inherently violent. It assumes that for the majority of Muslims over the 
centuries to the present day politics is simply the mechanical and repetitive expression 
of an underlying abstraction called ‘Islam’, pre-programmed for violence, fanaticism 
and despotism” (2008: 41). Indeed, there is a plethora of evidence in the press and in 
the political language of the last decade, that demonstrates that by 2008 Islamophobic 
sentiment had become the staple diet for many with stories in the tabloids such as 
“Ham Sarnie Muslims sue jail for 2M” (Daily Star 2007). Moreover, many the tabloid 
reports linked the words ‘Muslim’ and ‘terrorism’ in their headlines. For example, the 
Express newspaper headline relating to a 2008 terrorism trial stated that “Muslim 
terrorists wanted to inflict 'heavy casualties’” (Garnham 2008), and The Sun 
newspaper printed a story on 4 October 2007 with the headline, “4,000 are UK terror 
suspects: The number of suspected Muslim terrorists in the UK has multiplied nearly 
four times in seven months, security chiefs have been told”. Once again there is 
evidence of a link being established in the mainstream press between ‘Muslim’ and 
‘terrorist’. In fact, Kundnani argues that this had become the case since the early 
2000s, stating that, “anti-Islamic feeling is becoming increasingly acceptable across 
society, especially under the guise of the ‘war on terrorism’ and anti-Muslim elements 
in all communities have found renewed confidence in the wake of Bush’s ‘You are 
either with us or against us’ rhetoric” (2002: 74).  
There are examples of newspaper headlines which used fear and the negative 
portrayal of immigrants, asylum seekers and Muslims. For example, the Daily 
Express in 2007 published a front page story with the headline ‘Let illegal migrants 
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roam our streets’ (Whitehead 2007: 1) and in July 2005 led with a front-page headline 
which read ‘Bombers are all sponging asylum seekers’ (Anon. 2005b: 1). What the 
headline provides is evidence of a link between asylum, terrorism, Islam, and the 
abuse of the benefits system. Indeed, the leader of the council, Dennis Harvey, 
summed this up when discussing the rise in anti-Muslim sentiment stating, “the BNP 
were giving a very easy answer, backed up by certain newspapers, like The Sun and 
Daily Express and so on… I believe that newspapers like The Sun and Daily Express 
will be believed by people” (O2OI5 2013).  
It can be argued that tabloid headlines fuelled anti-Muslim sentiment. As the 
next article demonstrates, Islamophobia was widespread in the press at the time. For 
example, The Sun newspaper in February 2008 published a story which led with the 
headline ‘What a Burkha’ (Pascoe-Watson 2008: 1). It related to comments made by 
the Archbishop of Canterbury that Sharia law in Britain would be inevitable and 
stated that the “Archbishop wants Muslim Law in UK” (Pascoe-Watson 2008: 1). 
This article was published at a time when the BNP was clearly portraying itself as the 
only party who could deal with the ‘Muslim’ problem, and fed into the fear of Islam 
which developed in the wake of recent terrorist attacks, race riots and rising 
Islamophobia in the tabloid press. Indeed, one BNP voter referred specifically to the 
introduction of Sharia law stating that:  
Our government have introduced, or allowed the Muslim community to 
introduce a small part of Sharia Law. Now how can we have a parallel legal 
system? Even though at the moment it is small, when they grow the Islamic 
community are going to want more. How can we have a parallel legal system 
for one religion and a legal system for another? When by statute our system is a 
Church of England society how can we allow this other parallel legal system? 
(O2OI 2013). 
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Many within the right wing national press, through their reporting of the five 
themes, helped legitimise the BNP’s message. This was demonstrated to a large extent 
in the chapter on Islamophobia which showed how the press sanitised and legitimised 
the BNP’s anti-Muslim message. One such newspaper story was written by former 
BBC presenter Robert Kilroy-Silk (2004) who in an article for the Sunday Express 
headed, ‘We owe Arabs nothing’ and that Arabs are just “suicide bombers, limb-
amputators, women-repressors”. In his article, Kilroy-Silk offered a link between 
Arabs, terrorism, asylum and benefits stating that, “we have thousands of asylum 
seekers from Iran, Iraq, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and other Arab 
countries living happily in this country on social security” (Kilroy-Silk 2004). The 
story caused a great deal of controversy, and was widely discussed in the mainstream 
media in the wake of 9/11, at a time when Islam and terrorism were high up on the 
political agenda. However, the main tabloid newspapers reported Kilroy-Silk 
positively in the wake of the article, with the Mail Online referring to it as a “Simple 
Mistake” (Anon. 2004a). Another protagonist who is known for her writing on 
Islamist terrorism is Melanie Phillips. In fact, she wrote a prominent article in the 
Daily Mail in 2005 entitled ‘The lethal moral madness’. In the article she states that 
“London must no longer be Europe’s terror factory – the ‘Londonistan’ in which 
terrorists wanted in other countries are allowed to walk freely in our streets” (Phillips 
2005). Evidently, like the local press, the language used in this article was becoming 
more prevalent in the years following 9/11 and 7/7. Moreover, politicians were 
espousing similar sentiments in the press. For example, Boris Johnson writing for The 
Telegraph discussed issues relating to Britishness in the wake of 7/7. In his article he 
argued that “Imams will have to change their tune, and it is no use the Muslim 
Council of Great Britain endlessly saying that ‘the problem is not Islam’, when it is 
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blindingly obvious that in far too many Mosques you can find sermons of hate, and 
literature glorifying 9/11 and vilifying Jews” (Johnson 2005).  
The headlines and stories, like those mentioned above, fed into the fear which 
developed in the wake of the terrorist attacks (Refer to examples of fear that 
developed post-9/11 in chapter four). Indeed, interviewees were asked if the media 
coverage of immigration and Islamic terrorism were important, and they were 
forthright in their response, “yes definitely” (FG2P1 2012). In fact, one Labour voter 
stated, “Yes... I just read the headlines like most people. I don’t look too much into it 
and some of what I see disgusts me. So the media are important” (FG2P2 2012). This 
was a view shared by one Labour voter who took part in the focus group and argued 
that “there is conflation of being a Muslim and being a terrorist. Again going back to 
the media the two things are always talked about together. And again it is very easy to 
point a finger and blame them, blame the other rather than looking at ourselves, or 
any other part of politics or community” (FG1P3 2012). This sentiment fed into the 
narrative formed and promoted by the BNP in their political campaigns, linking 
Muslims and terrorism in a manner which suggested you cannot have one without the 
other, and proved beneficial when appealing to an element of voters in Nuneaton. 
There is evidence to support the view that the media were central in increasing 
the belief that all Muslims are terrorists or supporters of terrorism, which in turn fitted 
in with the BNP’s narrative. For example, the BNP campaign in the wake of the 2004 
Madrid bombings highlighted that the “BNP was right on the terrorism threat from 
Islamists” (BNP News 2004). Furthermore, newspapers such as The Express (online) 
ran stories with headlines such as, ‘It’s time for Muslims to denounce extremists’ 
(Forsyth 2008) and ‘Muslim terrorists wanted to inflict heavy casualties’ (Garnham 
2007). Forsyth in his article stated, “we non-Muslims are informed of bookshops rife 
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with hate material but never purged by the Muslims themselves; of Mosques where 
preachers speak only of hate against the rest of us but never cleansed; of social clubs 
where the young are indoctrinated and brainwashed on a diet of loathing of the non-
jihad world but never closed down” (Forsyth 2008). These stories fed into the hysteria 
and fear which had been developing since 9/11. Indeed, as shown in the chapter on 
Islamophobia, it was evident that the media have fuelled its rise, a view shared by 
Bunglawala who states that “the BNP has not exactly been hindered in its anti-
Muslim campaign by our tabloid papers with their regular diet of hysterical stories 
claiming that our national culture is under threat from minorities” (2006: 4). 
Evidently, the press were pandering to the BNP’s claims, and as Copsey argues, 
“where previously the BNP had been largely ignored or else denounced as fascist 
thugs, now it was becoming increasingly ‘normalised’ under the glare of media 
publicity” (Copsey 2008: 133).  
The examination of the data also demonstrates that it was not just reporting of 
terrorist attacks which fed into the anti-Muslim hysteria. In fact, as well as stories 
relating to terrorism there were also media stories prior to 9/11 which appeared to 
resurface continually and were linked to anti-white racism in the post-9/11 period. 
One story which made national headlines and was a spark leading up-to the riots in 
Oldham in 2001, was the attack on D-Day veteran Walter Chamberlain. This was 
fuelled by the BNP in Oldham who campaigned against anti-white racism, and the 
fear that parts of Britain were becoming no-go areas for whites, as well as BNP 
supporters openly organising boycotts of Asian owned shops (Harris 2001a). This 
story first broke in the local press but soon made national headlines. The result of this 
was that the BNP exploited this story, with Nick Griffin arguing that Oldham 
contained no-go areas for whites. In fact, this sentiment was evident in the response 
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given by BNP activist Mick Treacy who was standing for Oldham East in 2001; "If 
you are in the wrong place at the wrong time, you are going to get beaten up… I have 
no qualms against Asians or people of any colour. It's a matter of the country losing 
its identity" (cited in Vasagar et al. 2001). It once again increased the fear that Asian 
gangs were roaming around attacking whites, and was beneficial to the BNP’s 
propaganda machine. In fact, the BNP would utilise this when they stood for election 
in Oldham, and was no doubt beneficial in their rising support in the area. 
 
The media and immigration 
The analysis demonstrates that as the stories about Islam were making press headlines 
there was growing paranoia about immigration. Many respondents referred to specific 
newspaper stories about immigration when discussing terrorism issues and the media 
influence on their view. For example, one focus group participant when asked about 
the importance of the media in the success of the BNP in Nuneaton stated:  
 
The media have been important. You see a lot of these stories in The Sun or the 
Daily mail. There are a lot of stories about a hate filled Muslim Cleric and he 
has got a £2000 a month house on benefits. And everyone else is thinking I 
haven’t got a job, and he is inciting hatred and he is getting benefits and his rent 
paid by the government (FG2P3 2012) 
 
The reporting of immigration in the national press was also beneficial to the BNP in 
Nuneaton. This view was shared by one voter, who knew many people who had 
switched to the BNP. When asked why she thought people had done so, she stated 
that there was “a general feeling of economic distress in those areas were white 
working class people were feeling distressed. I mean the biggest problem was the 
media. I mean anybody who reads the Mail knows that their headlines are constantly 
John Grima  278 
 
talking about millions of immigrants coming in, immigrants taking our jobs and 
raping our women” (O2OI11 2013). The analysis of the data also demonstrates that 
some respondents felt that fear drove voters towards the BNP in Nuneaton, and it was 
the media who were the driving force in increasing that fear. This was reflected in the 
response from one BNP voter, who referred to the media when discussing what he 
viewed as a problem with immigration, and specifically illegal immigration:  
I have heard in the media and stuff that they are clamping down on people and 
you see on the news they have stopped so many people coming on the back of 
lorries and stuff, yet figures rise and rise and rise, by what I see with the amount 
immigrants who are taking our jobs. I mean a lot of labour is done by Polish 
people and that’s just ridiculous (O2OI7 2013). 
 
There have of course been a plethora of stories published in the tabloid press. 
For example, The Daily Mail published a story in 2007 entitled ‘Amnesty for up to 
165,000 asylum seekers’ (Slack 2007: 1), while The Sun (Anon. 2005c: 1) published a 
front page story entitled ‘Lawless Britain’, which included a section highlighting that 
Britain had one million illegal immigrants. Moreover, the press also played a part in 
creating the view that the then Labour government had lost control of immigration. It 
can be argued that the attacks on Labour’s immigration policy, and the fact that the 
BNP were making headway in relation to issue ownership of immigration, was 
important in galvanising BNP support prior to 2008. This is evident because media 
attacks on the Labour government would be beneficial to a far right party like the 
BNP who campaign on the central issue of immigration. Evidence of the media attack 
on Labour is highlighted in the press in the years prior to 2008. For example, in 
October 2007 The Sun newspaper led with the headline ‘Migrants? Labour haven’t a 
Clue!’ (Anon. 2007a: 1). The story focused on increasing immigrant numbers into the 
UK and argued that the Labour Party had lost control of immigration. A similar story 
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was published in the Daily Express with the headline ‘Immigrants: Now Brown wants 
more’ (Whitehead and Hall 2008), which attacked the then Labour Party’s leader 
Gordon Brown on Labour’s immigration policy.  
Analysis of the data shows that some respondents saw the media as the biggest 
proponent of fear and hysteria. Indeed, data collected for this research shows indicates 
that the press did drive some voters to support the BNP. For example, one respondent 
when asked where he came to his conclusions on immigration and why he supported 
the BNP replied: 
Well I suppose it is out of the newspapers, but I don’t buy them I just read them. 
I mean I read about people like Abu Hamza, you know he is a convicted 
criminal? He was locked up over here, and wanted in other countries, and we 
can’t extradite him cos of his human rights, you know he is a criminal, 
promoting terrorism, standing up for fundamentalists who want to kill innocent 
people over here? Then you know he shouldn’t have any f**king human rights 
(O2OI8 2013).  
 
This view was also shared by another interviewee who voted for the BNP, when 
asked the same question, stating: 
  
Yes… lots of stories in The Sun, about immigrants coming over... there was a 
Polish man who come over 5-6 years ago and he married an English woman but 
hasn’t been in employment for the last four years so he has just been taking the 
benefits from the government, um, and I think that’s just a load of crap… we 
shouldn’t just let anyone in (O2OI7 2013) 
 
The effect of the national media also highlights how the tabloid press linked 
crime to immigration, which mirrored the reporting in the local newspapers. The 
effect of this was evident during one interview, in which a BNP supporter directly 
linked crime and immigration, stating;  
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Obviously there are parts of Nuneaton that are bad like Camp Hill, I mean it 
goes for anywhere in the country though so, and again you read a lot in the 
newspapers that say 20-40% of these crimes are done by immigrants as well, 
um, and I think any crime that a foreign national does, comes over and commits 
a crime, disrespecting this country should be deported straight away (O2OI7 
2013). 
 
These views mirror stories published by the tabloids in the period before 2008. For 
example, a story was published in The Express with the headline ‘Immigrants bring 
more crime’ (Whitehead 2008: 1), and also one particular story in The Sun highlighted 
a murder committed by asylum seekers (Anon. 2005a: 1). The link was also 
highlighted by one Labour Party supporter who took part in the focus group, who 
when asked if the media was important, and whether the BNP used it to legitimise 
their views on immigration stated:  
Of course they did. This was clearly evident in their views towards immigration 
and is very much a BNP point of view. And again people tend to believe what 
they hear in the newspapers and the stories are not always right. Um, and 
certainly the BNP tapped into this. For example, the newspapers say that this 
crime relates to a certain race, or this guy was an asylum seeker, or this guy 
went to a Pakistani training school. People react to that (FG1P1 2012) 
 
What we can see is that the national press did, and still does impact on voters views, 
and could be argued that it acts as an ‘agenda setting’ tool which benefited the BNP. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the view that the BNP gained from media 
coverage was not just shared by analysts and respondents alike. BNP politicians also 
highlighted the role of the media in enhancing their cause. For example, the former 
deputy chairman of the BNP, Simon Darby, noted in 2003 that the media coverage of 
asylum was one of the most significant drivers of BNP support early on. Speaking in 
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The Guardian, Darby linked growing support and the success of the BNP directly to 
The Sun, Daily Mail and Daily Express, who were openly attacking asylum and 
immigration vociferously. In response to the question of legitimacy he stated “Oh 
yeah, totally. It has legitimised us. We are mainstream now", and when asked what 
the issues were on the doorstep Darby replied, 
Oh, the asylum issue… Definitely. They have been very badly affected by these 
asylum seekers and they don't like it at all… There's that old saying that you 
need quite a bit of luck in politics. Well we've had quite a bit of luck in that 
newspapers have become obsessed with the asylum issue. I have not been able 
to believe the Daily Express. Issue after issue, day after day, asylum this, 
asylum that. So we now have the luxury of banging on people's doors with the 
mainstream issue of the day (Darby cited in Addley 2003).  
 
This view was also shared by Nick Griffin who stated in 2003 that “one could today 
be forgiven for thinking that the editors of five of Britain’s national daily papers – The 
Star, The Times, Daily Mail, Daily Express and Daily Telegraph – had all suddenly 
become BNP converts” (cited in Copsey and Macklin 2011: 85). Although these 
statements were made in 2003, there is no evidence to suggest that over the next few 
years the BNP leadership has changed its opinions about how the tabloid press has 
contributed to furthering its cause. The influence of the national media was also 
demonstrated in the chapter on immigration, which highlighted the speech by the 
former Prime Minister Gordon Brown, during which he stated famously that he 
wanted “British jobs for British Workers” (Brown 2007). This story made all the 
major newspapers and was broadcast repeatedly on the news, and validated the BNP 
argument, and it was widely reported the party had previously used this slogan in the 
BNP’s campaigns. In fact, the BNP made use of the slogan in the aftermath of the 
speech, as was seen on the BNP Truth Truck, which was used in the campaign of 
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2008 and 2009 (see Appendix VI), and BNP leafleting campaigns (Appendix IV: 
Leaflet g. and h.).  
 From this analysis of the tabloid press it is evident that the media did help 
legitimise the discourse and policies of the BNP. Evidently, not all BNP voters read 
the tabloids covered in this analysis, however, those who took part and stated they did 
read the tabloids were influenced by the newspapers reporting on the five themes. 
They recalled newspaper stories and some voters referenced them when justifying 
their vote. Therefore, it can be concluded from the analysis of the national press that 
the tabloids were influential because they did, through salience of issues and their 
discourse, sanitise the BNP’s message in the eyes of some voters. The analysis of the 
national press offers an interesting insight into media reporting of the five themes. 
 
Conclusion 
What this chapter has shown is that although the media may not directly legitimise the 
far right through positive reporting, they helped create a negative view of issues 
relating to immigration and asylum more salient to the public, which benefited the 
BNP in 2008. It has shown that the newspapers at both a local and national level have 
made scapegoats of immigrants and asylum seekers, and to a large extent fuelled 
rising anti-Muslim sentiment which benefited the BNP in Nuneaton. The press in 
particular, provided legitimacy for BNP arguments. Moreover, by focusing on 
particular issues the press did, in the case of some newspapers, unintentionally open 
up a political space for the BNP, and steered some fearful voters into their arms. 
These findings correlate with the conclusion offered by Copsey and Macklin who 
state that, “there can be little doubt that media reproduction of stereotypical bias 
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towards certain ethnic minority groups, in particular through print journalism, has 
legitimised the BNP message” (2011: 99). 
  The findings in this chapter also show that elements of the media used moral 
panic surrounding fear of immigrants, Muslims and terrorism which benefited the 
BNP in places like Nuneaton in 2008. As analysis of the local press indicated, stories 
relating to the five themes increased dramatically prior to the success in Nuneaton, 
and at a national level moral panics relating to immigration and terrorism were the 
staple diet of the mainstream newspapers. Indeed, it demonstrated how tabloids 
fuelled anti-Muslim sentiment, and this increased hysteria and fear of all things 
Muslim in the post-9/11 period.  
Like previous studies of the media impact, it has not been possible to 
‘measure’ influence however this analysis has shown that the press through the 
salience of issues and discourse, in relation to the five themes, has impacted on voter 
choice. This was evident through the analysis of the qualitative data, which 
highlighted that particular newspapers and stories indicated that voters’ views were 
swayed and in some circumstances confirmed. But there is clearly a correlation 
between media hostility to immigrants, asylum seekers, and the rise of Islamophobia 
within the press, even if it is difficult to establish causation. 
 Finally, it is also worth noting that although there has been a great deal of 
coverage on the main themes, notably immigration and asylum, in the press at both a 
local and national level as demonstrated in this chapter, it has not been to the benefit 
of the BNP in the long term. In fact, issue ownership was never really established due 
to the reality that the media never really endorsed the BNP or its leadership in the way 
that some parts of the media have now endorsed issue ownership to the United 
Kingdom Independence Party, and its current leader Nigel Farage. Although the BNP 
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benefited from the convergence of views expressed in the media, and this evidently 
assisted breakthrough in 2008, only ‘ownership’ of immigration can lead to 




































The objective of this thesis was to conduct a localised case study of early twenty-first 
century British National Party (BNP) electoral success, helping to test the credibility 
of the existing academic literature on far right breakthrough. In this respect, the 
research identified and analysed the key reasons behind the success of the BNP in the 
2008 local elections in Nuneaton. Data produced by focus groups, interviews and a 
questionnaire captured opinions of voters, politicians and community representatives 
as to the reasons for this 2008 victory. These opinions were supplemented by archival 
work, revealing socioeconomic data and media influences. 
 The findings of this Nuneaton case study support the existing literature to the 
extent that the main variables identified from the literature review all had a significant 
impact on this particular election. In this respect, the Nuneaton research suggests that 
any explanation of early twenty-first century BNP electoral breakthrough should be 
multivariable in nature. Yet, the Nuneaton case study produced more nuanced 
findings. Particular variables were more significant than others. Immigration, for 
example, stands out as the most prominent factor of influence. In addition, the role of 
the media, the press in particular, was of great significance. The media was important 
in sanitising and legitimising negative stereotypes of immigrants, asylum seekers and 
Muslims. This case study also suggests that Islamophobia should be placed high up in 
any hierarchy of explanatory factors. Indeed, Islamophobia was an important part of 
the jigsaw and conflates with a number of variables tested in this thesis. In sum, the 
findings of this research suggest that the cause of the BNP’s 2008 Nuneaton victory is 
multi-variant, but immigration and Islamophobia are the most significant drivers. 
Islamophobia should be given more emphasis than is often the case in the existing 
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academic literature on recent far right breakthrough, whereby socioeconomics was 
only important when conflated with immigration and Islamophobia. 
Chapter three tested the main social and economic explanatory factors 
highlighted in the existing academic literature. Socioeconomics was a key influence 
galvanising support for the BNP in Nuneaton. BNP campaigners took advantage of 
‘fertile ground’ related to social and economic problems in the town. Yet, the research 
undertaken suggests that this particular variable was only an indirect or underlying 
variable in explaining the BNP’s victory. Socioeconomic analysis certainly assisted 
profiling BNP voters, but it was limited in its actual determination of why people vote 
for this party, and therefore cannot alone offer an explanation as to why the BNP were 
successful in 2008. This study therefore suggests that it is only when other factors, 
notably immigration, Islamophobia and disaffection combine with social and 
economic issues that the BNP were able to take advantage of this ‘fertile ground’. 
Analysis in this chapter found that the BNP achieved electoral success in two 
of the most deprived wards in Nuneaton. In this respect, this thesis differs from 
research findings from other locations which argued that the deprivation hypothesis 
could not be applied. This study found that in Barpool and Camp Hill there are 
particular problems including poverty, high unemployment, low quality public 
housing, and the ward shows signs of neglect. Yet, amongst BNP supporters the 
economy was consciously not the most important reason why they voted for the party 
they did. These socioeconomic factors only come to the fore when linked with 
immigration issues. In Nuneaton, despite the relevance of the deprivation hypothesis, 
socioeconomics are only relevant in a multivariate context.  
Chapter three also analysed age and education in the case study location. It 
found that age did not really offer any real correlation; however, the analysis of 
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education indicated that there was some correlation between the level of education 
and support for the BNP. The largest group of BNP voters comprise members of the 
electorate who have relatively low educational levels. This correlates with the 
findings from previous analysis of far right success in Britain, showing that the BNP 
won more votes in the wards with a working age population, who have fewer than 5 
GCSEs or equivalent (John et al. 2006: 15). The analysis of the data indicated that the 
wards where the BNP were successful, and had councillors elected, are in the bottom 
0.5 per cent when looking at deprivation linked to education, skills and training. This 
shows that education was a significant socioeconomic determinant, and can be viewed 
as an indicator as to where BNP support was the strongest, although it cannot alone 
explain the BNP’s success. 
 The examination of immigration in chapter four demonstrates the significance 
of this variable. Indeed, immigration stands as the most prominent factor in the 2008 
case study. Immigration was central in explaining the BNP breakthrough, but again 
rather than being a single issue, immigration acted as the catalyst in the ‘fertile 
environment’ of multiple explanations which existed in the first decade of the twenty-
first Century. 
In Nuneaton, the BNP exploited growing negative perceptions of immigrants, 
a phenomenon very much evident in the previous literature. Immigration became an 
important electoral issue at both a national and local level, and BNP voters suggested 
they had lost trust in the mainstream parties’ ability to deal with what they view as an 
‘immigration problem’. The analysis of the data also demonstrated that immigration 
was a 'national issue', rather than being local in origin. This study suggests that the 
politicisation of race in the national arena filtered down to the local arena. The study 
found only limited evidence of racial tension and violence. It was more the perception 
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of racial tension that exists which is greater than the actuality which had an impact on 
electoral behaviour.  
The research also indicated that BNP voters, in particular, thought that the 
indigenous white majority British were suffering at the expense of immigrants. The 
BNP's message that the party would act to redress this suffering was one argument 
BNP voters particularly responded to. This thesis highlighted how a sense of white 
resentment developed, which increased the anti-immigrant sentiment amongst voters, 
and immigration was linked with other factors such as, Islamophobia, 
socioeconomics, and the media. The result was that the BNP in Nuneaton were 
successful in 2008 with their brand of anti-immigrant politics.  
Chapter five found that the BNP’s success cannot really be understood or 
analysed without examining the effects of Islamophobia. Previous literature has 
suggested that the impact of Islamophobia should not be overstated. However the 
findings of this research indicate the opposite. Islamophobia is an equally important 
factor and should be analysed as part of a multivariate analysis of recent far right 
breakthrough. 
The BNP were able to attract voters by highlighting the segregation which 
they believe exists in Nuneaton, and amplified the division specifically between the 
‘Muslim’ and ‘white’ community. It found that voters of all persuasions held the 
belief that the Muslim community do not, and are not willing to mix with their ‘white’ 
neighbours, and this benefited the BNP, who utilised fear of the ‘other’ to attract 
wider support. The analysis of Islamophobia in this thesis also demonstrated that 
some voters in the white community felt isolated and separated from the Muslim 
community. In 2008 this benefited the BNP who propagated a narrative on Islamic 
segregation. The findings show that in comparison with other locations where the 
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BNP were successful, such as Burnley, the geographical concentration of the Muslim 
population can help explain why the BNP were successful, and can be applied in 
Nuneaton. The BNP in 2008 were successful in predominantly white wards that 
bordered these locational clusters of the Muslim community. 
The examination of Islamophobia in this thesis also highlighted the impact of 
fear, a fear which was no doubt amplified by the media in the wake of major Islamist 
terrorist attacks. As with immigration, national security issues were more important 
than any local threat. The major terrorist events including 9/11, 7/7, and the 
subsequent ‘War on Terror’, were pivotal for the BNP in 2008. The BNP made 
political progress by utilising the rising fear and scaremongering, following the terror 
attacks and threats from Islamist groups. The data highlighted a correlation between 
increasing Islamophobia in the post-9/11 period, rising media and political anti-
Muslim rhetoric, and the BNP breakthrough in 2008. Anti-Muslim campaigns 
resonated with BNP voters, and fed into the fear of Islamist terrorism and Islam in 
general. Indeed, examination of the interview data indicated that BNP supporters view 
Muslims and Islam with suspicion and fear. The thesis also observed that the language 
and scaremongering fuelled this fear. Islam and Muslims were viewed in an extremely 
negative manner, and in the first decade of the twenty-first Century the BNP tapped 
into this fear.  
 The findings in chapter six indicated the significance of political opportunity 
structures (POS) in the BNP's success in Nuneaton. The research findings on this 
variable broadly support the position found in the previous literature. The thesis found 
that factors within POS contributed to the explanation for the BNP's success. Again, 
however these alone cannot explain why the BNP were successful in Nuneaton.  
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 Political opportunity structures (POS), disaffection and disillusion can have an 
impact on the level of support for the far right and this was evident in Nuneaton. For 
instance, convergence fuelled the sense that the parties are ‘all the same’, and this 
increased disaffection, disillusionment and mistrust of the mainstream political 
parties. The chapter also highlighted how BNP voters believe that the mainstream 
parties are not competent when it comes to dealing with issues relating to immigration 
and corruption.  
Chapter six further demonstrated that the Labour Party was complacent in 
2008, and this was important for the BNP in winning the competition for votes in 
Nuneaton. This was a significant factor, showing that the mainstream parties did not 
do enough during their campaign to counter the message coming from the BNP. This 
thesis has also shown that the established political parties failed to respond to the 
BNP’s electoral challenge. This was apparent in the level of campaigning, the 
selection of candidates, and the level of ignorance held by the incumbents of the 
BNP’s threat in 2008. As indicated in the chapter, these findings validate the 
explanation offered in the literature by Rhodes (2009 30-31) and Wilks-Heeg (2008: 
18), who both highlighted the demise of local politics, and the failure of the 
mainstream parties to act as credible opposition.  
The thesis also tested the impact of low turnout, and the nature of the electoral 
system as an explanation for the BNP’s breakthrough. However, the nature of the 
system in the 2008 election was found to be irrelevant, and the findings from this 
study suggest that the BNP won two seats in Nuneaton despite, not because of, the 
first-past-the-post system. Concerning turnout, the findings indicate that this was of 
limited relevance in the success of the BNP in 2008. In fact, this thesis has shown that 
the turnout in 2012 was over 10 per cent lower than in 2008.  
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 Chapter seven was concerned with the modernisation of the BNP and its role 
in their success in 2008. Examination found that, again, modernisation independently 
cannot explain the breakthrough for the BNP in Nuneaton, but it can help understand 
how the BNP took advantage of the political environment by becoming, at least 
publicly, more moderate and offering a broad popular appeal. The BNP managed to 
secure an air of respectability for some voters. The BNP concealed parts of their 
ideology and normalised the party’s image, and in this respect the BNP copied 
elements of the French Front National strategy and created a very British version of a 
nationalist party with popular appeal. 
Further analysis in chapter seven draws attention to how the local BNP 
candidates in Nuneaton were able to take advantage of an opening in the political 
space by becoming more ‘acceptable’ to parts of the electorate. They took advantage 
of ‘limited’ legitimacy in an environment where elements of the electorate were 
concerned with issues such as immigration and Islamophobia. It has also shown that 
Nick Griffin, during the mid-2000s, succeeded in his attempt to ‘normalise’ the party, 
and the policy of targeting local elections, and campaigning using local ‘respectable’ 
candidates was beneficial. As this thesis has demonstrated, the BNP in Nuneaton were 
successful in that their candidate in Barpool, Martyn Findley, has local roots in the 
community, and is a ‘respectable’, well-known local driving instructor, with many 
links to that local community. Indeed, like Rhodes (2009), this study has highlighted 
the importance for the BNP in fighting campaigns on local issues, and utilising 
community based activism. The case study, in this respect, very much supports what 
has been written previously on the modernisation of the BNP. 
Finally in chapter eight attention focused on analysing the role of the media at 
both a national and local level, and the significance of the media in the success of the 
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BNP in Nuneaton. What this chapter showed is that, although the media may not 
directly legitimise the far right through positive reporting, they were complicit, if not 
purposely, in fuelling BNP support. They were engaged (directly and indirectly) in the 
cultivation of a negative view of immigrants and asylum seekers. The press also 
increased the salience of these issues amongst the wider public, as well as 
significantly influencing anti-Muslim sentiment. Indeed, it demonstrated how the 
reporting of newspapers, at a local and national level, made scapegoats of immigrants 
and asylum seekers, and were also central in constructing a link between anti-Muslim 
sentiment and immigration.  
Archival research of the Heartland Evening News (Nuneaton News) 
demonstrated that between 1999 and 2001 reporting of the five key words, 
immigration, asylum, terrorism, Islam, Muslim increased dramatically. This included 
many negative stories relating to immigrants and asylum seekers, as well as some 
stories relating to the BNP prior to their success which could be construed as neutral 
or indeed positive. Therefore, the press provided legitimacy for BNP arguments, and 
in the case of some newspapers, they unintentionally opened up a ‘narrow’ political 
space for the BNP. Indeed, the analysis of the qualitative data highlighted that 
particular tabloid newspapers ‘influenced’ voters, and in some circumstances 
confirmed their views. This was evident in the tabloid newspaper headlines 
highlighted in this thesis, which demonstrated how the press used fear and the 
negative portrayal of immigrants, asylum seekers and Muslims. This does compare 
with the explanations in the literature that media reporting has legitimised the BNP 
message (Copsey and Macklin 2011: 99; Copsey 2008: 133; Eatwell 2003; 61).  
There is evidently a correlation between media hostility to immigrants, asylum 
seekers, the rise of Islamophobia, and the BNP success in the first decade of the 
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twenty-first Century, even if it is difficult to establish causation. It is the difficulty in 
establishing causation that has often meant the media have only warranted a brief 
mention in the literature. However, as this thesis has shown, any study of the far right 
breakthrough should test this explanation, and its importance.  
Although the BNP benefited in 2008 from anti-immigrant sentiment, rising 
Islamophobia, a disenchanted electorate, and the media’s negative coverage of these 
issues, it has not been to the benefit of the BNP in the long term. One reason 
highlighted is in relation to issue ownership of immigration; in fact issue ownership 
was never really established by the BNP or its leadership. For instance, the media 
never endorsed ownership of the immigration issue for the BNP, like they have for the 
Conservative party, or in a similar way they have now endorsed issue ownership to 
the United Kingdom Independence Party, and its current leader Nigel Farage. 
Moreover, in Nuneaton, as in many other locations where they experienced a 
breakthrough, such as Burnley and Stoke, they failed to build on their ‘limited’ 
legitimacy and their election successes once in local government. There were of 
course many reasons for this failure in Nuneaton, including the resignation of BNP 
councillor Darren John Haywood in Camp Hill, who resigned within six months after 
failing to attend any council meetings, and BNP infighting which led to Martyn 
Findley leaving the BNP and becoming an Independent in 2011. The BNP councillors 
failed to embed themselves in the council and develop any kind of working 
relationship with other councillors. Moreover, the Labour Party was able to re-engage 
with some supporters who switched to the BNP, and the BNP imploded nationally 
which became evident in growing internal tensions, infighting, corruption and a 
‘failure’ to campaign in a similar manner witnessed in 2008. If the BNP’s 2006 
success of 33 local election victories was the BNP’s ‘finest hour’ (Copsey 2008: 80), 
John Grima  294 
 
then the 2008 success in Nuneaton represented the ‘intermission’ of a party which 
saw its support collapse from 2010 onwards. In fact the BNP have now retreated back 
into the abyss, with the final sign of the demise of the party the removal of Griffin, 
who after standing down as leader and handing over the role to Adam Walker, was 
expelled from the party on the 1
st
 October 2014. 
Finally, it is evident that some scholars have referred to those who support the 
far right as ‘angry white men’ (Goodwin 2011). This research has found that although 
some BNP voters were evidently angry in their responses, this anger was based on 
fear. Rather than angry white men, they were ‘fearful’ white men. There is a fear 
amongst those who were questioned for this research; a fear for their jobs, a fear for 
their way of life, a fear for their children, a fear for their community, and a fear that 
things are moving and changing so fast that they are losing out in the global economic 
race. It has also been shown in this study that the BNP benefited from moral panic 
over Islamic terrorism. There was evidence of this fear in the wake of Islamist 
terrorist attacks, which was amplified by the media and politicians alike. The effect of 
this was that some voters in Nuneaton viewed Muslims and Islam with suspicion and 
fear, and this fear was important in their voting behaviour. It is clear that it was the far 
right, notably in Nuneaton the BNP in 2008, who tapped into these fears and attracted 
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Please find below the details of interviewees and focus group participants. FG1 refers to 
participants who took part in the first focus group. This included four participants who are 
numbered one to four accordingly, followed by the year. FG2 refers to participants who took 
part in focus group two and these are numbered one to three accordingly, followed by the 
year. The one-to-one interviews will be referred to as O2O. The code will begin O2O, 
followed by the interview number and the year they were interview. For example, O2OI1 




Focus group 1 Participant 1 BNP voter – FG1P1 2012 
Focus group 1 Participant 2 Labour – Independent voter – FG1P2 2012 
Focus group 1 Participant 3 Labour voter – FG1P3 2012 
Focus group 1 Participant 4 Labour voter – FG1P4 2012 
Focus group 2 Participant 1 Labour voter – FG2P1 2012 
Focus group 2 Participant 2 Labour voter – FG2P2 2012 
Focus group 2 Participant 3 Labour/Independent voter – FG2P3 2012 
One-to-one BNP Voter Interviewee 1 – O2OI1 2012 
One-to-one BNP Voter/Member/Activist Interviewee 2 – O2OI2 2012 
One-to-one Local Labour Councillor Interviewee 3– O2OI3 2012 
One-to-one BNP Voter interviewee 4 – O2OI4 2012 
One-to-one Local Labour Councillor (Leader) Interviewee 5 – O2OI5 2013 
One-to-one Local Muslim Community Leader Interviewee 6 – O2OI6 2013 
One-to-one BNP voter Interviewee 7 – O2OI7 2013 
One-to-one BNP voter Interviewee 8 – O2OI8 2013 
One-to-one BNP voter Interviewee 9 – O2OI9 2013 
One-to-one Local MP Interviewee 10 – O2OI10 2013 
One-to-one Labour/Conservative voter Interviewee 11 – O2OI11 2014 
One-to-one BNP voter Interviewee 12 – O2OI12 2014 
One-to-one Conservative voter Interviewee 13 – O2OI13 2014 
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